DISARMAMENT

A periodic review by the United Nations

Volume XV, Number 4 1992

Post-'92 Helsinki

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United Nations

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Post-'92 Helsinki

Towards an Operational Institution for Comprehensive Security

Victor-Yves Ghebali

Not long after the signing of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (21 November 1990), which proclaimed the end of the cold war and institutionalized the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), it became apparent that the CSCE could not serve as the instrument for managing the changes it had, in conjunction with the multiplier effect of *perestroika*, helped to bring about on the continent. There were two basic reasons for this: first, the powers it had been given were more declaratory than operational; second, it had to contend with competition—formerly unthinkable—from other international institutions, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Community, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe, not to mention the United Nations at the height of its prestige. After a year and a half of uncertainty and impotence, the CSCE now seems to be on the verge of political rebirth as a result of its fourth "Follow-up Meeting" and its third summit, held at Helsinki. Entitled "The Challenges of Change", the Final Document[1] adopted in the Finnish capital on 10 July 1992 shows how the CSCE has adapted to the true parameters of post-communist Europe, no longer mythical ones, as it did in the Charter of Paris. In the specific sector of security, it brings in three new elements: a

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definition of the concept of comprehensive security, attribution to the CSCE of operational means for conflict prevention, management and settlement, and the establishment of a Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC). (For excerpts from the Helsinki Document pertaining to the FSC, see page 172)

The Concept of Comprehensive Security

From the beginning the CSCE, to its credit, had addressed security from a unified global perspective without, however, specifying it explicitly. The Helsinki Document has filled this vacuum by referring expressly to the concept of "comprehensive security". From an analysis of the full text, the following three essential elements stand out.

In the first place, security must be *cooperative*. Starting from the premise of equal rights of States in security matters and of equal respect for their interests, the CSCE believes that no country should strengthen its own security (particularly through the use or the threat of force) to the detriment of other States. In direct application of this idea, the decision was taken to establish, as discussed below, the Forum for Security Cooperation, one of whose functions is to serve as a framework for ongoing cooperation and dialogue.

Secondly, the many facets of security are *indivisible*. The Helsinki Document directly links: (*a*) international peace-keeping to respect for human rights, pluralistic democracy and the rule of law; (*b*) security and stability to the development of economic, environmental, scientific and technical cooperation as well as social justice; (*c*) political pluralism to the functioning of the market economy; and (*d*) the stability of democratic societies to cooperation against terrorism, drug trafficking and other international organized crime.

Thirdly, security implies flexible global, regional, subregional and transfrontier *linkages*. Recalling that since 1973 it had represented a bridge between the security of

Europe (now geopolitically defined "from Vancouver to Vladivostok") and global security, the CSCE declared that from now on, it saw itself as a "regional arrangement" in terms of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, opening the way to direct collaboration with the United Nations in the prevention, management and settlement of conflicts. Similarly, it considered that the development of security in the Mediterranean region as well as changes in prevailing economic, social and political conditions there had a direct bearing on the stability of Europe. Hence the decision by the CSCE States to strengthen their multilateral relations, insignificant up to that point, with the "non-participating Mediterranean States" (NPMS)—Israel and the Arab countries of the region—and to link Mediterranean issues more closely with CSCE objectives in the future. The Helsinki Document makes no mention of even the remote prospect of a conference on security and cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM),[2] modelled on the CSCE. It contents itself with announcing the holding, in 1993, of a modest "Mediterranean seminar", open to NPMS, the closing document of which will not contain binding commitments for the countries of the Helsinki process. Finally, it should be noted that the CSCE has broken new ground here by including subregional and transfrontier cooperation (on the national, regional, local and community level) in the problems of security—the first because it presents the advantage of promoting the development of "pluralistic structures of stability",[3] and the second because it makes a contribution to overcoming socio-economic disparities, strengthening ethnic understanding and fostering good-neighbourly relations among States and peoples.

New CSCE Operational Means

Unlike the drafters of the 1990 Charter of Paris (who had believed that, solely because of the downfall of communism, Europe was becoming irreversibly "democratic",

"peaceful" and "united"), the drafters of the Helsinki Document 1992 have scarcely given way to euphoria. Though emphasizing that Europe is experiencing a period of rich opportunity and promise, they recognize, none the less, that it is, in fact, in an unstable and insecure phase marked by economic decline, social tension, aggressive nationalism, intolerance, xenophobia, ethnic conflicts and the use of force to achieve the objectives of political hegemony and territorial expansion. They consider that the CSCE, which had been a tool for the peaceful transformation of Europe, should now become a tool for managing the effects—both positive and negative—of that transformation. Consequently, they adopted specific provisions to make the CSCE operational, on the one hand through strengthening its existing structures, and on the other through adding new instruments for the purpose of crisis prevention and management, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The Helsinki Document 1992 confirms the inevitable rise of the Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) within the decision-making structure of the CSCE. As the agent of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the CSO is now responsible for the supervision, direction and coordination of all activities of the process, and has been granted new powers giving it a central role in early warning and political management of crises, peace-keeping operations and peaceful settlement of disputes. The CSO has the power of sending rapporteur missions or fact-finding missions and of undertaking good offices, mediation or conciliation activities. In short, the Helsinki Document provides for the integrated use of the various instruments and mechanisms available to the CSCE under the authority of the CSO, and especially of its chairman-in-office. The latter is now entitled to secure help from limited groups of States (a significant development in a process which, until now, has prided itself on making use of only plenary working bodies), from "special representatives"

(as is the United Nations practice) and also from his immediate predecessor and successor, who would form a troika with him similar to the one operating within the European Community.

The two major innovations decided upon in Helsinki are to establish the post of High Commissioner for National Minorities (an idea proposed by the Netherlands) and to authorize the CSCE to engage in peace-keeping operations.

Appointed for a three-year term renewable only once, the High Commissioner has been conceived as an instrument for averting a particular kind of conflict (involving national minorities) at the earliest possible stage. His role is to sound a very early warning and, if need be, start very early action when national minorities are caught up in tensions which seem to him likely to degenerate into a conflict that might affect the peace, stability and relations among States in the CSCE geopolitical area. As part of his mandate, the High Commissioner is expected to gather information on collective situations (but not individual ones) relating to national minorities, from whatever source (including the media and non-governmental organizations), and after consulting with the CSO, to go to the scene to obtain firsthand information, offer his unofficial good offices as needed to the parties directly involved, and make recommendations to the CSO that will allow him to help the parties resolve their differences. The Netherlands idea of authorizing him to receive "petitions" was not approved; however, the information that the parties directly concerned are authorized to transmit to him in support of their position may include reports on breaches of CSCE commitments concerning the protection of national minorities. The High Commissioner's basic task is nevertheless to warn the CSO of a potential risk of conflict, or of the fact that a given situation is in the process of degenerating into a conflict, or that it has gone beyond his own capacity to act. This arrangement remains to be tested in practice, but it already

clearly indicates that the CSCE is determined to develop a capacity to identify the root causes of crises and to envisage remedies before they become uncontrollable. Furthermore, the agreed arrangement has the advantage of allowing the CSCE to confront the problem of national minorities other than from the sole (and thus far inconclusive) perspective of human rights.

The inclusion of *peace-keeping* in the political panoply of the Helsinki process is much more far-reaching, in the sense that it transforms it into a truly operational institution. The CSCE has endorsed three of the major principles underlying United Nations peace-keeping operations, namely: that such operations must be non-coercive, must be carried out impartially and must have the prior consent of the parties directly concerned. On this last point, it has been agreed that a peace-keeping operation can be decided upon only if the parties concerned have demonstrated their effective good will—particularly by cooperating with the CSCE and by entering into a process of peaceful settlement. The Helsinki Document 1992 is crystal-clear on this point: any peace-keeping operation must be conceived as a *complement*, of necessarily limited duration, to a peaceful settlement process—and in no instance as a substitute for such a settlement. Three specific conditions have been set as prerequisites for sending any CSCE contingents to the scene: the existence of an effective cease-fire, a written agreement between the CSCE and the parties concerned, and guarantees by the parties regarding the safety of the personnel involved in the operation.

The Helsinki Document defines peace-keeping operations in United Nations terms: any dispatch of civilian and/or military personnel in whatever numbers and under whatever arrangement (observer or monitoring missions and troop-deployment missions), with a view to supervising or ensuring the observance of a cease-fire, monitoring troop

withdrawals, helping maintain public order, providing humanitarian and medical assistance, and aiding refugees. The salient fact to be underscored is that such operations can come into play following *intra*-State as well as *inter*-State conflicts occurring in the CSCE geopolitical area.

The CSCE can engage in such operations at the request of one or more of its participating States. The decision is to be taken (by consensus) by the Council or the Committee of Senior Officials—the latter, however, being responsible for the overall political supervision and control of the operations—with the benefit of assistance as needed from the Vienna Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). Any CSCE State will have the right to take part in peace-keeping operations so long as its participation is not rejected by one of the parties concerned. The cost of the operations will be apportioned among all CSCE States according to the regular scale of assessments.

It will be noted that the CSCE may also decide, depending on the circumstances or the nature of the problem, not to conduct a peace-keeping operation itself but to turn to the United Nations. It also has latitude in calling upon NATO, the European Community, WEU or even the Commonwealth of Independent States to help it carry out a peace-keeping operation. It proved rather difficult to adopt this provision because of a difference between France and the United States which can be summed up as follows: unlike the United States, France wanted to keep NATO from becoming the prime military arm of the CSCE. The Helsinki compromise gives it a large measure of satisfaction. The understanding is that when calling upon an outside organization, the CSCE will take decisions on a case-by-case basis and after consultation with the States participating in the organization concerned, and not with the latter as a body. Furthermore, the CSCE will continue to direct the

operation, and any CSCE State may take part in it even if it is not a member of the organization asked to help.

In other words, the CSCE has taken up the idea (once put forward by NATO) that the management of post-communist Europe demands the concerted action of a set of interlocking European and transatlantic institutions. The Helsinki Document confirms this viewpoint by providing for the development of practical cooperation between the CSCE and NATO, the European Community, WEU, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).[4] The provisions for collaboration in the field of peace-keeping obviously go beyond a simple measure of rationalization: the collaboration lays the groundwork for operational complementarity, which, if it actually comes about, could help Europe to break out of the vicious circle that has been paralysing it since the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

The Forum for Security Cooperation

The Helsinki Document may be said to have opened up the realm of disarmament to the CSCE: it can be credited with having put an end to the unfortunate dichotomy that had, since 1973, assigned the negotiation of conventional disarmament (mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR, later CFE)) to a few outside bodies restricted to the countries belonging to the military alliances, and relegated the CSCE to the negotiation of confidence-building measures and confidence- and security-building measures (CBMs/CSBMs). The basic decision taken here is the one to establish a Forum for Security Cooperation in Vienna, beginning on 22 September 1992. Open to all CSCE States without distinction, the Forum will, under a Programme for Immediate Action, exercise three

functions: negotiation, ongoing dialogue and reflection on the theme of conflict prevention.

The Forum's first function is to negotiate specific new conventional disarmament measures, provisions harmonizing the obligations assumed under various international instruments in this area, bearing in particular on exchange of information, verification and force levels, as well as new CSBMs and "stabilization measures" (in other words, constraining-type CSBMs), with a view to introducing more transparency in the military field, especially with regard to modernization of the equipment and weapons for the forces of active and non-active units.

The Forum's second function is to provide a framework for consultation, cooperation and ongoing dialogue on security questions—such as the predictability of military programmes and capabilities, the non-proliferation and transfer of weapons, liaison, exchanges and contacts among armed forces, weapons conversion and the formulation of a military-political "code of conduct".

The Forum's third function is to elaborate on the theme of conflict prevention. The related provisions are vague in nature, reflecting an ambiguous compromise between the proponents and the adversaries of a substantial strengthening of the Conflict Prevention Centre, established in the CSCE as of 1991. The Helsinki Document does indeed envision a "strengthening" of the CPC. But it does so in cautious terms by stating that the CSCE States shall develop (at an undetermined future date) the CPC capacity to reduce the risk of conflicts through "relevant techniques" (not specified), or else in ambiguous terms through a reference to "cooperation in the field of verification".

The first two functions are to be exercised by the Forum sitting in "Special Committee" (assisted by subsidiary working bodies open to all participating States). The third will fall to the Advisory Committee of the CPC, sitting as the

Forum, on the basis of guidelines developed for it by the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers.

The Forum will have an executive secretariat which could also, if the parties concerned so decide, serve as the secretariat for the implementing bodies of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Open Skies Treaty.

It should be noted that the Forum has been conceived in eminently pragmatic terms—as a variable-geometry instrument. It is, for instance, open to all CSCE States, but they are not obliged to join it. The Programme for Immediate Action remains open: it can be amended, supplemented or expanded by consensus, as early as the next CSCE review conference (Budapest, 1994). The States taking part in that meeting are explicitly free to negotiate CSBMs as well as arms control or disarmament measures outside the Forum. Lastly, and above all, the area of application of the specific measures to be negotiated can vary greatly depending on their nature. The Programme for Immediate Action provides, moreover, that such measures could apply to specific regions or, if need be, to specific frontier areas.[5]

Conclusion

The foregoing picture, an unquestionably positive one, must be tempered by two criticisms. The first has to do with the decision-making procedure of the CSCE, to which the Helsinki Document brings nothing new: the rule of consensus (and also the rule of "consensus minus one") still prevails—and this will increasingly constitute, for an institution with 52 member States, a factor making for unwieldiness and paralysis. The second criticism has to do with the peaceful settlement of disputes, an area with which the CSCE is particularly unequipped to deal: the provisions of the (non-binding) mechanism available to it here since the meeting of experts in Valetta (February 1991) apply neither to

intra-State disputes nor even to high-stake inter-State disputes (territorial integrity, national defence, etc.). To fill this gap, France had suggested establishing a conciliation and arbitration court, a measure that implied a definite step towards the "juridicalization" of the CSCE—a step that other States were not ready to take. For its part, the United States had submitted a far less ambitious counter-proposal focusing on conciliation. The Helsinki Document does not settle the debate. It goes no further than to recognize the need for a set of comprehensive measures aimed at expanding the options available to the CSCE in the matter of peaceful settlement, and to schedule the convening, in Geneva from 12 to 23 October 1992, of an initial meeting with a mandate to negotiate such measures. In the final analysis, these two criticisms carry little weight against the fact that the Helsinki Document has both endowed the CSCE with the means to carry out its policies and defined its role in relation to the other international security institutions.

Notes

1 A/47/361-S/24370.

2 The idea of an intergovernmental CSCM was put forward—unsuccessfully—by Spain and Italy in September 1990. Then it took shape in June 1992—in the non-governmental context of the Interparliamentary Union.

3 Paragraph 10 of the Helsinki Summit Declaration cited in this context the recent cooperative undertakings between the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Visograd Triangle and Pentagonal countries.

4 The ways of developing such practical cooperation include, in particular, the exchange of information and the assignment of "guest of honour" status to institutions invited to submit "contributions" to CSCE activities.

5 The question of the area of application of the specific measures to be negotiated within the Forum does not seem to have been definitely settled, as can be surmised from the interpretative statements made in Helsinki by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and France (see the Journal, No. 50, of the Helsinki Meeting).

Post-'92 Helsinki

Europe on the Way to a Regional System of Collective Security

Dieter S. Lutz

After the Second World War, the struggle for supremacy and apparently insurmountable controversies over social systems and ideologies were obstacles to the establishment of a European order of security and peace, and led to conflict between the two blocs, the doctrine of deterrence and a race for destructive power, especially nuclear weapons. In the 1970s and 1980s, the arms race developed a dynamic of its own, always producing new arms spirals and intensifying existing conflicts.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the threatening situation altered entirely: the East-West conflict is now finished; the cold war is over. Revolutionary changes in the States of the former Warsaw Pact have radically changed the economic, security and political map of Europe—and even of the world. It is true that the aftermath of the cold war is still evident in many sectors; the problems that were created or partly superimposed by 40 years of antagonism are obvious. The economic and ecological differences between Western and Eastern Europe, as well as, in the security, political or military field, the existence of still huge armament potentials, are part of these effects. But above all, national, cultural and confessional antagonisms were apparently reactivated after the collapse of the authoritarian regimes. Therefore it is perhaps correct to insist on starting to eliminate the military

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"waste" of the former East-West conflict and to establish an effective common European security system.

What should such a common European security system look like? In the following pages, I shall first advocate the establishment of a regional system of collective security. I shall then approach the role of existing institutions in the development or management of such a collective security system—institutions such as the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Western European Union (WEU). Finally, I shall ask if and by what means the Federal Republic of Germany is constitutionally able to participate in such a system of collective security—a question intensively discussed in Germany at present.

A Plea for a Regional System of Collective Security for and in Europe

Today not only are linkages in the economic, political and military fields constantly increasing, but dangers and crises (economic crises, environmental pollution, radioactive fallout from a civilian reactor accident or a nuclear war) also have an effect beyond frontiers. In such circumstances—at least following the nuclear reactor accident at Chernobyl—it has become clear that security can no longer be achieved by focusing on only one aspect. A nation's own security must always also take into account the security of its neighbours. In short, security can no longer be found in confrontation; it must be achieved in collaboration. Security is common security.

The rationale in the "common" approach to overcoming dangers does not end when an emergency occurs. On the contrary, the idea of "common security", as an approach to overcoming conflicts, must be tested in times of actual conflict. Carried to its logical conclusion, in the long term common security leads to a system of collective security,

which also recognizes the need to support its members militarily in emergencies.

The substance of collective security is not completely new. The idea, at least, of collective security has long appeared in treaties and legal norms, including article 52 of the United Nations Charter, article 11 of the former Warsaw Pact and article 24 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Looking back over past decades, one certainly cannot deny the relative failure of the idea of collective security in the United Nations. But it would be wrong to say that the idea has failed forever. On the contrary, at least since the end of the East-West conflict, there has been a need for a strengthening of the United Nations and a renaissance of collective security. An example of this is the unanimity with which, in the late summer of 1990, the international community condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, and the United Nations Security Council resolved on sanctions backed up with the threat of the use of military force. It is true that a whole series of disputes even before the Second World War damaged the effectiveness of the League of Nations, and even after 1945 they prevented the organization of military security in the form of "collective security". This led to the formation of military alliances patterned on a self-defence or collective self-defence model. The problem issues included—and still include—besides the effectiveness of military forces, the clear identification of the aggressor, the capacity of the organs of the system of collective security (especially the Secretary-General and the Security Council) to decide and to act, the institutionalization of compulsory arbitration, and so on.

So what is the way out? In the 1950s there was already discussion of the possibility of regional systems of collective security—permitted under the United Nations Charter—as a preliminary solution leading to a universal system of collective security. Today this possibility is still being discussed. However, the proposals for the formation of regional systems

faced and still do face the fundamental problems of achieving collective security. Still, it is easier not only to have an overview of these problems—because they are limited to a particular area—but also to deal with them in a political programme. And finally, with the recent discussions on common security and structural limitations on the ability to launch an attack (defensive defence), a common understanding has been reached, which must also find a way into the development and establishment of a system of collective security.

If it is true that every system of collective security is a logical and consistent development of the basic notion of common security, concepts like "supremacy" and "superiority" may no longer be understood in the traditional sense. "Superiority" in the system of collective security remains "defensive superiority", similar to that in a regime of common security. It is true that collective security does seek collective superiority, but it is aimed exclusively at dissuasion. Internally, within a regional system of collective security, in cases of conflict, this demands collective sanctions under conditions of renunciation of all weapons of mass destruction. Externally, however, dissuasion is very different from deterrence. It means reducing the perception of threat on the part of possible opponents by planning the armaments on one's own side so that, while superior, they are oriented towards defence and are structurally incapable of attack.

Similar clarifications and examples can also be found in connection with the functioning and mechanisms, or institutionalized guarantees, of a collective system of European security. If the mistakes and weaknesses of the League of Nations and the United Nations are not to be repeated in Europe at the regional level, this would seem to require:

—The formulation of contractual and institutional guarantees comprising a strict and automatic obligation to support any victim of aggression;

—The institutionalization of a European security council with the undisputed right to restore collective security in the case of aggression;

—The establishment of supra-national forces and the possibility of legal recourse to national troops;

—The building up of institutionalized possibilities for compulsory, peaceful resolution of conflicts (where anyone who refused to accept arbitration would be an aggressor) and for peaceful change leading to common peace;

—And not least with a view to a new European order of peace in the wider sense: permanent institutions and a variety of consultative mechanisms for multilateral European collaboration in all areas.

On the Development of Euro-Collective Security via a Network of CSCE, NATO and WEU

Institutional Structures within the Scope of CSCE

The first steps in this direction, especially from the perspective indicated in the first section, can be found in the statement made after the Paris meeting of heads of State on 21 November 1990. In the Charter of Paris for a New Europe,[1] the following new structures and institutions were resolved on as part of the process:

—A council, consisting of the foreign ministers of the member States;

—A committee of senior officials;

—A secretariat in Prague;

—A conflict-prevention centre in Vienna;

—An office for free elections in Warsaw (since January 1992, an office for democratic institutions and human rights).

However, these resolutions do not constitute more than the first cautious steps forward. If they are intended to lead to a European system of collective security in the long term, they must be developed and supplemented by a series of institutions and organs. One could imagine that they might be

established along the lines of the chief organs of the United Nations (articles 7 and 8 of the Charter) and that they would function in accordance with articles 52-54. The minimum organs needed would thus be:

—An assembly of members (general assembly)

—A security commission (security council)

—A secretariat (secretary-general).

As a further main organ, a European court of justice or the International Court of Justice could assume judicial functions, and on a basis such as that in articles 47-51 of the United Nations Charter, a European general staff committee could be set up to support the security commission.

That these and similar considerations are not so far-fetched is demonstrated by the fundamental change in CSCE procedures initiated during the second meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Prague in January 1992. In the future, the Council shall be able to take decisions according to the "consensus-minus-one" formula, so that, contrary to the traditional concept of sovereignty, the State concerned shall forfeit its right of veto.

Military Substructures via NATO and WEU

Thus, by means of its January 1992 decision, the CSCE Council has finally established decision-making structures that make feasible even the employment of military means against an aggressor. However, the CSCE so far does not have any military substructures at its disposal. Mechanisms for recourse to existing forces and institutions, NATO and WEU, have yet to be established.

Suppose one starts by assuming that the military structure of a collective security system will be shaped by not only the renunciation of means of mass destruction, but also the following:

—The forces would be completely or partially supranational;

—The system would be oriented both internally and externally towards dissuasion;

—Most of the forces or their weapons would be oriented towards defence;

—A limited portion of multinational forces would be provided for the efficient execution of the assistance option.

If that is the case, it becomes possible to implement the following steps as part of a process towards establishing a system of collective European security, even with the ongoing operation of NATO and WEU:

—The formation of contingents of mixed nationalities, and the granting of a choice of military service in foreign (allied) forces as well;

—The abandonment of the "national triad concept" while maintaining the effectiveness of the total system, that is, developing specialized national forces and dividing the work among them in such a way that the risk of aggression by individual States internally or externally would become non-existent or at least negligible;

—The rearming of the main portion of forces with the most modern technologies to provide an effective but defence-oriented potential (structurally unable to launch an offensive);

—The establishment of multinational rapid deployment forces.

If some individual States wanted to become pioneers in the process of creating a new European security system, there is a further possibility on the basis of the measures mentioned above: a unilateral, radical reduction of military capacity, armed forces and arms to about a fifth of what they are at present. Even a strong European security system (with a "mere" million soldiers instead of the 4–5 million hitherto) would hardly ask more of an individual participating State.

These and similar considerations may still sound utopian. However, the revolutionary changes in East-West relations almost daily demonstrate that even utopias can turn into reality. For instance, not only has the Warsaw Pact disappeared from the security-political map of Europe, but also NATO, as early as its London Declaration of 5–6 July 1990,[2] extended to Central and Eastern European States "the hand of friendship", and, in its Rome Declaration of 8 November 1991,[3] NATO invited the foreign ministers of the former Warsaw Pact States to institutionalize their relations with NATO via a North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Finally, the admission of the States of the former Soviet Union, now the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), to the NACC on 10 March 1992 must be considered a historic act.

So the first steps towards expanding and transforming NATO from a limited military pact into a European security system have been accomplished, and the same is true with regard to the size, equipment, structure and mission of the armed forces themselves. The questions of the withdrawal of foreign troops and of the reduction of national forces are on the agenda, for which the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, the disbanding of the National People's Army of the former German Democratic Republic or the reduction of the armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany from approximately 500,000 to approximately 370,000 troops can serve as examples.

Likewise on the agenda is, however, the establishment of new military structures, such as the creation of a bi-national German-French corps, or, as recently stated in the Petersburg Declaration of 19 June 1992 "on strengthening WEU's operational role". Appropriately implemented, the Petersburg Declaration will mark another milestone on the way to creating the military structures of a system of collective security in and for Europe via coordinating CSCE, NATO, and

WEU. The Declaration provides for the assignment of military units to military missions carried out under the authority of WEU. Beside common defence, such missions would embrace humanitarian and rescue operations, peace-keeping and the use of military force for crisis resolution, including peace-making measures. The military units would be composed of the armed forces of WEU member States, including, after consultation, armed forces assigned to NATO missions, and would be structured multinationally. It is uncertain whether German soldiers will become involved at all and, if so, what role they are going to assume beyond participation in humanitarian aid missions. According to general opinion, political will and constitutional legal requirements are contradictory. Consequently there have been calls for an amendment to the German Constitution, the Basic Law. In the following section it is argued that such an amendment is not necessary.

Participation of the Federal Republic according to the Basic Law

According to the intention of the Parliamentary Council which prepared the Basic Law in 1948–1949, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany was to contain a vigorous peace imperative. That is why the drafters of the Basic Law created a unique constitution through a number of regulations. These regulations include the preamble, article 1(2); article 4(3); article 9(2); article 24(1),(2) and (3); article 25; and article 26(1),(2) of the Basic Law.

In 1948–1949, with these provisions, the Parliamentary Council expressly set out a new beginning. A political system that had not even refrained from offensive wars, mass murder and enslavement was to be abandoned, and the German people's will for peace was to become the hallmark of the Basic Law. The Federal Republic to be established was to

be constituted as a value-oriented, democratic and peaceful State; new means and procedures were to be developed for its domestic policy and, above all, for its foreign policy. Would these new means and procedures comprise military forces and permit their eventual deployment outside the territory of the Federal Republic ("out-of-area")?

In 1948–1949, the Parliamentary Council did not provide for the rearmament of the future German State. The Basic Law of 1949 did not, however, expressly exclude it as a political option. Thus it was imperative to legalize the introduction of military forces through the amendments of 1954, 1956 and 1968 to the Basic Law. In other words, in spite of the vigorous and partially pacifist peace imperative of the Basic Law, the existence of armed forces was and is not prohibited. Their deployment, however, is subject to strict limitations. According to article 87(*a*)(1) of the Basic Law, the Federal Republic raises armed forces only "for defensive purposes". According to article 115(*a*)(1), a state of being attacked (*Verteidigungsfall*) only exists in case "the Federal territory is attacked by armed forces or if such an attack is immediately impending". Moreover, according to article 115(*a*)(5) of the Basic Law, the Federal President is entitled to make the required announcement declaring a state of being attacked only after "the Federal Republic has been attacked by armed forces". A "mere" threat of such an attack is not sufficient and neither is the "mere" attack of another State's territory. The deployment of the Federal Army (*Bundeswehr*) for collective self-defence, which would be admissible according to international law and the Charter of the United Nations, would thus be illegal according to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic unless the state of being attacked had previously been declared. This applies also to missions within military pacts such as NATO.

Finally, except for the defence of the Federal Republic, armed forces can be "deployed only as far as the Basic Law permits it explicitly". Besides the provisions for emergency legislation (*Notstandsgesetzgebung*) which relate to domestic

affairs and are therefore irrelevant here, the only exception to this restriction is provided in the Constitution by article 24(2) of the Basic Law. According to it, the Federal Republic can "for the maintenance of peace accede to a system of mutual collective security" and can "consent to respective restrictions of its sovereign rights".

However, "collective security" is, as was shown above, a technical term. In contrast to an order of peace based on human rights, which the Constitution otherwise pursues, or even to an alliance-type system, which aims at accomplishing or defending very concrete tasks, values, and goals of a socio-political and structural nature, collective security is a means of securing peace in the sense of preventing international conflict and assuming obligations of mutual assistance.

The means by which the Federal Republic could join a security system are not expressly stated in the Basic Law, nor does article 24(2) provide any information on this subject. However, as we have seen, the spectrum of possible sanctions within a system of collective security also includes military assistance. On the other hand, what applies to the system as a whole need not apply to all its members equally. The real possibility of assuming or readiness to assume obligations to render military assistance is not a precondition for acceding to a system of collective security; on the contrary, security systems without an absolute obligation to common military actions are quite conceivable. Even the requirement of "mutuality" in article 24(2) of the Basic Law does not demand absolute uniformity in the actual contributions of the various members. Already the Convention of Herrenchiemsee, the constitutional draft of which contained, in fact, all the essential elements of article 24 of the Basic Law, understood that by this regulation "*a prior obligation* is imposed on the German people". "After what has happened in the name of the German people, however, such a prior obligation, that brings in its train corresponding actions by the other states, is appropriate".

From this formulation of the Herrenchiemsee Convention, one can at least deduce that in 1949 article 24 of the Basic Law neither regulated nor presupposed the existence of armed forces. Since the constitutional amendments of the 1950s and 1960s, however, the Federal Republic can no longer pretend not to have a *Bundeswehr*. On the contrary, since rearmament, the Federal Republic, like any other State, has to meet all the obligations it has assumed, including military ones. However, as long as a European System of Collective Security has not yet been established, the obligations of the Federal Republic are limited to the security system set up by the United Nations.

It can thus be concluded that the assignment of *Bundeswehr* units within the framework of a European or a global system of collective security would be admissible—even obligatory—under the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany. For example, the Federal Republic might be requested by the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with article 43 of the United Nations Charter, to join in actions for the enforcement of sanctions in accordance with article 42 of the Charter. Given the Constitution's explicit orientation towards peace, this would apply, even more so, to the *Bundeswehr's* participation in peace-keeping forces or other actions for the "pacific settlement of disputes" according to chapter VI of the United Nations Charter.

Finally, in order to avoid misunderstandings, I would like to emphasize the collective character of the sanctions and the absolute priority of civil means and measures over military ones. The "out-of-area" deployment of the *Bundeswehr* is admissible only within the scope of United Nations forces under the supreme command of the United Nations, that is exclusively as an act of assistance according to article 43 of the United Nations Charter. In the case of a European security system, similar conditions should apply. Furthermore, all other means of settling a dispute would have to be exhausted.

The Basic Law seeks to avoid the application of military force and to resolve international disputes by means of peaceful settlement. Article 24(3) of the Basic Law makes this explicit by stipulating that the Federal Republic should join an international arbitration court. As this regulation does not use the expression "legal disputes" as does article 36 of the Statutes of the International Court of Justice, but refers in general to "disputes" including so-called political conflicts of interest, the basically peaceful character of this constitutional decision is clearly emphasized. It can at least be reasonably assumed that the range of application of the means of arbitration provided for in article 24(3) of the Basic Law ought to be as broad and basic as possible. This interpretation is confirmed by emphasizing the character of arbitration as being "general, comprehensive, obligatory, international". In other words, arbitration should be universal or at least open to all States. In general, it should deal without constraint with all kinds of disputes, not only with those concerning juridical issues or subjects or particular States, and it should above all provide for the obligatory participation of all.

The deployment of the *Bundeswehr* within a system of collective security is thus admissible. However, given the interpretation of human rights found in the Constitution and the system of arbitration aspired to by the Basic Law, the use of military means can, in the long term, be no more than a last resort (*ultima ratio*).

Notes

1 A/45/859, annex.

2 CD/1013. The London Declaration was reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XIII, No. 4, 1990.

3 NATO Press Communique S-1(91)86.

The Helsinki Process: A Success Story and New Challenges

Pertti Torstila

Record of Achievements

Few, if any, of the representatives of the 35 European and North American States gathered in Helsinki in the winter of 1972 for the preparatory consultations on a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) anticipated the enormous built-in power of the process they were initiating. In less than 20 years, the community of basic human values—democracy, the rule of law and human rights—hallmarks of the CSCE, had overwhelmed the false legitimacy of totalitarianism and opened the door to freedom and unity for all of Europe. The dramatic events of 1989 and 1990 were consequences of the social and economic failure of the communist system, but the Helsinki process accelerated this inevitable collapse in an unpredictably quick manner. The CSCE not only survived the cold war, but also contributed greatly to its demise.

Governments and people, organizations and individuals—all those who during the past years prepared the ground for the radical changes—drew their strength from the rich potential of the Helsinki process. "Helsinki" symbolized a better future for countless numbers of people and they were not misled in their expectations. The CSCE has stood the test of time effectively.

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The Helsinki process legitimized the right of a country to expect, indeed demand, that the external behaviour of States towards each other, and the internal behaviour of States towards their peoples, conform to the Helsinki Principles and other CSCE agreements. How a country treats its own citizens is now a legitimate concern of other CSCE countries. Expressing one's concerned opinion no longer constitutes inappropriate intervention in the internal affairs of other States. At the heart of the CSCE were not only national sovereignty, non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and consensus, but also, and especially, human rights and the right of self-determination. Major CSCE achievements—the Human Rights Mechanism, the Mechanism on Unusual Military Activities and the Emergency Mechanism— have broken the ice of absolutism surrounding the sensitive area of sovereignty and consensus.

Since the beginning of the Helsinki process, consensus has been the golden rule in the CSCE. No decision is possible if any participating State raises an objection. It is significant, though, that consensus does not equal unanimity. Consensus implies concessions and compromises by all sides. Maximalist national positions have time and again had to give way to a search for a common denominator. Quite often the level of ambition has had to be lowered. But once consensus has been found, decisions have rested on a solid foundation.

The success of the CSCE is closely linked to the consensus rule, and rightly so. In today's new situations, however, the consensus principle is under review in many quarters. New challenges and risks may make it imperative to make adjustments here also if one wants to make the CSCE an effective instrument for settling crises and ensuring stability.

"Consensus minus one" is already a reality in cases where human rights and democratic principles are flagrantly violated. The question is raised: If all CSCE States have agreed to common values—as they have in the Paris Charter

and the CSCE Helsinki Documents—why should they then have the right to prevent consensus in conflict situations where these very same values are violated in their countries?

The cold war divisions, antagonisms and threats have ended, and with them the peculiar kind of stability they gave rise to. In their place, a Europe full of potential for democracy, economic well-being and human rights has arisen. The competition between the super-Powers has given way to dialogue and to a joint acceptance of both European and global responsibilities. Europeans are no longer afraid of massive military confrontation among their States, which can now embark on the search for security in Europe on an equal footing, as free and democratic societies.

The CSCE was designed to bridge the East-West division. It meant an opening, not a sanctioning, of the division of Europe, and played an immense role in the evolution of the relations across the dividing line, the "iron curtain". It helped to preserve dialogue and essential forms of cooperation during those difficult years. Now that there is no longer an East-West division, different problems are appearing and the CSCE is facing new challenges. Its contributions will be very much needed during the years ahead as well.

Future Potential and Challenges

The Europe of today has succeeded in reducing military threats and means of conflict. At the same time, there is ample evidence that the use of military force is no less unthinkable in the new Europe than during the cold war. It may be possible to contain conflicts in Yugoslavia or in parts of the former Soviet Union, but they are more than just local or internal affairs. Many outstanding problems have become more visible with the disappearance of East-West confrontation. The actual and potential instabilities arising from economic, environmental and minority problems, nationalistic antagonisms and destabilizing ethnic claims and con-

flicts undermine the fragile new system of security, which is characterized by complexity, interdependence and unpredictability. The indivisibility of security and the interrelationship of the three baskets of the Helsinki Final Act—military security, cooperation in the economic, scientific and environmental areas, and the human dimension—now have more significance than ever before.

Europe is undergoing a fundamental process of reorganization, militarily, politically and economically. The elements in this new constellation—States, organizations and institutions—are redefining their relationships and functions in order to form a sound whole. There is little reason to believe that the profound changes of 1989–1990 will be consolidated in a short period of time. Rather, a fragile equilibrium punctuated by outbreaks of instability will continue. Europeans will thus need an effective political forum to which they all belong.

The Helsinki process is being transformed from a process into a more organized structure with distinct institutions. At the Paris CSCE summit in November 1990, the CSCE participating States agreed that their foreign ministers would meet at least once a year as a Council. With the Council, the CSCE now has at its disposal a central forum for political consultations, a political body with a broad mandate. Besides, a Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) was established to prepare the work of the Council, carry out its decisions and review current issues. Also, a Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) was set up to "assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict".

These new institutional arrangements form the basis of a structured form of organization. When equipped with effective instruments and mechanisms, and a commitment on the part of the participating States to use them, the CSCE will have a solid foundation for preventing, managing and resolving conflicts.

The new—and still imperfect—CSCE crisis management mechanism has had its first true test in connection with the crisis in Yugoslavia. Hostilities continue and no satisfactory solution has been found. This does not prove that the CSCE has failed or that its new crisis management system cannot be made to work.

The United Nations and the European Community (EC) cannot be blamed for the continuation of the civil war in Yugoslavia, either. We all know that the reasons for the tragedy lie deep in the history and culture of the area and that they are internal.

The Helsinki process is, *inter alia*, a "security system", but not in the sense of a military alliance. The CSCE is not a system of classical collective security, nor can it, in its present form, offer the degree of security that European States desire. States will continue to derive security from their own arrangements for self-defence, but a renationalization of security policies should not be the goal. The CSCE provides the basis of a system of cooperative security, and the cooperative security measures developed within the CSCE complement the existing measures and offer new possibilities in the military area. Thus, security with others overrides the need for security against others.

The new order in Europe permits States to create jointly, on a cooperative basis, new security and policy options which were not possible for individual States in the previous confrontational situation. But the new opportunities cannot be realized by one element alone, whether it be an institution, structure or process. Neither the CSCE, NATO, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Western European Union (WEU), the EC, nor any other organization for that matter, can, by itself, provide the basis for stability and security in the new Europe. Real security can only be guaranteed together, through mutually supportive cooperation and interaction of all interlocking institutions and forums.

We should use what works for as long as it works, and add what is needed, if and when it is needed.

The CSCE can meet the new challenges, if it is permitted to develop existing and acquire new operational capabilities, for example, through enhancing institutions and structures which were created to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. This requires, *inter alia*, a clear division of responsibility between the Committee of Senior Officials in Prague, the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw. In the Finnish view, the CPC as a permanent CSCE body has particular potential. Finland is convinced of the crucial role of the CPC in the area of conflict prevention and crisis management. The Council and the CSO should retain a dominant political role. The CPC, as the main implementing organ, should be assigned wider competence in the area of conflict prevention, security dialogue and implementation of arms control agreements. As a component in the emerging European security structure, the CPC provides a forum for the 52 States to "be present", that is, to be physically represented at all times. Ways to involve the CPC at an early stage of a given conflict should be elaborated. The conflict prevention and crisis management capability of the CSCE can be improved through the use of clearly defined instruments. Fact-finding, observation and monitoring of the implementation of cease-fire or disengagement agreements are essential parts of conflict resolution. The Helsinki Meeting 1992 made important headway in this field.

CSCE Peace-keeping

Peace-keeping, in cooperation with the parties involved in the conflict, is a forceful tool. The Helsinki Follow-up Meeting in 1992 took far-reaching decisions to enhance the CSCE's capability to meet future challenges.

These decisions will be as path-breaking as those taken in Helsinki in 1975.

Peace-keeping operations in Europe under the CSCE umbrella can, indeed, be performed by using various complementary methods, by groups of individual countries and in cooperation with different organizations and institutions. Some could be more effective in the area of enforcement, others in dispute-settlement. For this purpose all interested CSCE States could identify and train fact-finders, observers or peace-keeping units for conflict prevention purposes. A military organization could contribute to the implementation of a settlement which is governed and controlled by other bodies. Expertise and resources of organizations, such as NATO or WEU, should be used in carrying out CSCE peace-keeping operations. An advantage of the CSCE not shared by other institutions is that it gives all European States their due weight in the affairs of the continent. The CSCE is the natural centre for European crisis management action.

CSCE peace-keeping requirements do not differ from the well-known ones developed through the experience of the United Nations. The fundamental requirement for CSCE peace-keeping is that parties to the conflict have the political will to seek a peaceful solution. A basic condition for CSCE peace-keeping clearly will have to be the consent and cooperation of parties directly involved in a given conflict. The parties to a conflict must refrain from and cease using force, and cooperate with the CSCE. As many potential European conflicts, both between and within States, cut across national and ethnic lines, procedures should also be worked out to involve those parties which ask to be heard and to participate independently of the Governments of participating States. National minorities and respect for their rights are of particular relevance today.

The CSCE and its potential to contribute to stability and security in Europe—including crisis resolution and the

development of cooperative economic, political and security arrangements—must be viewed from the perspective of complementarity rather than substitution in relation to other institutions. The CSCE is a mechanism for linkage and not replacement. The experience and capabilities of relevant European and transatlantic economic organizations must be utilized. Affluent members of the CSCE should meet their responsibilities to facilitate the historic transitions now taking place in the economies of some of the CSCE participating States. Europe must not become a continent where a new division replaces the old. To overcome the obstacles to political and economic stability and development, those organizations and actors which are best equipped in their own areas of competence should lead the way. The unique advantage of the CSCE is that it includes the existing participating States with their due weight in European affairs and will similarly include all the new participating States. The CSCE thus offers an overarching framework within which much can be accomplished.

The New CSCE Security Forum

The new CSCE security negotiations will take as their point of departure the mandate of Helsinki, the results adopted in Paris in November 1990, and in Vienna in 1992. The results, if implemented in full, are already impressive. The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) will effect deep, first-ever cuts in conventional armaments and bring about the desired parity. Together with the CSBM provisions, the CFE Treaty creates an unprecedented system of verification and inspection, military transparency and openness from the Atlantic to the Urals. The new negotiations do not have to begin from zero. The new forum rests on the solid and tested foundation created by the negotiation on conventional armed forces in Europe and on

confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), but negotiations will be based on a new mandate.

Experience has already shown that "operational" arms control, as the CSBM-type measures are sometimes called, opens interesting new avenues for the future. The operational approach will gain ground as interest in further negotiated reductions diminishes.

Disarmament as such will remain high on the list of priorities, but the commitments already agreed upon must first be scrupulously implemented. Negotiated results may prove to be complex in a multilateral setting between some 52 sovereign States. Yet, there is no lack of incentive for further measures, nor is there lack of scope. The capabilities of the immense amount of treaty-limited equipment and other weapons that remain in Europe even after the execution of the CFE commitments exceed the needs of secure stability. Interest in further measures in different corners of Europe is understandably real. From Finland's point of view, for example, it is important that reductions in armed forces extend to the neighbouring regions in northern Europe, as well.

A negotiating pattern which would satisfy every participant was not easy to find. Experience drawn from the CFE negotiations—although they took place in a bloc-to-bloc setting—is a concrete reminder of the difficulties encountered. In the mandate negotiations in Vienna and Helsinki 1992, several suggestions were made. No single formula to meet the requirements of every single participant was possible. It proved—once again—very difficult to develop "the" reduction concept or criteria to assess national defence needs. But the mandate of the new CSCE Security Forum recognizes the existing different security concerns and interests of all participants. The negotiating procedure is based on a combination of approaches where the security needs determined by the countries themselves ultimately meet the concerns of others.

The mandate of the CFE negotiations included the provision that the security of each participant was not to be affected adversely at any stage. That provision serves as a good basis for future talks in a 52-State setting as well.

The military element of security continues to be indispensable. Yet, military power as such is not the only guarantor of stability. Thus, while the disarmament component of the future forum will be vital, equally important and ever more prominent will be confidence- and security-building. When moving beyond CFE 1 and 2, a different logic is needed. According to this logic, threats are minimized, security concerns of others are taken at face value and cooperative security arrangements are sought.

The allegory of Gulliver in Lilliput is pertinent in this context, too. There is more to confidence- and security-building than the Stockholm-type measures on notification, observation and inspection of military activities, or the Vienna-type transparency measures. Confidence-building also has a valuable non-military, or political, component. The two aspects together with the cooperative approach can open new innovative areas in the future negotiations.

Elements of new cooperative confidence- and security-building measures were already included in the 1990 and 1992 Vienna CSBM Documents. A detailed exchange of information on military forces reflects the climate of decreased confrontation.

A consultation mechanism concerning unusual military activities is a useful new device. Enhanced contacts contribute to overall security and trust. A communication network has been established and can serve the CFE needs as well. Annual implementation meetings will be convened to monitor the fulfilment of promises made.

The implementation of these cooperative measures constituted the initial function of the CPC, which will widen its scope of activities in the years to come. It may eventually

live up to its name and play a role in crisis prevention and management.

Insecurity is not rooted in the quantity of weapons only. Mistrust, suspicion and potential tensions will not be overcome through reductions only. The sustained dialogue on confidence- and security-building since the early years of the Helsinki process has decisively facilitated concrete steps toward significant arms reductions in Europe and offers a valuable example for other parts of the world.

CSBMs are not merely of marginal utility in the arms control process. They contribute to it by creating better assurances and by removing suspicions about the intentions of the other side. Without mutual confidence, efforts to achieve disarmament could not succeed. Confidence- and security-building, on the one hand, and disarmament, on the other, are inseparable twins.

However, CSBMs serve a more ambitious purpose than that of simply paving the way for concrete disarmament steps. Arms reductions are limited in size and in time. Once armaments have been reduced to an agreed level, measures to enhance transparency and openness as well as maintain and strengthen confidence and stability gain importance. Reductions must be supported by stabilizing measures, measures to enhance transparency, and constraints. Innovation is needed in this regard.

A framework of regional cooperation will play an important part in the new comprehensive security setting. Regional cooperation will be able to respond more effectively to various local conditions and needs, allowing regions to tackle their specific problems together. Arms control should be adapted to the specific conditions of the different subregions, binding together their security interests. There is no lack of potential in this area. Selective regional measures and solutions embedded in an all-European CSCE framework present propitious perspectives and may become a real innovation of the post-Helsinki security negotiations.

Regional cooperation offers limitless possibilities in the economic and social areas as well. On the all-European level, the emerging system of security for Europe will have to take into account the political dynamics of Western Europe in the process of integration, the security concerns of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the future roles of the great Powers in Europe.

The Past Is Prologue

"Security is not gained by erecting fences, security is gained by opening gates", Finland's President Urho Kekkonen said at the first CSCE Foreign Ministerial Meeting in Helsinki in June 1972. In 1992 in Helsinki again, 20 years later and after the disappearance of the old barriers, the CSCE enters its more operational phase. As it did in its first phase, the CSCE in its next phase will play a unique and critical role in building a durable peace and a just and equitable order in the new Europe.

There is nothing "final" about the Final Act. This historic document, drafted at a time when Europe was divided, contains the principles which are even now shaping and will continue to shape an undivided Europe. While many commitments and pledges still remain empty and unimplemented, many more have had a profound impact. The greatest strength of the CSCE will remain its moral strength, based on the Helsinki Principles and the fundamental human rights it supports for individuals in all participating States. The Final Act is a reminder of what remains to be done and an unfailing source of inspiration for further endeavours and actions. The Helsinki process will be judged by its success in providing the basis for the profoundest concept of human rights—freedom, justice, equity and security. The Final Act of Helsinki and the Charter of Paris together present an open-ended vision of a new and better Europe, committing all the participants with equal force to each of their provisions.

Security in the Arctic Region

Coming in from the Cold War: Arctic Security in the Emerging Global Climate: A View from Canada

Alex Morrison

In his report of 17 June 1992, "An Agenda for Peace", United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserted that:

> "Mutual confidence and good faith are essential to reducing the likelihood of conflict between States. Many such measures are available to Governments that have the will to employ them. Systematic exchange of military missions, formation of regional or subregional risk reduction centres, arrangements for the free flow of information, including the monitoring of regional arms agreements, are examples. I ask all regional organizations to consider what further confidence-building measures might be applied in their areas and to inform the United Nations of the results. I will undertake periodic consultations on confidence-building measures with parties to potential, current or past disputes and with regional

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organizations, offering such advisory assistance as the Secretariat can provide."[2]

Introduction

In the wake of the post-cold war rush of peoples to establish new countries based on outstanding religious, ethnic and other claims to national sovereignty, the universal Arctic is rapidly becoming an area around which is swirling much cautious preventive diplomacy and international negotiation. The Arctic as a security region is distinct from other regions around the world. It lacks the ancient quarrels of the Middle East, and the heavy concentration of arms of Europe; in addition, the prospects of violent ethnic conflict erupting in the Arctic region are remote to say the least.[3]

Throughout the cold war, the Arctic was an area of immense strategic importance; notwithstanding—or perhaps because of—its barrenness, it served mainly as a buffer zone between the super-Powers and was armed and defended accordingly. Its main significance was drawn from the prevailing East-West tensions; it was not regarded as a security region of concern unto itself. Military forces stationed in the Arctic served a very broad purpose: national defence of various countries' homelands and interests rather than defence of the Arctic *per se*. Many have believed, and continue to believe, that the Arctic itself has been and continues to be a relatively safe place, notwithstanding its position between the United States and Russia. Now that the cold war is over and related tensions have eased, what are the implications for security in the Arctic? Can confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) play a role in an Arctic security regime?

As they begin to assess Arctic security considerations in the post-cold war climate, the States in the region are moving cautiously and conservatively, largely because they are as yet unsure how to proceed, or perhaps even are unsure of

the goal. They are assessing security not only in the traditional, classical military sense, but in the broadest possible meaning of the word, encompassing such factors as environmental, social and economic security.

In looking to the Antarctic for inspiration and guidance, both from the perspective of similar physical conditions and from that of the Antarctic Treaty regime, the leaders of the Arctic countries appear to have dismissed certain aspects of that regime, having reached an unspoken agreement that the path of "common heritage" followed in the case of the Antarctic Treaty is not one they wish to follow. Rather, there is a desire to secure and develop the Arctic area, for the time being at least, in alignment with the aspirations of the Arctic countries, while bearing in mind the larger question of universal security. Further, while there may well be certain features of the Antarctic regime that are transferable to the Arctic, it must be recognized that in a great many respects each of these areas is substantially different from the other.

The caution of the Arctic States is compounded by a sense that there may not be more than one chance to ensure the security of the Arctic. If Governments and peoples fail to be deliberate in their negotiations, they may not reach an agreement at all, leaving the Arctic areas of individual countries open for unilateral, uncoordinated national action—a situation which would not be in the best interests of the region as a whole and which might indeed aggravate conditions throughout the Arctic.

Now is an opportune time, before tensions arise, to begin the establishment of a comprehensive security regime. The listing of CSBMs which could be prime elements in such a regime for the Arctic is a proactive movement and solid first step in the proper direction.

The term *universal Arctic* needs to be clarified. There is a distressing tendency for analysts and commentators discussing the Arctic to see the area in national or regional

terms. That is, Europeans, Asians and Canadians nearly always look due north and think of the object of their gazing as "the Arctic". It is necessary, when discussing the future of the region, to take a broader outlook: to look beyond national borders to see the region as a whole. Hence the use of the term "the universal Arctic" to describe the area of the world north of sixty degrees, thirty-three minutes north latitude. The Arctic countries are: Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States. The Russian Federation has the largest Arctic land area, followed by Canada.

This chapter will briefly discuss the strategic importance of the Arctic during the cold war years, before moving on to a consideration of the Canadian approach to the region and an outline of various Canadian governmental and private initiatives, as well as a brief description of one student project on the subject worthy of expansion. The question of whether CSBMs established in other areas are suitable for transfer to the Arctic will be answered and a tentative list of some measures that might most appropriately and effectively serve to make the Arctic more secure will be put forward for later and fuller discussion.

A Transformed Political Climate

During the recent visits of Russian President Yeltsin to Canada and the United States, the euphoria displayed by the public of both countries, and by the usually more staid parliamentarians, while reminiscent of that of the Gorbachev era, seemed more genuine. It is as if Canadians and Americans together with their Western allies desperately want to believe that from this time forward Russia will march resolutely and unerringly into a democratic, secure future.

Today's political climate is certainly more relaxed than that of the cold war. Yet, realistically, it ought not to be expected that peace, security, tranquillity and harmony will

automatically become permanent features of the international landscape. It is true that traditional hostility and distrust are waning and in some areas are on the verge of disappearing, but the relationship of the future will be one of "healthy competition", rather than one in which companies and countries simply share all with one another. Healthy competition will require States to continue to act in their own best interests but also to have a positive and progressive regard for the various ways in which they can assist Russia and the other countries of the former Soviet internal and external empires. The Arctic is one area in which this competition will be staged. However this time the competition will have as its aim the establishment of security in a very broad sense.

During the cold war, the Arctic was an area from which each super-Power kept surveillance over the other and in which each stationed military forces so as to be able to react quickly to aggressive moves by the other. As with other areas of the world, it was pervaded by an atmosphere of suspicion, with the moves of each side being met with immediate distrust by the adversary, whether nationally or as part of an alliance. Even the definition of where the Arctic began and ended, the very delineation of its geographic limits, was an issue. For example, some countries sought to exclude from their "Arctic" areas those locations in which were stationed military forces which were regarded by others as offensive in nature and far beyond what was needed for self-defence. In the new era of healthy competition, surveillance will still play a large role, but with a quite different intention.

Security and Competition in the Arctic

The first duty of a Government is to provide for the security of its citizens. This includes military security. But security, to be comprehensive and meaningful, must encompass many other aspects, involving human rights, the recognition and exercise of sovereignty claims, the protection of resources

including land, air, water and oil and the all-encompassing question of the protection of the whole of the environment.

These are the areas from which will spring the international competition—and perhaps tensions and maybe even conflicts—of the future, as each country of the Arctic region strives to meet its national aspirations. Ideally, this will be accomplished to the detriment of none. Competition among and between nations is indeed healthy and is to be encouraged. However, in the interests of sustained peace, security and stability in the Arctic, multinational cooperative efforts must be undertaken to ensure a peaceful, coordinated approach. The successful results of such an undertaking will be a positive reflection not only on each country in the region, but also on the Arctic as a whole and, by positive extension, on the entire international community.

Healthy competition in heretofore unexplored functional and geographic areas leading to results beneficial to all participants can be possible only if suspicions of military intentions are non-existent or kept to the lowest possible levels. It is thus necessary to devise and implement CSBMs which will be accepted by all and which will ensure maximum transparency to an effective and agreed level. The adoption of such a system will go a long way towards ensuring that the competition does indeed remain secure and "healthy" and does not degenerate into conflicts over, for example, development of resources.

Canada and the Arctic: Perspectives and Initiatives

Before proceeding to the suggestion of CSBMs for the universal Arctic, a review of Canada's past attitudes and initiatives with regard to its own Arctic territory is in order. This will serve to establish a point of departure for the measures that will be outlined later.

Canadians have always looked to the Arctic with pride. Yet issues of sovereignty and security in the Arctic area claimed by Canada have been prominent and contentious since the formation of the country in 1867. The Canadian claim to the Arctic comes, of course, from the transfer of British rights and claims. Various other countries have, from time to time, disputed the Canadian claims, but most of these have been resolved.

Canada's ability to exercise sovereignty over its own waters, land mass and airspace has always been regarded as being of the utmost significance and importance for Canadian governments and for many citizens. Yet the matter of providing the means to acquire that ability has been viewed as more a question of finance than of necessity—a luxury that would be nice to have, but only if it is affordable. Thus successive governments, while formulating foreign and defence policy, have attempted to provide the minimum required to be devoted to such matters, without unduly arousing the ire of those who would prefer to spend less—or more—on Canadian sovereignty.

In defining its security policy for the Arctic, Canada has had to take a number of factors into account. Canada's geographic position in the world has meant, first, that it has had to pay particular attention to the policies of its neighbour to the south, perhaps more than is the case with others. Second, with the onset of the Second World War and then the development of the cold war, Canada's position between the two then-super-Powers exerted a powerful influence on its defence policies.

In matters of national defence, Canada has always sheltered under the defence umbrella of another country. For the first seven decades of its existence, it took refuge under British protection; in 1938, the British umbrella was replaced by the American. The suggestions of Secretary of State for External Affairs Louis St. Laurent, which led to the formation

of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, and the later Canadian-American establishment of the North American Air (now Aerospace) Defence Command agreement were attempts not only to make the world a more secure place, but also to ensure that Canada would not be overwhelmed by the unilateral actions of the United States. In its relations with the Americans, Canada has contributed to the common security effort, enough to ensure respectability, but perhaps not a penny more.

All of this has meant that Canadian defence expenditures with relation to the Arctic have not been at the level advocated by those who were convinced that the country needed the ability to accumulate detailed knowledge of the various activities taking place in the Arctic.

In the immediate post-Second World War period, the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force cooperated in Arctic exercises conducted under plans for Defence of Canada Operations. These exercises were not maintained and complacency set in, although from time to time efforts were made to pass off the occasional Canadian military presence in the North as meaningful attempts at the exercise of sovereignty.

The Northwest Passage is a particular point of contention with those who do not recognize it as being Canadian property. Indeed, the United States, for a variety of reasons, in 1969 and in 1985 openly sailed civilian vessels through the passage in what was regarded by many as a challenge to Canadian sovereignty. These voyages caused much concern in Canada.

A New Defence Policy

In 1987, the Canadian Government published a White Paper: "Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy for Canadians". It reflected, to a large degree, the rise

in concern among Canadian parliamentarians and citizens about the Arctic.

This White Paper was the first comprehensive governmental statement on defence in a decade and a half. In his foreword, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney said:

> "But just as the Alliance can only prosper through shared effort and a common impulse, so too Canada must look to itself to safeguard its sovereignty and pursue its interests. Only we as a nation should decide what must be done to protect our shores, our waters and our airspace. This White Paper, therefore, takes as its first priority the protection and furtherance of Canada's sovereignty as a nation."

Some of the language of that White Paper has been rendered inoperative by the end of the cold war. But the contention that the Arctic is "an area of growing strategic importance" remains valid, and it thus provides a government-approved philosophical basis on which to build future security measures.

The White Paper went on to discuss the growing accessibility of the Arctic due to the emergence of large numbers of nuclear-powered submarines. It posited the use of the Arctic by Soviet submarines and noted that "in light of these circumstances, the Canadian navy must be able to determine what is happening under the ice in the Canadian Arctic, and to deter hostile or potentially hostile intrusions. At present, the Canadian navy cannot carry out in the Arctic these roles essential to our security and sovereignty".

The White Paper debated the merits of nuclear-powered submarines versus other underwater detection devices and came down squarely on the side of the submarines, announcing plans to procure them for the Canadian Forces. A strong belief is held by some that the planned purchase of nuclear-powered submarines was as much to

detect the underwater operations of its allies in the Canadian Arctic as it was to detect Soviet movements. Others believe as strongly in a slight variation of the foregoing, that is, that they were to carry out the tasks in Canadian defence responsibility that its allies were doing for it. It is difficult to have a country's national sovereignty exercised by another State. The acquisition of the submarines was seen to be for the promotion of Canada's security and sovereignty rather than for use against others. In other words, they were a national CSBM. Another example of a national CSBM is the Canadian Arctic Sub-Surface Surveillance System, which has as its aim the discouragement of unannounced use of the waters of the Northwest Passage and Canadian archipelago.

In less than two years, however, the submarine project, along with many other planned defence acquisition programmes, had been cancelled for financial reasons. The Minister of National Defence acknowledged that Canada did not have the capability to exercise sovereignty in the Arctic and that we would have to depend on our allies for information about what was happening in the Canadian north.

Governmental officials also pointed to the fact that Canada and the United States had, in early 1988, concluded the Arctic Cooperation Agreement, which bound the United States to seek the permission of Canada when it wished to send civilian ice-breakers through waters claimed by Canada to be internal. It is to be emphasized, however, that the Agreement did not cover underwater vessels or military ships. Two years later, the Government cancelled plans to build the Class 8 ice-breaker. There are many in Canada who still believe that, given recent initiatives in the economic area, the need for a powerful Arctic ice-breaker may be greater than ever. It has been said that Canada's best way to assert its claims over the Northwest Passage and other northern internal waters would be to encourage international activity in the Canadian

Arctic—on Canadian terms and in accordance with Canadian law.

Some Canadian Arctic Initiatives

The past three years have seen the undertaking by Canada of a number of initiatives which have, as their broad and conceptual aim, the establishment of confidence in many and diverse areas.

Prime Minister Mulroney, on 24 November 1989, announced the establishment of the Canadian Polar Commission "to develop a new cooperative ethic with our northern allies and neighbours". The mandate of the Commission was multifaceted: to (*a*) enhance Canada's international polar profile by fostering and facilitating international and domestic liaison and cooperation in circumpolar research; (*b*) promote and encourage national institutions and organizations to support the development and dissemination of such northern knowledge; (*c*) increase international focus on circumpolar concerns such as Arctic haze, the greenhouse effect, and air- and water-borne toxins in the food chain; and (*d*) support the Government's Science and Technology Decision Framework and the role of the Innovation Strategy by improving the coordination of the diverse and dispersed Canadian polar research community.

On 20 November 1989 an agreement on "Cooperation in the Arctic and the North", designed to foster collaboration in scientific, technological, economic, social and cultural fields, was signed by Canada and the USSR. Four days later in Leningrad, Prime Minister Mulroney called for the establishment of an Arctic council to be composed of politicians of the eight Arctic countries to provide for increased bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

In the latter part of April 1990, the eight Arctic countries met in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, and discussed various environmental matters. The Secretary of

State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, said that Canada was determined to solve "Arctic environmental problems through an overall circumpolar strategy that combines environmental responsibility with sustained economic growth for the Arctic and its peoples".

Far-reaching consultations on many matters, including arms control and disarmament, were conducted by Soviet and Canadian officials in Ottawa in June 1990. Two months later Canada was instrumental in the formation of the International Arctic Science Committee. In June 1991, Canada and the other seven Arctic countries signed a Declaration on the Arctic Environment flowing from an Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy and establishing an Arctic monitoring and assessment programme.

As evidence of the greater desire on the part of those living in the Arctic to become more involved in the overall security of the area, the Northwest Territories government, on 1 November 1990, released a discussion paper on "Military Activity in the North and Establishment of a Circumpolar Zone of Peace and Security". The main recommendations of the paper were in the areas of: (*a*) a central Arctic demilitarized zone; (*b*) Arctic "open skies"; (*c*) aerial CBMs; (*d*) sea- and air-launched cruise missiles; (*e*) unilateral Soviet initiatives; (*f*) a conference on Arctic security and cooperation; and (*g*) the creation of an ambassador for circumpolar affairs.

Security in the Arctic: The Need for a Comprehensive Approach

The first duty of any Government is to establish and preserve the security of the nation and its citizens. National security may be defined as the preservation of a way of life acceptable to the population and compatible with the needs and legitimate aspirations of others. It includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal subversion

and freedom from the erosion of political economic and social values which are essential to the quality of life.

Only by approaching the challenges of security in such a comprehensive manner can it be ensured that CBMs achieve their aim in the broadest possible sense. As was declared in the Final Document of the 1987 International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development:

> "Security is an overriding priority for all nations. It is also fundamental for both disarmament and development. Security consists of not only military, but also political, economic, social, humanitarian and human rights and ecological aspects. Enhanced security can, on the one hand, create conditions conducive to disarmament and, on the other, provide the environment and confidence for the successful pursuit of development."[4]

Clearly, there is a need for an "overall Arctic security strategy".

One of the challenges facing the design of any CSBMs is how to reconcile the right of a nation's control over its sovereign territory with its obligations to contribute to international peace, security and stability. Obviously the approach to be adopted is one of integration and positive cooperation, even healthy competition, on the national and international levels. The resulting security framework will be one which takes into account the legitimate concerns of all and infringes on the rights and privileges of none.

Another aspect to be considered when designing CSBMs is the intended audience. Whose confidence and security are we attempting to strengthen? World leaders? The citizens in the street? Peace and security organizations? The media? The United Nations? The military? The native

population? The developers? It ought to be clear that the answer must be "all of the above".

It is apparent that the new and changing security situation in the rapidly-evolving and emerging international order requires a consideration of many factors before the task of suggesting CSBMs is attempted. A suggested list of such factors might include:

a Traditional military factors. The inherent right of a country to take measures to ensure it is capable of self-defence and indeed of exercising sovereignty over all of its territory cannot, must not, be abrogated. One of the problems will be to prevent the institution of a maximizing upward militarization spiral which sees arms procurement and deployment increasing at a rate inconsistent with the legitimate needs of national security.

b Environmental factors. The ecosystems of the Arctic are unique and fragile, and have thus far remained relatively undisturbed. As the Arctic grows more important economically and politically, and as human activity and industrial development in the region increase, steps must be taken to ensure that degradation of the Arctic environment does not occur.

c Economic factors. It must be ensured that any necessary Arctic commercial development is carried out in a manner consistent with the attainment of the broadest possible level of security.

d Socio-political factors. Until recently, the sparse population of the Canadian Arctic has claimed only scant attention from the Federal Government. It is apparent that settlement of aboriginal land claims will proceed at a much faster rate in the future. Any future Arctic security regime, to be effective, will require significant input and substantial agreement from native communities.

e The need to solicit broad participation in designing an Arctic security regime. In establishing CSBMs, Governments ought to take into account suggestions put forward by non-

governmental organizations (NGOs). Also very valuable are the deliberations of independent but government-facilitated groups such as the Canadian Department of External Affairs Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control. Of particular importance is the attitude of the various native communities in the Arctic countries and their desire to become much more actively involved in their future Arctic security.

SEALS: A Student Initiative

Recently a group of students at Glendon College of York University in Toronto (Glendon Commission on Arctic Security) released a proposal for greater Arctic security under the title "Security for the Environment of the Arctic Lands and Seas (SEALS)". The Commission defined a secure environment as one in which the core values of a State and of its citizens are protected from real or perceived threats, be they internal or external in nature. The core values of an Arctic security system would include: (*a*) the integrity of the physical environment; (*b*) preservation of the social and cultural characteristics; (*c*) prudent economic development; and (*d*) the maintenance of a stable, participatory political atmosphere. Further, the Commission asserted that a "security system should facilitate interpersonal and inter-state cooperation. It should also better coordinate security concerns of all members consistent with individual and national interests, while at the same time preserving individual integrity and national sovereignty".

It is precisely this type of student involvement in the very real challenges inherent in establishing a new international order which ought to be fostered and encouraged. If we are to achieve the broadest possible security regime it is necessary to involve the broadest possible range of participation.

Thus a comprehensive CSBM security framework will contain inputs on a wide range of functional areas from a

diversely-drawn but philosophically-united groups of organizations and individuals.

CSBMs for the Arctic Region

While acknowledging the indispensability of CSBMs in non-military fields, such as cooperative international environmental and economic endeavours, and their great value in reinforcing overall security, detailed development and design of CSBMs in those fields will be left for a later occasion.

For Canada and most Canadians, the aim of CSBMs is to ensure the security and sovereignty of the country in a manner consistent with the attainment of international peace, security and stability. Such goals ought to be, and probably are, espoused by other countries as well, thus establishing a commonality of purpose.

CSBMs are unilateral, bilateral or multilateral in nature, establishment and application. One approach is not necessarily better than another. Initiatives by one country or on a particular level ought not to be held hostage to progress in many or all areas.

What needs to be established is a broad "quilt" framework representing the complete security picture that is desired. States can then take unilateral or cooperative action in filling in the "security squares" of the quilt. To be completely effective and to provide the maximum possible assurance, all the squares of the quilt ought to be filled in. However, there is some reassurance to be gained from a quilt in which only some of the squares are filled in. The path to be followed is one of necessary action at the appropriate time by the Governments most disposed to declaring CSBMs.

One important point to stress is that while it may well be that CSBMs agreed in international negotiating bodies for application in certain geographic areas may not be transferable *en masse* to another theatre, there are, no doubt, some

which have relevance and it may also be that there are lessons to be learned from the procedures employed by others.

It is clear that there is scant room for the development of original Arctic CSBMs. Where there is room for uniqueness is in the universality of the approach itself, that is, in the design and realization of an overall Arctic security strategy.

Suggestions for Inclusion in a List of Possible Arctic CSBMS

a Confirmation of the need to act in all areas in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

b Acceptance of observers and participants from other countries on Arctic exercises and scientific expeditions.

c Opening territory, seas and airspace to "Open Skies" type inspections, including environmental monitoring.

d Opening of Arctic military facilities to inspection.

e Only those military personnel, weapons, equipment and ammunition necessary for the purposes of surveillance, exercise of sovereignty and national defence will be stationed in the Arctic. All those deemed to be excessive will be removed.

f Military forces will, at all times, be mindful of the need to respect the Arctic environment.

g Prior notification of major land, sea and air exercises and of significant increases or decreases in stationed military strength.

h Appointment of an Arctic ambassador with responsibility for all matters of Arctic security.

i Publication of political and military doctrine concerning the Arctic, including training methods and the complementary sharing of intelligence and information.

j Establishment of an international NGO concerned with Arctic security, fashioned along the lines of the Canadian Consultative Group on Disarmament and Arms Control.

k Establishment of an Arctic council. Any Arctic council that is established should have within its mandate military security considerations. While these are discussed in other forums, a unified approach among Arctic nations would be of benefit.

l Establishment of an Arctic early warning system, including an Arctic crisis communication network.

m Establishment of "zones of security".

n A prohibition of nuclear testing in the region.

o The convening of a conference of representatives of the Arctic countries and NGOs to consider the whole question of CSBMs and an overall Arctic security system.

In suggesting possible CSBMs for the Arctic, it is perhaps best to start with those which can be declared and developed unilaterally. From that point, it will be easily recognizable where cooperative or multilateral steps can be taken which build on the actions of single States.

Conclusions

The adoption and implementation of CSBMs representative of those outlined above will go a long way towards enhancing security and stability in the Arctic and will be a positive and concrete reflection of the aspirations of the Secretary-General.

It must be acknowledged, however, that the absolutely essential agreement in the establishment of any system of security is the exercise of positive political will. If world events of the past five years have illustrated anything, it is the soundness of the maxim that if political will is present, the "impossible" very quickly moves through "probable" to "attainment".

Notes

1 The author wishes to thank Dr. George Lindsey, CISS Senior Research Fellow; Captain Keith Nesbit, Deputy-Commandant and Director of Maritime Studies, Canadian Forces Command and Staff College; and Susan McNish, CISS Research Officer for their valuable comments and assistance.

2 A/47/277-S/24111.

3 It is noteworthy that a perusal of appropriate articles in "*Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*" and of six separate United Nations meetings on the subject of CSBMs reveal meagre mention of the Arctic or the north or of the applicability or transferability of CSBMs to that area of the world. Perhaps one outcome of this and the other papers in this chapter will be the convening of a conference on CSBMs and the Arctic.

4 A/CONF.130/39, part II. The Final Document was issued as a United Nations publication (Sales No. E.87.IX.8).

A View from the Scandinavian North

Finn Sollie

Arctic Strategy

Land War and Maritime Strategy

The question of Arctic security is a relatively new issue in the history of international affairs and is still largely unknown to the general public. Nevertheless, political divisions in the modern world and development of new weapons and war-fighting techniques in the twentieth century extended strategic thinking and military operations to the far reaches of the Arctic. Consequently the European Arctic, with Svalbard and the Norwegian and Barents seas, long regarded as a distant region of scant military concern, began to attract interest. In the war of 1914–1918, the battle over maritime supply lines added a new dimension to war in Europe. Begun as a traditional continental land war, the First World War also became a war over overseas supplies, with supplies and reinforcement across the North Atlantic from North America as the most important target.

With that, questions were bound to arise about sea control in future wars and the advantage of securing bases for naval operations. The need for bases would be particularly

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great for major military Powers with limited access to open seas. In this regard, northern bases would be important, as evidenced by the German occupation of Norway in the Second World War and submarine and air strikes from Norwegian bases. Losses brought on allied convoys bound for Russia's northern ports were particularly heavy.

The Soviet Experience

For the Soviet Union, which suffered Western interference in the Far North in 1919–1920, with troops landing at Murmansk and in the White Sea region in support of the opposition to the Red Forces, and experienced the dangers of naval and shipping war in northern waters during the Second World War, the new development was a double lesson. On the one hand, it became obvious that defence of the northern maritime approaches would be essential in any major war where the Soviet Union might become involved and, on the other hand, that a strong navy and submarine fleet would be essential for effective fighting in a new protracted war in Europe. With open access to the Atlantic only from its northern ports—Baltic and Black sea ports have long, shallow and undefended approaches to the high seas—the Barents region would give optimum opportunity for Soviet naval operations, offensive as well as defensive. That conclusion was bound to raise political questions *vis-à-vis* neighbouring Norway, whose mainland coast and polar islands, including Svalbard and Bear Island in the middle of the Barents Sea, could be used to secure or to endanger maritime operations in and through the Barents and Norwegian seas.

To secure control of these northern approaches, the Soviet Union demanded in 1944 that Norway should agree to cede Bear Island to the Soviet Union, allow Soviet political control over Svalbard by establishing joint rule—condominium—there, with equal rights for both countries to have military bases and troops on the islands. The demands were in direct

conflict with the main provisions of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920, which recognized "the full and absolute sovereignty of Norway" over the islands with the specific provision that Norway was "not to create nor to allow the establishment of any naval base. . . [or] any fortification in the said territories, which may never be used for warlike purposes".

The demands would have facilitated Soviet political and military control over the European Arctic and were repeated in 1946, before they were shelved, probably for fear of reactions from other States, including the great Powers, which would have needed to agree to a revision of the Svalbard Treaty (the name of the Spitsbergen Archipelago was officially changed to Svalbard in 1925). Also, new developments in arms technology, notably the American possession of the atomic bomb, first used in the summer of 1945, upset traditional strategic thinking and required new priorities in Soviet military planning. The primary problem now lay in nuclear arms and the need to offset a nuclear threat from afar in a situation where protracted conventional land warfare depending on naval support and maritime supply might not be the primary danger.

Nuclear Strategy

With concentration on nuclear strategy, and for economic reasons as well, Stalin's original plan for naval development, which included a vast submarine fleet, was abandoned, and massive expansion of the Soviet Navy was delayed until the 1960s, when the lessons of the Cuban crisis (1962) called for a new and different Soviet Navy. In the new programme, the Northern Fleet operating out of the Murmansk region had first priority, and strategic submarines carrying nuclear-tipped missiles were to be a vital element, together with airborne atomic bombs and long-range intercontinental missiles, for nuclear balance *vis-à-vis* the United States. At first, with limited-range submarine missiles and a need for strategic submarines to operate close to

intended targets, the passage problem and need for forward sea control remained. Later, however, in a bipolar world where Norway was protected under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), political pressure for strategic advantage was no longer possible. Eventually, beginning in the 1980s, new developments in missile and submarine technology allowed for a new strategy where forward deployment of strategic submarines to distant waters was no longer necessary and, consequently, where the passage problem through the Norwegian Sea was less urgent. On the other hand, withdrawn deployment meant that the northernmost waters, including the Barents Sea, became more important in Soviet nuclear strategy.

The most recent Soviet submarines, the Typhoons and Delta IVs with deployment beginning early in the 1980s, carry long-range missiles which can be fired against any target in the northern hemisphere from any position in Arctic waters, and they have a special capability for under-the-ice operation. They present a horrifying threat, with each submarine carrying arms with an explosive power equal to that of all the weapons used by all Powers during the entire Second World War, and a dozen such submarines operating from bases on the Kola peninsula, close to the Norwegian border. With American forces following these operations in Arctic waters in order to track and offset the threat and maintain the military balance, the northern waters have become an Arctic Mediterranean and meeting-ground for nuclear super-Powers. A new dimension has thus been added to the waters between Norway's mainland and its polar islands, making them a nuclear staging area as well as a strategic passage to the polar basin and to Russia's northern ports.

Arctic security after the Second World War has been intimately linked to the strength, structure and strategy of Soviet forces, and to United States and NATO strategy to balance and offset a Soviet threat, and vice versa. The European Arctic, roughly defined as the region north of the

Arctic Circle, between Greenland and Norway's Jan Mayen in the west and Russia's Novaya Zemlya and Pechora area in the east, now serves as a strategic fulcrum in the global naval and nuclear balance. The question now is whether the break-up of the Soviet system and progress in international disarmament and, most important, troop withdrawals and force reductions in Europe will open opportunities for strategic disengagement and peaceful cooperation in the Arctic as well. As a long-term observer of strategic developments in East-West relations in general, and of the northern region in particular, I find grounds for only guarded optimism.

Continued Insecurity

It must be noted that arms reductions and troop withdrawals in Central Europe so far have had no parallel in the Far North. Here, Russian force levels are maintained and, in some regards, have been increased in the last few years. Also, while arms agreements and unilateral measures signal major reductions in long-range strategic and intermediate nuclear weapons, those reductions apply primarily to land-based systems and bombers, and sea-based systems are not reduced proportionally. True, some sea-based systems will be reduced, and a number of Russian submarines and surface vessels will be scrapped. However, the most modern missile systems may be retained, and their proportional weight in the total arsenal will increase. Thus, the relative value and strategic role of Russia's sea-based systems may be greater after the reductions than before. Moreover, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the value to Russia of its naval bases on the Baltic and the Black seas will be greatly reduced, with the result that the relative significance of the non-nuclear element of the Northern Fleet too will increase within the total defence structure. In these circumstances, the Arctic, and notably the Barents region in the European Arctic,

will continue to be a focal point for strategic planning and security concern.

It is still quite impossible to predict how far security and strategic interest will affect overall policy planning and, specifically, if military concern will interfere with general improvement in Arctic relations and limit prospects for future international cooperation in the Arctic. As the largest Arctic State, Russia will have a key role. Russian performance in that role will be determined in large measure by the internal political and economic development in Russia itself, and by the statesmanship of its new leaders. To better understand the possibilities and pitfalls in future Arctic development, some knowledge of past events leading up to the present and its problems may be helpful.

Lessons of History

Northern Sea Routes

On 10 May 1553, three ships under the command of Hugh Willoughby, with Richard Chancellor as chief captain and deputy, left Greenwich on the Thames for a fateful voyage into then unknown waters of the Far North. This was only one of many expeditions sent forth in those days by monarchs and enterprising merchants to explore uncharted seas and distant lands for fame for captains and fortune for principals, but it was the first to explore the European Arctic for the specific purpose of finding a northern passage to the Far East. That was not achieved before Sweden's A.E. Nordenskiöld succeeded in navigating the length of the Northeast Passage some three hundred years later, in 1878–1879.

The North-west Passage was sailed for the first time in 1903–1905, by Norway's Roald Amundsen (the man who was to "conquer" the South Pole in 1911, a month before Robert F. Scott reached it). Since then, new shipbuilding and propulsion techniques have opened Russia's northern sea

route in the North-east Passage for commercial shipping in the summer and fall season. Ice conditions in the North American part of the Arctic, on the other hand, are more severe and so far have not allowed a similar development through the length of the North-west Passage. For all practical purposes, therefore, any hope of developing year-round traffic between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific through the Arctic must be based on the Russian route or, as has been proved possible by the Russians, a more direct route across the Arctic Ocean itself. In both cases, the Arctic approach will follow the course used by the first explorers, between Norway's mainland coast and the now Norwegian polar islands.

The Unique Spitsbergen Regime

Early in this century the need for a legal regime for Spitsbergen could no longer be neglected, and Norway invited negotiations to establish one.

With Russia opposed to Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen, and Sweden no longer willing to support a Norwegian claim, a proposal was made to maintain the fundamental principle of *terra nullius* for common use, and to establish a joint commission with representatives from Norway, Sweden and Russia to administer Spitsbergen on behalf of all interested parties. A draft treaty was prepared by the three and presented in 1914, shortly before the outbreak of the First World War, and was promptly rejected by other parties, with the United States as the main opponent. After the war, partly on American initiative, the question was raised in connection with the peace settlement, and negotiations between the most interested small States and the victorious great Powers led to adoption of the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920.

As losers in the war, Germany and the Soviet Union, which surrendered to Germany shortly after the revolution (Brest-Litovsk, March 1918), did not take part in the

negotiations, and Soviet protests were of no avail. In the end, Norway secured Soviet approval of the Treaty in return for early Norwegian recognition of the Soviet regime.

This settlement of the Spitsbergen issue was possible both because Norway enjoyed a high degree of goodwill among the winning parties for the role played by the Norwegian merchant marine and its losses during the war, and because the Treaty satisfied international interest.

—First of all, agreement on Norwegian sovereignty removed Spitsbergen from potential political contention and dispute among the major Powers. In this context, it should be noted that Germany had forced the Soviet Government to accept a provision for German rights on the islands in the Brest-Litovsk Treaty.

—Secondly, Norway accepted a responsibility to avoid and prevent the establishment of naval bases and fortifications on the islands, thus removing them from military influence and use in war, a possibility that otherwise could have become attractive to States with naval ambitions after their experience during the war.

—Thirdly, Norway agreed to retain the international commons principle to the extent that "subjects" from all parties should have free access and equal rights in mineral exploration and in resource development and other industrial and commercial activities.

As it turned out, economic opportunities proved to be far less attractive than expected, and in practice Norway and the Soviet Union were to be the only countries to maintain permanent settlements and operations on the islands. Norway now has one active mining town and Russia has two. Nevertheless, the Treaty right of any "subject" to access and equal conditions does imply that other States have a right and, indeed, an obligation to observe and, if necessary, to interfere on behalf of citizens if their rights are violated. Most important, though, is the right and interest States will have to

prevent any party from violating the military restrictions of the Treaty. In this respect the Spitsbergen/Svalbard regime represents a common international interest.

The Russian Arctic

In purely statistical terms, Russia controls some 45 per cent of the coastal periphery around the Arctic Ocean. In addition to its northern lands, with nearly half its territory in the permafrost zone, Russia has an Arctic continental shelf extending up to 2,000 kilometres, or 1,250 miles, from the mainland, as the largest continuous shelf in the world. Most of Russia's Arctic waters and continental shelf suffer from heavy ice and hazardous operating conditions, and much of its northern land is barren, distant and devoid of communications. Yet these are the very areas where Russia has its major potential for future development of natural resources and, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and independence for the southern republics, Russia has become more dependent on Arctic resources for industrial and economic development. This is particularly true for energy resources, notably oil and natural gas, where the West Siberian Basin already accounts for the major part of Russian production. Future development to maintain and expand production depends heavily on improved ability to explore and exploit even less accessible regions, including continental shelf areas with extreme ice problems.

This is not the place to discuss future economic and industrial development in Russia, but it should be pointed out that the current systemic breakdown and the present serious industrial and economic crisis will restrict for a long time Russia's own capacity for rapid development of new natural resources in adverse Arctic conditions. Arctic development, like Russian economic and industrial improvement in general, may depend for a long time on the will and ability to secure outside support and participation. Desire for cooperation in

Arctic ventures was expressed by Mikhail Gorbachev in the so-called "Murmansk Initiative", in a speech in October 1987, and later was reiterated by spokesmen for the new Russia. Western nations have shown interest, and the Norwegian Government recently initiated a plan for cooperation in the Barents region, beginning with land-based projects and moving into offshore ventures, if and when agreement is reached on a fixed border between the Norwegian and the Russian national zones in the Barents Sea. From the Norwegian point of view, a fixed border for clear distinction between separate national jurisdictions is a fundamental precondition to be met before projects for cooperation in the Barents Sea offshore region can begin. On land, on the other hand, cooperation and joint projects will be welcome now, including programmes for plant modernization to reduce pollution and for updating nuclear power stations and disposal of nuclear waste.

Future Prospects

Borders and Barriers

Together with the deep sea-bed, polar regions are the last parts of the globe to be conquered by man and to be included in the international legal order and State structures. Even though systematic exploration of the Arctic began as early as 450 years ago and organized exploitation of Arctic resources and northern trade developed soon thereafter, fixed borders and distinct divisions between States and jurisdictions were late in coming in many parts. Even in Scandinavia, where there had been nation-States for a long time, the Russian-Norwegian border was not established until 1826. Jealously guarded as the legal limit of national sovereignty and a sacred fence for national integrity, the new border was not seen as a barrier. Traffic and trade continued to move as freely as before and family ties across the border remained close. The traditional "pomor trade", which began early in the

eighteenth century with ships and merchants from Kola and the White Sea area trading in northern towns in Norway, continued to thrive and Norwegians continued to fish, trade and settle on the Russian side of the border.

The Russian Revolution and the Soviet regime stopped all that, and old social and economic contacts between Norway and Russia in the north were broken, but continued in the narrow corridor to the Arctic coast which belonged to Finland after independence (1920). With Soviet conquest of the corridor in the Second World War, contact was broken and an impenetrable Soviet security zone was established along the border. Soviet protectiveness was not limited to the land border, and contacts were reduced to an absolute minimum throughout the Arctic, including in Svalbard, where both countries had mining towns. Soviet xenophobia was evident all around, but increased with political polarization after the war, and in its Arctic, security and military demands barred even purely scientific projects where the Soviets themselves would have benefited. Thus, when a third International Polar Year was planned (the first two were organized in 1882–1883 and 1932–1933) and arranged as a more inclusive International Geophysical Year in 1957–1958, the Soviet Union refused joint planning and programmes for the Arctic, while cooperating closely in Antarctica. When Sweden planned a scientific expedition through the North-east Passage in 1972–1979 in celebration of the centennial of Nordenskiöld's first passage, Soviet permission was not given even though Soviet scientists were invited to participate.

A Time for Change?

With glasnost, all that has changed and the border in the north is open again with traffic increasing in both directions, including a new generation of "pomors" who come in numbers to peddle trinkets for hard currency and Western tourists eager for a look at the other side and a taste of cheap

vodka to boot. Far more important, local officials, entrepreneurs of all kinds and representatives from academic institutes and cultural organizations now find open doors and eager partners for discussion and planning of exchange programmes and joint ventures in many fields. The hope is that communication will nourish understanding, and that cooperation will promote interdependence and contribute to mutual goodwill and common security. In Norway., the Government has begun studies of confidence-building measures at sea as a first step to reduce military tension and to prevent incidents in sensitive northern waters.

Even so, progress towards active programmes and effective cooperation with Russia has been slow. Political indecisiveness and bureaucratic bungling no doubt contribute to the impasse and that problem probably is no worse in the north than elsewhere. On the other hand, Russian hesitation in the north may be deepened by military opposition and political sensitivity on security issues, as witnessed, for example, in the opposition to President Yeltsin's plan to hand back to Japan the captured Kuril Islands in return for needed credit and a desired peace treaty to formally end the Second World War. Similar barriers seem still to be effective in the European north, with the Northern Fleet unwilling to accept measures that might affect its strategic advantage in Arctic waters.

Gorbachev's reform programme did indeed open the way for improved relations in the north, and his Murmansk Initiative in October 1987 outlined an ambitious plan for Arctic cooperation. Nevertheless, at about the same time, during his visit to Oslo in January 1988, Soviet Premier Ryzhkov stated flatly that the problems of the Barents Sea were so difficult and serious that the Soviet Union would not agree to establish a fixed border before conditions had improved. Instead, he now proposed, after some twenty years of negotiations for a border agreement, that a special zone be established for "partnership and mutual trust", with the clear

implication that security, as defined by the Soviets, was the primary objective. To Norwegians, the Ryzhkov proposal was starkly reminiscent of several former Russian and Soviet efforts to establish condominium and other forms of mixed jurisdiction in the north in an apparent wish to establish a base for influence beyond fixed and secure borders.

The contrast between the President's inviting openness and the Premier's brusque assertiveness was more than a difference of style and it seemed to reflect strong internal disagreement within the Soviet apparatus. This time, however, Norway's protest and objections seemed to encourage a less rigid attitude in Moscow. After a while, negotiations were reopened with Soviet agreement that a fixed border was the goal. In quick order, agreement was reached on some 75 per cent of the 1,700-kilometre-long border, and negotiations now continue to settle the remaining part. This is the most important section, near the mainland, where security and the strategic interest weigh most heavily and, also, where the fisheries as well as the potential for offshore oil and gas resources are greatest by far. From the Norwegian point of view, demonstrated determination on the part of the new Russian Government to complete the negotiations is essential for confidence in Russian intentions in the Far North, and final agreement on a fixed border is a precondition for economic and technical aid and joint ventures in these northern waters.

A further "test" of Russian intentions and attitudes may lie in the reaction to a Norwegian scientific expedition planned for 1994–1996 to mark the centennial of Fridtjof Nansen's drift across the Arctic Ocean with "Fram" (1893–1896). The expedition may employ a Russian ice-breaker (with a Norwegian flag) to sail east along the Siberian coast before entering the ice to drift across the Arctic deep-water basin, and use Russian bases for crew rotation and supplies. Scientific programmes, with Russian scientists invited and eager to participate, will be conducted outside the Russian

200-mile zone, and include plans for seismic investigation of the deep sea-bed, which could interfere with submarine operations. Naval spokesmen might object to this, even if the programme is conducted in international waters, and with the Navy controlling the air bases to service the expedition, reactions could be indicative of problems in accepting proper balance between international freedom of the seas and national security in the Arctic.

In this context, it should not be forgotten that political as well as military elements still cling to an extreme interpretation of the so-called sector principle, which was used in 1926 to claim Soviet sovereignty over lands and islands within straight lines from the Soviet coast to the North Pole, and would like to see that sovereignty expanded to include the ice-covered waters as well. A nationalistic revival and hard-core military influence could move in that direction and insist that Russia's growing dependence on northern bases and resources would require more effective control to protect Russian security against infringement and threat in Arctic waters.

Cooperation and Security

The opposite argument, of course, is that the best approach to security is to encourage international cooperation in scientific investigation as well as in resource development and management, and that cooperation and coordination will result not only give in a better economy, but in improved security as well. There is no doubt that activities will increase in the Arctic, that Arctic as well as other nations will benefit from the wise use of the whole region, and that we all depend on effective protection of the Arctic environment. As the greatest Arctic nation, Russia has greater opportunity and responsibility than most in drafting the Arctic course, but we have a common responsibility for the balance between national interest and international benefit.

Security in the Arctic: Past, Present and Future

Lev Voronkov

Introduction

The concept of "Arctic security" did not exist at all as a topic on the international agenda until the middle of the twentieth century, and the Arctic has continued to be a poorly studied region.

Today it is difficult to believe that the North Pole was reached by Robert E. Peary as recently as 1909, and that the North-east Passage was first navigated in one season as late as 1932 by the icebreaker *Sibiryakov*.[1] Since that time, this harsh region has found itself the focus of major international attention. How did this happen, in such a brief period, to a single geographic region surrounded by a number of States not having undisputed claims to it? Today, as before, the Arctic is not and cannot be an independent subject of international relations; the indigenous peoples do not play a role independent of the States to which they belong.

While the circumpolar States have a tremendous impact on the state of affairs in the Arctic, they also have interests which go far beyond the borders of the region. The situation in this important area is therefore determined more by the general evolution of the international political climate than by specific regional questions, and appears to be a consequence of fluctuations in relations between the largest and most influential States.

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From this perspective it is reasonable to ask whether the concept of Arctic security was born of the cold war, and whether the end of the cold war will put an end to the concept itself? Will it exist in the future, in a post-confrontational world, or will it be dissolved in the broader understanding of security which is emerging and may become dominant in the twenty-first century?

This paper assesses the state of security in the Arctic in the past, in times of confrontation between East and West, at present, when the world is painfully overcoming the heritage of confrontation and attempting to find a formula for a "new world order", and with regard to the future. In the twenty-second century, international relations may be concerned, not with rivalry, but with efforts on the part of all nations to respond to global challenges and non-military threats to security, and to ensure the security, rights and freedoms of individual citizens regardless of race, nationality, religion or the place where they live.

A Bit of History

Although the history of Arctic exploration covers hundreds of years, only at the end of the nineteenth century were efforts made to develop broad inter-State cooperation for research and development of the region.[2] The traditional view, based on early experience of exploration and utilization of the Arctic, was that the water and islands of the region were for common use, and did not belong to anyone. However, the situation started to change in the first decades of the twentieth century, as a trend developed for individual States to lay claim to Arctic islands. Though the United States recognized Danish interests in the whole of Greenland in 1916, it still kept an eye on the area. In 1920 the United States informed Denmark that it did not recognize the right of a third country to acquire Greenland, should Denmark wish to dispose of it.[3]

The Paris Treaty, signed in 1920, recognized Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen and determined that all the States participating in the Treaty had equal rights to utilize the territorial waters and land space of Spitsbergen. The former Soviet Union acceded to the Treaty in 1935.

The Treaty could have served as a good model of international cooperation, maintaining the Arctic as the common heritage of mankind or transforming it into an international condominium. This, however, did not take place. In fact, the Treaty of Spitsbergen stimulated the trend of States laying claim to parts of the Arctic.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Spitsbergen, the Government of Soviet Russia declared the White Sea south of the Kanin-Nos-Sviatoi-Nos line to be its internal sea. The possibility of establishing a Canadian Arctic sector attracted the attention of the Canadian parliament in 1924. In connection with Russian-Canadian disputes concerning the affiliation of the Wrangell Island, the Soviet Government issued, on 15 April 1926, a decree declaring all lands and islands, both those already discovered and those which would be discovered subsequently within the limits of the Soviet Arctic sector, as being Soviet territory (with the exception of the eastern islands of the Spitsbergen archipelago, internationally recognized at this moment as belonging to Norway). Russia also put forward arguments in favour of declaring Siberian seas (Kara, Laptev, East-Siberian, Chukotsk) as historically Russian seas.[4] As is well known, the problem of sovereignty over the North-west Passage, that is, the northern maritime way between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans through the straits of the Canadian Arctic archipelago, is not resolved: Canada considers the straits to be its territorial waters, while the United States considers them international.

This is not the place to analyse why the trend towards international cooperation in exploration and utilization of the Arctic, which began at the end of the nineteenth century, has

not been further developed. It is appropriate, however, to note that any international cooperation in this region would be defective without the participation of Russia, whose northern coast extends through an arc of almost 150 degrees.

The Russian revolution of 1917 and the two world wars did not promote international cooperation, while the trend towards laying claim to sectors of the Arctic became even stronger.

During the Second World War, the military rivalry of the opposing sides gave a powerful impetus to military utilization of the Arctic and to a growing awareness of its strategic importance. "Security in the Arctic" was perceived by each rival in terms of promotion of its own military interests in the region. These interests, as it became clear, were interwoven. For example, control over Greenland was quite important militarily for preventing hostile forces from gaining access to North America.

Germany's extension of the battle zone to the eastern coast of Greenland in March 1941 (communication with meteorological stations in the north-eastern part of Greenland was maintained by Germany right up to 1943) impelled the United States and Denmark to sign an agreement on the defence of Greenland, under which the United States recognized Denmark's sovereignty over the island and got the authorization to construct fortifications to be used by the air forces and navies of the North American States. The agreement was to remain in force until the threat to the peace and security of the American continent was over.[5] By the end of the war the United States had established thirteen army bases and four naval bases in Greenland. In the course of the war, Germany made a landing on Spitsbergen. The communication lines in the North Atlantic played an important role in delivering the Western allies' assistance to the USSR, and savage battles were fought for control over them.

Thus, during the Second World War great expanses of the North Atlantic and the Arctic were drawn into the confrontation, and the struggle for control over these areas constituted a vital element of the military strategy of the belligerents.

At the beginning of the cold war, territories and expanses of the Arctic were "snatched up" by the opposing sides rather than by polar and circumpolar States.

The post-war military strategy of the Western allies was determined mainly by military-technological capabilities of delivering nuclear and other warheads to targets on the territory of the adversary. Thus it became most urgent to establish a network of military bases in the vicinity of the USSR and its allies. These bases could also be helpful in controlling vital communications between North America and Western Europe, in accumulating a strategic potential for a war and in containing possible attempts on the part of the Eastern bloc to expand.[6] Military facilities in Greenland and Iceland were seen as being able to play a tremendous role in the implementation of this strategy. While discussing the draft of the would-be North Atlantic Treaty, the United States stated that if use of such facilities could not be ensured, the goals of the military alliance would not be achieved.[7]

The emergence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) helped to focus these concerns. Membership of Canada and some northern European countries possessing territories in the Arctic created the preconditions for involving the Arctic in the military security of East and West.

On 27 April 1951, Denmark and the United States signed an agreement on the defence of Greenland (to replace the 1941 agreement). The United States paid increasing attention to northern Greenland (closest to the Soviet polar borders) owing to the growing role of strategic bombers in the military policy of both sides. Norway declared the inclusion of Spitsbergen within the sphere of responsibility

of NATO. Between the United States and Canada a military agreement on the control of the polar regions, where they abut each other's territories, was signed. The agreement contained provisions for the development of Alaska and the Canadian far north and for the establishment of a chain of aerodromes from Alaska to Greenland.

The old idea of colonization was gradually being replaced by the concept of zones of political and economic influence.[8] The process of claiming rights over sectors of the Arctic is going on today in the form of delimitation of continental shelves, and fisheries and economic zones.

As East-West confrontation intensified, the military and technological capability of the rivals continued to grow not only in the the North Atlantic, but also in Arctic waters covered by ice, and the airspace above the Arctic began to acquire strategic importance. It is in this context that the modern concept of Arctic security has emerged.

The Arctic Component of a Policy of Deterrence

East-West confrontation was rooted in ideology. Each side tried to reinforce its belief system by military power, which was justified in the public mind as a guarantee of peace and survival. One of the most important tasks of each side was to "deter" the enemy by demonstrating the ability to defeat or to inflict unacceptable damage in case of aggression. Deterrence could not work efficiently without the proper equipment. Military-technological superiority was perceived by political and military leaders on both sides not only as a means to prevent hasty actions of an adversary, but also as an instrument to gain important political and strategic advantage. In this confrontational pattern of international relations, which spread to other States and continents, other oceans and outer space, the Arctic had an extremely important role to play.

In contrast to other geographical areas, the Arctic touches the territories of both North American States and Russia. The Arctic Ocean provides the circumpolar States with an expanse of common water (the major part of which is covered by ice), which gives them the possibility of direct access to each other.

The Arctic is situated on the shortest airway between North America and the territory of the former USSR. There are vital navigational and transportation arteries along which intensive commercial and military exchanges between Western Europe and North America take place.

In times of confrontation, it was inevitable that the geostrategic position of the Arctic would be exploited for military purposes. In addition, the Arctic was of growing interest because of its enormously rich natural resources.

During the cold war, the military-strategic interests of the rival States were dominant in this region, very often at the expense of other considerations, including ecological problems and the well-being of indigenous peoples.

The Arctic's role in East-West military-political strategy evolved, adjusting to growing military-technological possibilities.

The loss of the West's monopoly on nuclear weapons as well as the emergence of new means of delivery induced both sides to bring their military strategy into conformity with new realities. The former Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral G. S. Gorshkov, has pointed out that, within the framework of new military strategies, "oceans were declared to be rather extensive launching areas for different carriers of strategic weapons, designed for destruction of important targets on the territory of the adversary, rather than arenas of struggle for communications".[9]

Under these changed circumstances, naval forces began to develop into the most important element of Western armed forces. Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) tended

to become a more significant part of strategic forces, while aircraft carriers became the basis of naval striking power and one of the main means of carrying out the "flexible response" strategy *vis-à-vis* the East.

The Western allies continued to enlarge their arsenals of heavy bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The Secretary of the Navy in Ronald Reagan's Administration, John Leman, formulated the most important function of the allied naval forces as that of fighting and winning in the most defended areas of the enemy.[10]

American bases on polar territories of allied countries made possible the implementation of this strategy by helping to display and to supply large naval forces and to ensure their aerial coverage.

The emergence of military systems capable of undertaking surgical strikes against centres under the political and military control of the enemy stimulated a relative increase in the role of those elements of strategic forces that were mobile and could not be detected by an adversary. Opportunities to use SLBMs under the Arctic ice-cap made this element of the strategic balance as well as the Arctic region in general vital to the security of both sides.

Naturally, in order to maintain SLBM operations under the ice-cap of the Arctic, both sides had to acquire special military equipment to facilitate navigation, orientation, targeting, transmission of signals etc. and to reinforce anti-submarine defence. Special attention was devoted to the operation of submarine hunters, which pursued the adversary's strategic submarines from their home bases all over the open sea, including the Arctic Ocean.

East-West rivalry and the increasing significance of the naval segment in the military balance highlighted the prospects of the former USSR to acquire general sea power. Its geographical location set rather limited opportunities for direct access to the high seas, the straits of the Black and Baltic

Seas being controlled by Turkey and Denmark; respectively. In the eastern region of the country, climate is unfavourable and the possibilities of reaching the high sea are limited. Moreover, the eastern region is remote from the industrial centre of the country. Only on the Kola Peninsula did the former USSR have harbours open all year round and direct access to the high sea. In assessing the Soviet Union's potential for sea power, a group of American experts came to the conclusion that the USSR, even if it expended enormous effort, was doomed to have only a defensive maritime strategy.[11] Thus it was natural that the major part of Soviet strategic submarines and surface vessels, as well as powerful naval aviation groupings, were concentrated at the Kola Peninsula for use in the Arctic basin.

NATO's military command tried to gain strategic advantage from these geostrategic "weaknesses" of the enemy through various means, among others, through deployment on the territory of the northern European members of the Alliance, and to make deterrence more convincing.

In spite of tensions between Canada and the United States related to the question of sovereignty over the North-west Passage, their common interest in opposing the military threat of the East helped them to overcome disagreements as far as us of the North-West passage by American submarines on patrol under the ice-cap was concerned. The United States-Canadian air-defence system (NORAD), created in 1958, was dedicated to supervising the airspace of the circumpolar areas in order to intercept hostile bombers. In 1985 the agreement on NORAD was extended, and the United States combined the military structure of NORAD with the united outer space command of the American armed forces.[12]

Further escalation of East-West military rivalry was to draw the Arctic more deeply into military confrontation and could have transformed the region into a neuralgic knot. Each side considered exploitation of this area in terms of its own

interests. The possibility of destabilizing international relations—a step that could have had uncontrollable consequences for international peace and security—was inherent in this philosophy.

The need to bring the arms race in the Arctic under control and to prevent further aggravation of military confrontation gave birth to the concept of Arctic security. This was perceived by each side in terms of ensuring its own security in the region. However, the means to achieve these objectives differed qualitatively.

Proponents of *détente* promoted stabilization in the region, advocating the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones of different configurations, implementation of confidence-building measures in the Arctic in general and in naval activities in particular,[13] limitation of naval operations in the proximity of international communications lines and of international straits etc. It was hoped that such measures would pave the way for a political dialogue, which could limit military rivalry.

In addition, a wide variety of proposals was put forward by different Governments and by national and international non-governmental organizations with the aim of facilitating international cooperation in the exploration of the Arctic and protection of its ecology, exploiting opportunities for enhancing communications and transportation links between different States and continents, fostering closer cooperation between the indigenous peoples, and promoting the utilization of the Arctic's natural resources for the benefit of humanity.

Proponents of a tough approach continued to emphasize that deterrence was the best way to signal that the West would defend its values and ideals by all available means. In their judgement, acceptance of the proposals mentioned above might make deterrence less convincing.

The confrontational character of international relations in the Arctic created quite rigid restrictions on any interaction of States belonging to different alliances, even in those fields where the need for cooperation was considered vital. Moreover, access to the polar regions was limited for security reasons, and thus other important problems were neglected.

Towards a Post-Confrontational World

Although the momentum of confrontational thinking and behaviour continues to leave its mark on international relations, it is dissipating. The cold war is over, and the military policy of States is gradually being adjusted to these new political realities. Now the former adversaries are eager not to deter, but to convince each other that they do not have any aggressive intentions. It is very likely that a radical transformation of the functions of the armed forces will take place. They may, for example, guard borders on the basis of a non-offensive defence policy, and take part in peace-keeping and rescue operations. Although States will not renounce the possession of strategic nuclear armaments unilaterally, they have started to reduce them in accordance with the principle of equal security.

A number of important arms control agreements in both the conventional and nuclear fields have been concluded. In July 1992 the United States and the Russian Federation agreed on further radical reductions in their arsenals of nuclear warheads.

These developments have obvious implications for the Arctic. Owing to the general relaxation of international tension, inter-State cooperation in the Arctic is gaining momentum. The trend towards replacing former confrontation with partnership is in the interests not only of the circumpolar States, but also of the international community as a whole.

Arctic security will, in the future, probably be based on cooperative efforts of the circumpolar States to solve specific problems of the region. For example, taking into account the fact that the Arctic ocean is an indivisible biological complex, they would exploit the natural resources of their continental shelves and fisheries in accordance with their common interest and the interest of the international community in preserving and augmenting these resources.

The political policies and economic activities of the circumpolar States cannot be solely their prerogative. In environmental issues, for example, they are obliged to follow commonly recognized standards and criteria, and to treat the Arctic as the common heritage of humanity.

One can suppose that international governmental and non-governmental organizations will play an important role in converting the concept of Arctic security into an integral element of a general strategy of the international community—one aimed at establishing relations between modern society, on the one hand, and nature, on the other, which will promote sustainable development and fully recognize the security needs, rights and freedoms of every individual citizen of the world.

Notes

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13 See in more detail, Ronald G. Purver, "Arms Control Options in the Arctic", Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Issue Brief No. 7, 1987.

14 *Pravda*, 18 February 1990.

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Defensive Security Concepts and Policies

Military Doctrine: How to Define It

Miljan Komatina

The intense debate on variations of new security policies, commonly defined as "non-offensive defence", concentrates on quantitative indicators concerning military capabilities and defence postures aimed at reducing the possibility of surprise attack or major offensive operations. This debate is accompanied by sceptical criticism, mostly due to the character of modern weapons and the difficulties encountered in distinguishing between offensive and defensive war-fighting. The decrease of military conflict, normalization of East-West relations and a new *rapport de force* have renewed the vigour and focus of the debate, widening it to include broader problems of security concepts, even relating to military doctrines, a term used, as a rule, very loosely. All these problems are treated mostly, if not solely, from the narrow perspective of East-West rivalry, almost totally excluding local or regional competitions.

Military dictionaries have, in general, failed to develop a definition of military doctrine appropriate for a changing

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world in which all military matters, in their political, strategic or tactical aspects, tend to constitute a unity of action and concept. My contribution would, therefore, be mainly to focus on basic factors determining military doctrine as a concept that shapes a country's long-term position on the political and strategic dimensions of military matters. In examining this subject, I will question rather than give answers, since these factors are unknown, with the fundamental changes taking place in international society.

Two groups of questions seem to be particularly relevant. First, to what extent can the current adjustments in security policies and postures be equated with the evolution of military doctrine in its basic political significance and military relevance, and secondly, to what extent are the new trends in international relations sufficient to lay the foundation for qualitatively new security concepts?

The answers to these questions, of course, can be found only through concrete analyses of political and social developments in the world. However, certain *theoretical clarifications* establishing a *basic concept-meaning*, if not a complete definition, are needed. This task obviously cannot be accomplished within the framework of a seminar. But it should be mentioned in order to underline the fact that there is a substantive difference between military doctrine that reflects a country's *basic position on war*, and military doctrine that reflects a *temporary change* in some aspects of that basic position owing to changes in the country's security policies.

The term "military doctrine" is used in different ways, even in academic essays, professional analyses and official documents, and relatively little attention has, until recently, been given to the study of the concept. A growing number of analysts are now recognizing that military doctrine in various ways serves as a general guide to modern strategy and is a fairly accurate indicator of main trends in military-related

matters. Yet, observers are rarely unanimous with respect to the concept and its objectives.

Military doctrine varies from country to country, but a certain body of rules and principles remain essential for its conceptual understanding. They go beyond the changes in current security policies, which derive mostly from the evolution of political relations, military technologies, social structures, etc. These different interpretations are gradually converging in the nuclear age, but they still remain deeply divergent in both their definitions and their applications.

Study and research in the field of military doctrine face manifold difficulties and limitations, both technical and conceptual, such as: lack of accurate information owing to secretiveness on sensitive military matters; rhetoric or political ambiguities in official documents; preconceptions regarding potential enemy intentions, which distort the evaluation of the real threat perception; differences in terminology; and rapid developments in military technology, military art and science. Particular difficulties appear when one attempts to determine the criteria for distinguishing military doctrine from strategy, operational tactics and battlefield concepts. On a less general level, there are difficulties in distinguishing offence from defence and offensive activities from defensive ones, and in *ensuring defence without engaging in offensive operations*, although defensive operations do require adequate offensive capabilities.

It is, therefore, difficult to grasp even the outlines of a "correct" definition. In general, to get closer to the meaning of this elusive concept, military and political analysts cover a variety of subjects from which they derive the main thrust of military doctrine. They point mostly to four areas:

—The long-term evaluation of the international system; its evolution and the character of State interaction; views on the nature of conflict in the international community; identifi-

cation of long-term political goals; the relationship between goals and means; the character of the socio-political system;

—Basic considerations with regard to war, its origins, scope, typology and relationship to policy; war-aims; preparation for war; evaluation of its inevitability, "winnability", duration, effects;

—Evaluation of the general security environment, potential threats and dangers; perceptions at different phases of the balance of military power; geopolitics, economic development and security policies deriving from them;

—Ways and means of waging war; use of armed forces, their structure, deployment, equipment, weapons development, combat readiness, training, control of combat decisions, battle concepts, etc..

None of these general approaches could, however, be considered valid by itself. One of the first questions is, therefore, how to state the problem, taking into consideration the "cause-effect" relationship between all political and military matters, and the fact that, in general, most aspects of military doctrine belong to the category of political decisions. One has, therefore, to differentiate between what is temporary and what is firmly rooted in a country's tradition, political and military culture or geography. A system of traditional vested interests based on military strength is slow to evolve into a concept of purely defensive security as a cooperative undertaking. For example, many analysts point to the tradition of a strong continental army for the former USSR, and a strong navy and air force for the United States.

Whatever approach is taken in the search for an approximate definition, military doctrine cannot be reduced to a rigid formula or be inferred from temporary military capabilities or changes in the political climate in any given politico-strategic environment. As a point of departure for a working definition, one can say that military doctrine is a dynamic, unified body of thought on military matters in the

process of change, with strong links to fundamental political thinking, especially the basic principles concerning the overall use of military power to attain political goals. Although to a large extent military doctrine is a "question of politics", it is not the mere result of political decisions already adopted and imposed upon the military whose duty it is to elaborate the means to implement them. It cannot be equated with an ideological model or with any "scientific theory" either. Furthermore, it cannot simply be reduced to providing only answers to anticipated questions, excluding the search for solutions to qualitatively new problems posed by the evolution of the international and domestic systems. Its body of long-term principles and objectives, based on a steadily evolving political, geographic and cultural environment, is vital to military theory in general at the highest strategic level and to anticipating modes of war-fighting.

The evolution of such a body of thought cannot be equated with the changing postures of armed forces and weapons, partial measures of disarmament, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), elusive concepts of trust and confidence, fragile security structures, or non-offensive defence. It can be neither identified with nor separated from strategy, politics, security policies and objectives, even on an operational tactical level. It is in fact difficult to determine whether, or to what extent, military doctrine shapes military policies in their strategic and operational aspects. Many aspects of warfare, for example, forward defence (called also operational doctrine), air-land battle concepts, attrition warfare, flexible response, mutual assured destruction (MAD), offensive defence, training doctrines, combat readiness, postures, etc., are used interchangeably to refer to both strategy and doctrine.

The United States and the former USSR, as the main actors in world competition, had different views on how to define military doctrine. According to official documents,

many aspects of their doctrines evolved in the post-war period together with their mutual relations, military technologies and reactions to what they considered each other's strategic intentions.

The Soviet concept of doctrine united the political (relationship between war and policy, nature of war, "correlation of forces") and the military aspects (character and function of armed forces, principles of military construction, combat readiness, deterrence and war-fighting capabilities, preemption, targeting, etc.), but separated both aspects from the strict definition of the mode of warfare. Soviet analysts described Soviet doctrine as "scientific" because it was based on ideological principles as well as on conventional military science; they considered it as "progressive" and "peaceful" because its aim was to defend the USSR and other socialist States against aggression emanating, in their opinion, from the Western world.

Military doctrine as such was always given the highest priority and it exerted considerable influence on the political goals of the Soviet State both in war and in preparing for war. While political aspects of the doctrine were considered constant, its military aspects (limited to means and methods of waging war) were susceptible to change. Soviet military doctrine was also largely deduced from the Soviet and Russian tradition, and was "reactive" to the real (or assumed) strength or weakness of the Western bloc. In its purely military dimensions, Soviet doctrine gave preference in general to offensive warfare, emphasizing surprise, speed and coordination of all forces, arms and services. In cases where war was judged imminent, fear of attack made consideration of preemptive strikes acceptable. Soviet doctrine was based on strict rules.

The Western, largely American, view of military doctrine is less theoretical and more pragmatic. It governs strategic thinking, including operational tactics even on the

lowest level. In Western military and political thought, doctrine includes basic views on war preparation and modes of war-fighting, but focuses mainly on variations of nuclear strategies/doctrines—from mass retaliation to different levels of limited options. In the American view, often expressed in lengthy operational manuals, there is no place for ready-made solutions or permanently "valid principles of war".

The doctrines of the cold war were based on a belief in the inevitability of conflict between two basically antagonistic and irreconcilable States and societies, and on non-acceptance of defeat under any conditions. Hence the predominance of military factors, global conflictual competition with the entire world as the arena, and the unrestrained pursuit of objectives. In such a world, military doctrine tended to be offensive both in defining security in terms of expansion, and in war-fighting. This mentality generated endless arms races, perpetual political tensions and regional conflicts.

The cause-effect relationship between the new emerging political and strategic reality, on the one hand, and subtle and gradual changes in the basics of military doctrine, on the other, cannot be examined without taking stock of the nature of the transformation of international relations in terms of *rapport de force*, degree of acceptance of common values and standards of behaviour, leading to common security as a system of peaceful management of global contradictions.

The crucial question is to what extent the new international situation reflects a qualitatively new concept. Is the "problem of war" considered in a radically different way? Obviously, the world of today is different: the security dilemma between East and West has softened, and security is now perceived less in terms of conflict and more in terms of a balance of mutual interests; there are enhanced possibilities for the resolution of new disputes and more open polities; there is greater momentum towards war prevention and de-escalation of regional tensions in different parts of the

world; there have been important breakthroughs in two fields of disarmament, namely conventional weapons in Europe and strategic nuclear arms, with less provocative military postures and weapons deployment. The world is closer to recognition and even implementation of some basic principles of international law, contained in the United Nations Charter and related to human rights, self-determination and security; there are greater possibilities for unity of purpose and action between major military Powers and convergence of concerns and views on the rationality or irrationality of war and on its effects; and the United Nations is beginning to be recognized as a focal point of international cooperation. If one cannot say that a new world has been born, it is indisputable that events and ideas are evolving in a positive way in at least one part of the world; there is less global bipolar rivalry as one super-Power, while remaining nuclear, is unable to marshall geopolitical power.

We are, however, too close to events to fully assess their significance and to judge the importance and durability of the changes. Certain sources of offensive military doctrine are gradually disappearing in response to new realities, but important traits of that doctrine have remained the same. To ignore them would be dangerous. There is greater clarity on threat perception, on the role of the United Nations, on the effects of the arms race, on the non-usability of nuclear weapons and on the role of deterrence, but, at the same time, the level of military power, with the continuous building of new weapons and modernization of old ones, can fulfill a variety of purposes, including the achievement of hegemony. Even if the danger of a "big war" has diminished, new risks have arisen with new centres of power and new political actors born of the disintegration of multinational States and the erratic creation of new ones, often on the basis of ethnic groups.

The changes that have taken place, except those with respect to *rapport de force*, are more quantitative than qualitative. Growing interdependence and a lessening of the danger of nuclear war should not hide the fact that the transformation of the global situation is only marginal. The replacement of one totalitarian system with a new, truly democratic alternative is only a process at the initial stage. Strong tendencies towards authoritarianism in the form of aggressive ideologies and nationalism on the part of "small and big" nations and opinion-moulding machines efface the boundary between war and peace; aggressors and liberators; truth and semi-truth; protection of human rights and abusive intervention. Different, often opposed, criteria are used for identical or similar situations dictated by *realpolitik*. The system of common security has not yet been institutionalized, and the United Nations does not yet serve as a nucleus of initiatives, decision-making or even coordination. Multilateral interaction is fragile; the role of military force, as a source of strength, remains an important tool of policy; deterrence and new technologies will be, for a long time, the basic framework for the survival of doctrines requiring the ability to carry war deep into the territory of the aggressor. On the global level, there are even greater social and economic inequalities and military imbalances. The third world remains tumultuous, with increased capabilities of provoking conflicts of global import through the diffusion and proliferation of new technologies. Such a situation may give rise to new arms races.

One trend is clear: important tenets of what was Soviet military doctrine are rapidly changing as Russia's capabilities are reduced and its social system, views on war, concepts of security and foundation of foreign policy undergo deep reform. At the same time, the doctrines of other Powers are responding peacefully to these changes. This has generated important adjustments in security policies in different

parts of the world and has removed the global dimension from many regional crises.

In order to discern the scope of transformation at the global scale, one has to see the situation not from a narrow Western or Northern perspective. Indeed, in that part of the world, a high degree of homogenization of common values and behaviour is taking place under the influence of common threat perception, economic development, the pressure of technology and the free market. On the other hand, these integrative factors cannot yet remove or control centrifugal forces, even in Europe, let alone in the rest of the world.

Defensive military doctrine or security policies only make sense if they serve the interests of all States willing to abide by the rules and participate in establishing them. The South, on the other hand, did not benefit from such development and has become even less relevant—certainly more marginal—in decision-making in the "new world order". On the global scale, there is not yet sufficient acceptance of common values and interests to preserve peace everywhere. Thus, the world may stumble into a situation which would be more unpredictable and chaotic than any we faced during the cold war. The developed world has become a safer place, but its security structures have not yet been adapted to other regions.

Although important battles for the new world have been won, the real battles have yet to begin. It is, therefore, not yet certain whether security has become a "positive sum game". Can turbulence or violent regional conflicts be confined to the point where they don't escalate into major crises? How long can economic underdevelopment or an all-out "trade war" be kept under control? Will "open" societies necessarily be more peaceful towards societies that do not share their values? Are new responsibilities emerging, or just a new balance of power? Can military doctrine be defensive, with nuclear weapons as a pillar of security? To

what extent is the world ready to receive and absorb the shock of further fragmentation? Will the power vacuum be filled with qualitatively new forms of coordination on the planetary level, with common security as the framework? Will arms control and disarmament become a permanent process covering all military activities, or will it remain only partial and quantitative?

The creation of a supersystem with deeper inequalities in economic and military power and absolute security for one part of the world would blur the traditional view of hegemony and security, replacing war with subtle coercion, intervention and weapons modernization. The hallmark of our civilization is a kind of dictatorship of military technology. Despite changes in some aspects of military doctrine, reflected in new security policies and an unprecedented degree of cooperation, the balance of power remains the chief arbiter, and a new foreign policy agenda is still unfolding. The process of integration is limited to the developed world, and militarily and economically strong States continue to dominate in matters of war and peace. Peace is becoming more divisible. In the midst of epoch-making change, positive reactive behaviour should not obscure the lack of an integrated approach and of a global vision.

Transition to Defence-Oriented Configurations

Andrzej Karkoszka

Political Aspects of Defensive Transition

Developments in international relations over the last few years indicate a clear tendency towards a growing recognition of States' interdependence in all respects. In the military domain, this recognition can be seen in the gradual acceptance of the idea that a State cannot achieve lasting security unilaterally, or one-sidedly, but only in a cooperative way that takes into account the threat perceptions and anxieties of other States. The most obvious consequences of this new attitude are the arms limitation agreements of the past few years and the ensuing growth of stability and confidence in the regions deemed for decades to be on the edge of conflagration. It is too early to say that military force has ceased to be a tool of foreign policy, but it has undoubtedly lost its former value as a decisive yardstick of States' power and security.

Because radical disarmament on a wide scale is not attainable in the foreseeable future, other ways of strengthening international security are being sought. The most promising one seems to be a transformation of the existing military potentials into non-threatening, less destabilizing

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and, as far as possible, defensive ones. This transformation, which in theory should finally result in exclusively defensive military capabilities, is conceived as something much more complex than disarmament or arms control. It may actually entail arming in specific types of weapons.

Being the result of political change and part and parcel of this change, defensive transformation is bound to be implemented in concert with other aspects of international relations. It may even be undertaken in its rudimentary forms in the context of antagonistic relations between States. But its more advanced forms, as prescribed by the theory of non-offensive defence, will probably necessitate gradual improvements in a wide range of political and economic interactions of States. Left alone, without attention being paid to the non-military aspects of security, defensive transformation would probably falter sooner or later. It may therefore be said that defensive transformation is equally a military and a political concept.

So far, the intensive theoretical and political debate on exclusively defensive postures has focused predominantly on the individual State's military forces or, at best, on bilateral military relationships. The multilateral setting, particularly one involving a number of small, medium and great Powers, has not been elucidated sufficiently by the theory of the concept, indicating a potential difficulty in its practical implementation. To be viable and durable in real life, defensive transformation cannot be confined to a limited number of States. It must address a wider spectrum of the international military order. Emanating from the old East-West military ramifications, it naturally developed in and focused on Europe. However, for obvious geographical, military and political reasons it cannot, even if applied there in practice, be sustained for long in isolation from other regions. This observation, if correct, seems to underline the very early stage of the formulation of the concept of a

defensive posture. The one developed for Europe will hardly be adaptable to other regions, each with vastly different military, political and economic conditions. The defensive posture of the European States, defined, for example, by the structural inability to launch large-scale offensive operations, might be, in the case of the African States, defined by entirely different arrangements and behaviours, some of them altogether non-military in character.

Defensive Structures and Great Powers—Incompatible Notions?

Even at a cursory glance, the military structures of the nuclear Powers with global military reach are the structures most visibly incompatible with the notion of non-offensive defence. The nuclear weapons' fire-power and the range of their means of delivery cannot be considered as being in the realm of non-offensive defence. Moreover, such Powers possess extensive air- and sea-lift capabilities, large oceangoing navies, global space- and ground-based command, control, communication and intelligence-gathering facilities, and military bases in foreign countries, all functionally tied to a global or regional power-projection. Although they are in the process of reducing their forces deployed abroad, they are ready to introduce an effective military force anywhere in the world on short notice if their interests are at stake. Power-projection of this kind requires extensive preparations of logistical support and adequate military matériel. The military doctrine of these Powers presupposes an ability to wage both offensive and defensive operations on strategic, theatre (operational) and tactical levels.

The possession of a long-distance and overwhelming conventional force-projection capability seems to be again, as it was in the pre-nuclear era, the most conspicuous quality differentiating a global great Power from all other, even nuclear, Powers. Possession of nuclear weapons alone

endows a State with strategic deterrence potential, which is, however, useless as a tool of coercion in a local or limited regional conflict. Without a technologically fully developed ability to project decisive conventional force over long distances, such a nuclear State cannot be considered today a real global Power. It is doubtful whether a State or States enjoying such a unique position in the international community will agree to relinquish it for the sake of the rather elusive idea of defensive international military structures.

Although their military potentials are incompatible with the concept of unequivocal defensiveness, the behaviour of nuclear Powers during recent years has played an important role in facilitating the developments leading to the widespread acceptance of the concept of defensive military posture. There is no need to argue at length about the impact on the world scene of the end of the great Powers' ideological and political confrontation, of the agreements on reduction and withdrawal of their nuclear weapons, and of the withdrawal and reductions of their ground forces deployed in third countries. Despite the fundamental role played by these developments in initiating the course of events on a wider scale, their influence has, however, had mainly a political character. Their military value, as far as the concept of defensive posture is concerned, seems limited, due to the fact that the offensive substance of the great Powers' military potentials has not been altered (except in the case of the former Soviet Union).

The postures adopted by nuclear Powers and those who aspire to a global role have a decisive influence on the nature of the international military order and thus, in the long run, will delimit the chances for a world-wide transition to defensive military configurations. In specific and confined geographic areas such as East Central Europe, for example, such a transition will probably proceed regardless of what is happening in the United States or in French military forces. Once, however, the Russian or German potentials become

shaped according to the prevailing technological and organizational tendencies set up by the American or French example of offensive structures, the continuation of the process of defensive transition in the region may be called into question. The great Powers are involved in all regions of the world. If their offensive capabilities are to be left unchecked while the military potentials in the respective regions undergo defensive transitions, the situation will become politically untenable. It is hardly possible that the international community would acquiesce to the prolonged existence of the present exclusive club of States endowed with an offensive power projection, nor is it likely that it would help to widen the gap in military capabilities in favour of these States.

The influence of the great and major Powers on the implementation of the concept of non-offensive defence is seen in a situation in which these Powers have small or even medium-sized States as neighbours. According to prevailing opinion, any effective defence, including one designed as non-offensive, calls for a counter-offensive potential on the tactical and, to a degree, operational level. In the case of a major military Power undertaking a truly defensive orientation for its armed forces, such a potential would most probably be quite large and in a state of readiness. According to traditional wisdom, one cannot doubt that, whatever the justifications for its existence, this counter-offensive force would always be seen by the smaller State as an offensive threat that would have to be reckoned with in case of political crisis. Despite the defensive posture adopted by the major Power, the outcome of such a situation would, in all probability, be a perception of lack of stability and subsequent recourse to armaments. Such a result would be likely to occur despite the argument, put forward by the proponents of non-offensive defence, that the best remedy to the inequality of military potentials is not competition in offensive capabilities—a competition which could never be won by a smaller

State—but an intensive investment in the weaker State's defence.

NATO and the Non-Offensive Posture

Until recently one of the obstacles to the wider European acceptance of defence-oriented military postures was a fear that their application on a national level would be detrimental to the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Because the early debates on non-offensive defence often presupposed a radical elimination of the offensive potentials of the two antagonistic blocs, including in particular nuclear weapons, that is, the linchpin of the Alliance's military doctrine, the whole idea was anathema to NATO. The theoretical solutions proposed by the advocates of defensivê posture constituted a drastic departure from the traditional NATO doctrine without, however, indicating how they could be realized in practice. The concept of non-offensive defence foresaw a strong territorial national defence. Since such forces were non-existent in a number of NATO States, they would have to be financed probably through resources thus far devoted to Alliance-oriented forces. Moreover, such territorial forces would be less responsive to the unified command structures. Thus cohesion of NATO could be undermined.

The events of the last two years have permitted a more positive re-evaluation of the concept of defensive posture by NATO. It actually turns out that the Alliance may have to absorb some of the basic features of non-offensive defence if it wants to survive the disappearance of any serious military threat on the continent. The adoption of the new strategic concepts and the ongoing reorganization of NATO forces seem to make possible not only a substantial numerical reduction of forces but, more importantly, a gradual shift in the entire NATO apparatus towards a defence-oriented configuration. While nuclear weapons, flexible response, and

forward defence were preserved as principles of Alliance doctrine, the decisions adopted during recent months indicate that the role of nuclear weapons is being de-emphasized; national contingents have gained in weight in relation to the stationed ones; reinforcement forces are becoming decisive in comparison to the forces deployed along borders; and the overall readiness of forces has decreased. All these changes have strengthened the non-provocative and non-aggressive nature of the Alliance.

On the other hand, certain issues of consequence have not yet been addressed adequately by NATO, and other factors lead one to think that it is not defensiveness but other concerns that have impelled the recent decisions of the Alliance. Among the issues that sooner or later will have to be addressed and that have clear repercussions for regional and international stability, one could enumerate the problems of military technology (weapons' modernization and military innovation) and the arms trade and dissemination of high-tech weaponry in the world, for which the NATO States, the main sellers of modern weaponry, bear major responsibility.

It also has to be admitted that, from a purely military point of view, increase in mobility, enhancement of a unit's fire-power and of command, control and reconnaissance, the steady drive for greater stealth in weapons and other forms of qualitative improvements result in an expansion of the offensive potential of NATO's forces, despite the reductions or other aforementioned positive measures. The expression "leaner but meaner" accurately describes the state of affairs.

Transition to a Regional Defensive System—The Case of Europe

Among the world's regions, Europe seems at present most likely to make a successful transition of local military potentials into a defensive configuration. This prospective transition appears to have a solid foundation: the political and

economic evolution of the East and Central European States, the dissolution of the Soviet federative State, the growing economic integration of the continent, the steady maturation of the CSCE process, the establishment of far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures, and the conclusion of the CFE I agreement, to name but the most obvious examples. However, it seems that this strong political base for further changes in the military domain may not be sufficient for their implementation.

The situation in the new States in Eastern Europe is volatile and will remain so for an unspecified period of time. The ethnic conflicts, economic disturbances, social unrest and conflicting territorial and border claims—all these factors may force the authorities of the new States to try to hedge their bets against worst-case scenarios by resorting to the one relatively stable State institution, that is, military force. Such a situation may prevail in the region for a number of years to come. All this may not and should not inhibit the continuation of defensive restructuring by adjacent States, even if they are in some way embroiled in the developments in the East. However, such a prospect is not encouraging and may be detrimental to the general political processes on the continent.

Mindful of the overly quantitative character of the first CFE agreement, the parties involved in the preparatory consultations on the future mandate of negotiations seemed generally to opt for measures encompassing, in particular, the reduction of the existing offensive potentials, and on establishing constraints that would include schemes for the appropriate structures and deployment of forces. This, when implemented, would be tantamount, for the first time in history, to a multilaterally binding system of defensive military structures.

Regrettably, these expectations did not materialize, as is evident from the content of the CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, "The Challenges of Change",[1] regarding, *inter alia*, the

future negotiations on arms control, disarmament and questions of security. The stated objectives of these negotiations are measures which aim at "keeping or achieving the *levels* [emphasis added] of armed forces to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond".[2] There is no mention of the problems of defensive structures or of qualitative arms races.

However, this visibly less ambitious programme is probably more suitable, given the aforementioned instability of the Eastern half of the continent. Thus it will probably be more appropriate to establish fairly general rules on structures and deployment, stressing instead and elaborating new and more ambitious confidence, security, constraining and control measures.

East Central Europe—The First Test of Transition

Although the transition to a defensive military posture may be discerned in the actions of several major and small military Powers and in various regions of the world, the East Central European States, particularly Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic and Hungary, are the first to undertake a complete defensive reorientation of military potentials in line with an officially adopted policy. These three States belong to the most numerous and typical category of small or medium-sized countries. Their experience in the transition may therefore be of interest to other States, and not only to those in Europe.

The three States under consideration here are no longer linked by an alliance. The abolition of the Warsaw Pact has given them complete freedom of action in the military domain, but not without a price. Because the entire spectrum of their military affairs—their military doctrine, force and command structures, weapons' acquisition, military R&D and production—was moulded according to the Soviet

pattern, departure from Soviet tutelage has forced them to undertake a profound revision of all these old patterns. The sheer dimensions of the problems involved have often overburdened the newly established, hence inexperienced, political bureaucracies, and the lack of any precedents in such an endeavour on an international scale has raised the financial, material and social costs. The increasing role of civilians in these States' security decision-making processes has opened up heretofore unknown, thus often difficult, points of military-civilian interaction. Equally novel has been the opening of military policy to public scrutiny and the growing involvement of society in the States' security matters.

Their newly established military and political independence, though cherished by all sectors of their respective societies, brought about a very unpleasant and disquieting feeling of strategic loneliness in each of the three States. Their trilateral cooperation in foreign and security matters has been slow to start, and it will never be able to replace the sense of security stemming from a formal guarantee issued by a great Power or a whole Alliance. The irreversible Western orientation of these States prompted them to seek such a guarantee from their new friends, but to no avail. Strategic interests and intra-Alliance politics foreclose the possibility of such a guarantee being issued by NATO or by any of the major Western Powers in the foreseeable future.

The complexity of transition to the new security requirements and to the defensive configurations of the military potentials of East Central European States is enormous. Several far-reaching processes had to be undertaken simultaneously, though only a few of them are complementary and a number of them are even contradictory. Even the most cursory recapitulation of them produces a long list. The processes in questions are: de-ideologization and re-nationalization of military forces, humanization of military service, reform of the legal system on which the military postures are

based, redefinition of the national military doctrine, geopolitical reorientation of military cooperation, professionalization of the armed forces, deep reductions of forces both under international agreement (CFE 1) and on a unilateral basis, redeployment of forces, restructuring of forces and of their command systems, redeployment of the logistical assets, modernization of weaponry and equipment, reorganization of the air defence system, conversion of military industry, and substitution of old foreign sources of weapons procurement with new ones.

In all three States an intensive debate on national military doctrine is taking place. The intention is to give the doctrine an official character in order to give its defensive aspects greater international credibility. The "defensiveness" consists of several elements: none of the States feels threatened or sees an enemy among the members of the international community. Their defences are to be established on the principle of "sufficiency", that is, the ability to defend their territory and the inability to wage major offensive operations. The task of the military forces is the defence of national borders and territory; by law they cannot be used in aggression. The level of forces, their deployment, structures, and weapons' composition should unequivocally be perceived as defensive. The States have obligated themselves to strive for a peaceful solution of any international disputes in which they may become involved. Foreign and military policy is to be aimed at the creation of a system of common security in Europe. The doctrine postulates drastic reductions of the present overall levels of forces down to and sometimes below the levels prescribed by the CFE 1 agreement. The ground forces are to be composed of operational and territorial forces. The small operational forces are to be much more manoeuvrable and with high fire-power. They are envisaged as being strong enough to launch a counter-attack to regain lost territory. This postulate entails in the case of each of the

three countries a substantial increase in certain categories of weapons (anti-tank, anti-aircraft) and in the mobility of forces (self-propelled artillery, combat and transport helicopters). The territorial forces are to be more numerous but in a low state of readiness in peacetime and armed only with light weapons and deprived of high mobility. To redress the pattern of deployment of their forces poised westward, the three States plan to move several large units and their logistic bases in order to spread them more evenly over their territories. Such a deployment is to give flesh to the concept of "circular" defence, in which all directions are treated as politically and militarily equal. The air defence is to cover all territorial airspace.

In reaction to the former substantial or, in some types of weapons and equipment, total dependency on Soviet sources, the three States plan to remedy the situation by, first, preserving and strengthening their own production capacities; second, undertaking intraregional cooperation; and third, utilizing multiple sources of military technology to the extent made possible by their budgets.

In terms of general indications of military preparedness, such as military expenses and the so-called "social density" of military forces, the East Central European States are planning to stay at the level of some 3 per cent of the State budget devoted to defence and of some 0.6-0.8 per cent of the population serving in the armed forces.

All the above described directions for the defensive transition of the military potentials of the three States are already in the second year of implementation. However, as it turns out, the implementation has proved to be exceedingly difficult and costly. In several instances the plans could not be fully executed and some have been postponed to a more distant future. The main difficulty stems, however, not only from the costs incurred by the military transformations, particularly those of transarmament, modernization and

redeployment, but from the overall economic conditions in the States as they undergo fundamental reforms and are, at the same time, battered by inflation and recession. The implementation of the defensive structures, at least initially, needs apparently much greater economic resources than those possessed by the East Central European States.

As a result of restructuring measures, the central military authorities were reshuffled, streamlined, and put under civilian control. The military districts were reorganized and, in the case of Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, new ones were created in the eastern parts of the countries. Several officer schools were disbanded or integrated into larger units. In Poland the two types of divisions, tank and mechanized, were reshaped into uniform mechanized divisions, with a lesser component of tanks. Each mechanized battalion of the seven Polish operational divisions received additional units of anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery. The strengths of the armed forces of the three States have been reduced by one fourth to one third of the total numbers. Military service has been shortened to 18 months. Several engineering and supporting units were disbanded. The reduction and destruction of weapons prescribed under the CFE I agreement proceed apace, with several hundred units already decommissioned and scrapped.

The planned redeployment of forces was to shift about 20-30 per cent of the ground and air forces to the eastern regions of the States. This relocation of forces had to be slowed down or postponed, however. The reason was simple: the military budgets of the States could not sustain the great costs of transporting several thousand tons of equipment and matériel, constructing new barracks and other technical infrastructure, new communication lines, roads and training grounds, new flats for officers, schools and health care centres.

The modernization of the aging armed forces of the three States was one of the priority tasks of the transition. The actual quality and age of different weapons systems varied from State to State; nevertheless, in several instances, particularly in aircraft, air defence systems, and anti-tank weapons, the armies lagged far behind modern standards. In consonance with the new military doctrine, the planned modernization was to concentrate on air defence systems (aircraft and missiles), guided anti-tank weapons, mine warfare equipment, and command and control systems. After the experience of the last two years and in view of ongoing economic difficulties, it may be safely assumed that, notwithstanding the improvements emanating from the relative increase of modern weaponry in their arsenals due to decommissioning of the old weapons under the CFE I Treaty, the modernization plans of the three States are beyond their reach for several years to come.

The price of Soviet weapons has soared and now equals those of Western origin, thus making them similarly unaffordable. Because of the internal disturbances in the former Soviet Union, cooperation in maintenance of weapons and timely delivery of spare parts, lubricants and other indispensable materials are more than haphazard. The present difficulties in the technical maintenance of the armed forces are approaching a catastrophic dimension with a highly damaging impact on their overall level of combat worthiness and on morale. Turning to the Western arms markets does not help, since Soviet weapons are incompatible with Western technology. The reorientation to other than Soviet or Russian hardware, if the financial situation permits at some time in the future, will proceed through all categories of weapons systems and will certainly take a long time. International cooperation in weapons procurement is only a partial and uncertain solution. The three States signed an appropriate agreement but, so far, the cooperation is limited to simple exchanges of

spare parts and mutual maintenance support, whereas the prospects for industrial co-productions are dim. The hurdle is that the military industries of these States are competitive rather than complementary. Moreover, the industries are undergoing radical conversions, and the chaos created by this and other aspects of economic reforms in these States makes it difficult to enter into joint procurement arrangements.

The range of military production in the three East Central European States is quite extensive, particularly in Slovakia and Poland. Until recently these industries consituted a kind of economic enclave, ruled by its own specific principles and composing a part of a huge, Alliance-wide military-industrial complex. This explains why in all three States extensive investments were made even in the 1980s, when all of them were already in deep economic crisis. The large credits making the investments possible are now to be repaid. The burdens of the financial conditions and the disappearance of internal and foreign markets for their productions have caused an unprecedented crisis in this industry. Dozens of factories and labs are being closed down and tens of thousand of workers and technicians are being laid off. The States have lost a large portion of their military-industrial base, some of which is indispensable for the modernization and preservation of viable armed forces.

The budgetary allowances for the national defence in the States in question have shrunk steadily over the last three years, both in nominal and real terms. At present the military operates on less than one third of previous levels of financial allowances. Despite the greatly diminished strength of the Polish army, for example, nearly 60 per cent of the military budget goes to the costs of personnel, with no money for purchase of weapons, training, and maintenance, not to mention the task of restructuring. This trend will apparently continue, despite the alarmingly rapid deterioration of the armies. The reason for this trend is first of all the deepening

recession and secondly the anti-military attitude of society, especially among the younger generation—a factor unknown before but increasingly decisive on the internal political scene. Although from a certain point of view such a situation may be seen as positive, in reality, when both the economic crisis and the anti-military tendency work together, the result may be counterproductive in terms of State security. As an officer writing in a soldier's daily in Poland remarked, the restructuring as seen from the bottom of the military hierarchy resembles "all-out destruction". The process that had originally aimed at a defensively-oriented transition may eventually lead to no defence at all. The strategic vacuum considered by some to exist in this part of Europe would turn out to be a military vacuum, with the prospects for stability in the region uncertain.

Notes

1 A/47/361-S24370, annex.

2 A/47/361-S24370, annex, sect. V (11).

Defensive Security: The Conceptual Challenges

Jasjit Singh

Defensive security, as a concept, born of the military doctrine of "non-offensive defence", which was formally adopted at Berlin by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) for the first time in May 1987, still remains in the very early stages of evolution. However, it holds out the promise of a fundamental change in the security paradigms that have existed since 1641. As it is, matters of national (and international) security constitute a complex interplay of various factors and elements in which perceptions play a crucial role. Therefore the potential for applicability of the emerging concept of defensive security in different dimensions—bilateral, regional, and global—can at best be examined only in the broadest conceptual framework, where one can seek to apply some of its principles to a specific environment. As it is, the bilateral framework of security varies tremendously across the globe. The South is concerned much more with security issues arising out of an inadequate pace of socio-economic development, and the security of the industrialized countries of the North has assumed substantively different dimensions. In either case, military power and its application can be expected to continue to play a crucial role in the security calculus, while political-economic-technology

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relations move on to become the real determinants of security in all its manifestations.

The first issue related to applicability that must be addressed is whether to treat the concept of defensive security strictly in military doctrinal terms or in a political framework, or perhaps in politico-military paradigms. This author has earlier argued that the optimum approach, if one is to translate the doctrine of non-offensive defence into practical effects on a more universal basis,[1] is to deal with it at the politico-military level. The reality is that if the political ideology and doctrine are aggressive and offence-dominated (as in export of revolutions), military doctrine will have to be offensive. If the political ideology is defensive, then the military strategy can be offensive, defensive, or a mix of the two. The concept of defensive security will therefore definitely need to be considered in essentially political and politico-military terms, so that purely military doctrines will flow from political policies rather than the other way around.

Framework for Application

At the outset there can be very little disagreement about the need for improving the foundations of security in the world. The integration of the global economy, the interdependence of political processes, the linkage between potential instability due to the South's underdevelopment and the industrial North's vulnerability to the spillover of turbulence from the South, and the potential of military power to destabilize the security environment—all these require a restructuring of the prevailing strategic doctrines and security paradigm. While conflict and application of military power have been integral components of human progress and history, two aspects deserve attention.

The rise of the concept of the "sovereign" nation-State in the Westphalian order reoriented the national security paradigm. Sensitivity to the concept of national sovereignty

itself channelled the security paradigm towards an open-ended search for *national* security which inevitably contained the seeds of the concept that security might be attained at the cost of the security of another sovereign country and also imparted a certain aggressiveness to the pursuit of national security.[2] Security became competitive and, in specific circumstances, confrontational and conflictual. Cooperation in security matters arose out of the compulsion to work together in "collective" security—inevitably against perceived threats. This itself created a similar competitive process—the Allies versus the Axis Powers in World War II and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) versus the Warsaw Teaty Organization (WTO) in the cold war. In many respects, the political and economic processes of increasing interdependence and integration gradually transformed the parameters of national sovereignty towards voluntary adjustment in a cooperative framework under supranational institutions, in which national sovereignty was partially subsumed. Hence the European Community (EC), Western European Union (WEU) and the concept of "Europe 1992". Similar development did not take place in Eastern-bloc States because of the absence of the voluntary basis for inter-State cooperation. In fact, sovereignty of WTO members was subordinate to that of the USSR and the Eastern-bloc alliance structures.

The fundamental modification of the concept of "sovereignty" of a nation-State permitted the application of the principle of non-offensive defence to arms control and security-building measures in Europe (like the process of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the conventional forces in Europe (CFE) agreements), in a regional framework. The alteration of the paradigm of *political* relations between the United States and USSR—an essentially bilateral process which has had global implications—provided the motive force for change. This change was expedited by the voluntary opening up of the closed,

authoritarian and dogmatic system of the Eastern bloc. The over-arching umbrella of nuclear deterrence provided a security guarantee under which it was possible to apply a degree of non-offensive defence doctrine (as in the CFE agreements). This points to the second important factor necessary for any concept of defensive security to take root: some form of guarantee is necessary to cover the risks involved (to national security) of moving from a competitive to a cooperative and defensive security paradigm. It is not my intention to argue here that nuclear deterrence and strategic parity provide the only means of insurance against risks in the transitional period, but to emphasize that nations—especially those whose sensitivity to their "sovereignty" and independence is very high (as indeed is the case for most of the developing world and for the newly independent States of the former USSR)—have a strong need for means and methods of reassurance to enable defensive security concepts to be accepted and translated into policies.

The second fundamental point is the high dependence on the Clausewitzian concept of "war as an instrument of policy" that has guided the security and national policies of nation-States for more than two centuries. The validity of this concept has increasingly become untenable. The concept also operates as the antithesis of any formulation of a defensive security paradigm. War with nuclear weapons, obviously, cannot serve any rational political objective. However, the industrially developed countries have become increasingly vulnerable even to a conventional war. The proliferation of nuclear installations, chemical industry and the highly developed, but integrated, functioning of the State and society places these countries at grave risk in case of a war with conventional weapons. The accidents at Chernobyl (USSR) and Bhopal (India) provide enough data to support the above. At the same time, the developing countries are extremely vulnerable to the risk of conventional war, which could

destroy their limited high-value economic-industrial assets. India's persistent efforts to get an agreement with Pakistan on non-attack on nuclear installations was motivated by this logic. The consequences of initiating the war against Kuwait has set back Iraq's developmental processes for decades. As the recognition grows that war implies not just the victory or defeat of military forces, but fundamental damage to the State and society, acceptability of the concept of defensive security (which, logically, should aim primarily at the prevention of war) will increase. In fact, pursuit of defensive security doctrine requires a basic conceptual, as well as objective, operational, re-examination of the effects of (conventional) war and the Clausewitzian concept of war as an instrument of policy. This would provide one of the important conceptual bases on which defensive security could be built at the bilateral, regional, and global levels.

The international community today has a renewed, reinforced interest in disarmament. In recent years there has been a perceptible shift in the approach to the issue: from the arms control approach of managing the arms race to first tentative steps towards disarmament through arms reduction agreements. The reduction of levels of armament by itself does not enhance security, but interfaced with doctrine and the concept of defensive and cooperative security, it starts to assume a special significance. Progressive disarmament and arms reductions (for that matter even arms control) within a conceptual framework, of which defensive security is the centre-piece, would be really meaningful, especially in providing the direction for arms reductions: not merely for the sake of reduction, but as the means to the larger end.

Selective arms reductions, for example of offence-oriented military forces, would not only make a positive contribution to disarmament, peace and security, but help establish the principles of defensive security. Defensive security concepts and policies have the potential for such

selectivity. Indeed this has been in evidence in the arms reduction agreements in Europe, where the doctrine of non-offensive defence provided an important basis and rationale for what was desirable for both sides. At the same time, the very concept of defensive security requires increasing transparency.

Mistrust is one of the most powerful motives for adopting policies and postures that lead to national security paradigms based on imposing insecurity on another State. The process of eliminating mistrust really lies in the domain of political relations. At the same time it needs to be noted that at purely military levels, any viable doctrine, for a variety of reasons, tends to rely heavily on offensive action and posture. Military efficiency is heavily weighted in favour of the offensive and aggressive spirit. In recent centuries this was reinforced by the politico-military doctrine of war as an instrument of policy, and at the political level by the self-centred concept of security and sovereignty of the nation-State and of transnational ideologies. It was also possible for States to pursue this approach unilaterally, although efforts to enhance security at the cost of the security of other States did lead to the action-reaction phenomenon of the arms race. Defensive security, on the other hand, cannot really be pursued on a unilateral basis, and this is both its greatest limitation and strength. By definition, the concept requires a degree of cooperation and reciprocity between States and must concede to other States the right to equal security. States considering adoption of defensive security concepts must pay special attention to improving political relations, especially with countries which might pose a security problem. Confidence-building measures, arms control and reduction processes would naturally constitute important ingredients of a non-threatening basis of inter-State security.

One of the important factors reinforcing mistrust is the military posture and potential for *surprise*. In purely military terms, surprise is an important ingredient of an efficient military doctrine, since it helps to generate the favourable asymmetry in time and space so critical in military conflict.[3] But the potential for surprise not only reinforces mistrust, but, with current rapid advances in technology, constitutes a powerful factor of instability. As it is, with every increase in accuracy, mobility range, and fire-power of military systems, the incentive for pre-emption increases significantly. Fundamental change in security doctrine through a shift towards defensive security can hardly be achieved without addressing the destabilizing element of surprise. This also needs to be tackled at the strategic, operational and technological levels.

In order to reduce the destabilizing role of surprise and pre-emption, *predictability* has to be strengthened without endangering the security paradigm. Transparency is an element of critical importance in improving predictability and removing mistrust. Transparency can be sought and instituted at different levels and in different ways. Transparency is needed in relation to military capabilities, postures and activities as much as it is needed in relation to technological dimensions of a State's military power. In order to apply the concept of defensive security, bilateral and multilateral steps are needed to enhance transparency at the local, regional and global levels. At the same time, States must be encouraged and assisted in establishing national technical means of monitoring and verification as part of the transparency objective. This would require a major reversal of policies, since surveillance systems have been held back and countries, especially in the South, have been discouraged from acquiring such capabilities. From this standpoint, many of the non-proliferation regimes, like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), are retarding the growth of transparency.

Prevention of War

One of the means of application of the concept of defensive security is through appropriate changes in the national security objectives of States. Almost without exception, modern States include *defence* as the key national security objective even if it is not expressly stated in these terms. Defence itself then is based on the strategy of either *forward defence* or *territorial defence*. In both cases the doctrine also rests on a very high degree of willingness to use force and to resort early to it. Where possible, national defence is sought on the basis of deterrence through punishment. This is where nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, offensive air power, etc. assume not only a legitimate role, but form the basis of national security calculus. In all cases, defence inherits the experience of the ages: that "offence is the best means of defence". In order to successfully achieve national security goals, an increasing degree of military efficiency becomes important. Now, military efficiency itself requires heavy reliance on offensive action and doctrine. Advances in technology and changes in the very nature of warfare have increased the premium and pay-offs of an offence-dominated strategy. At the same time, where countries have adopted a forward defence posture, they have inevitably created military power projection capabilities. Such capabilities (and hence the posture and doctrine) generate a strong contradiction with the concept of defensive security. Forward defence had assumed a special significance in cold war military confrontation, but with the demise of the cold war this requires re-examination, especially if the application of defensive security concepts is to be given an opportunity to succeed. The trend, however, is towards justifying power projection in relation to "new threats" from the South.

For a variety of reasons, States need to give serious consideration to altering their national security objectives: to shift from "defence" to "prevention of war", while safeguard-

ing their territorial integrity. There would obviously be serious problems if prevention of war were sought at all costs where abject surrender and passivity are allowed to take the lead. But what is being proposed here is that conscious steps be taken to prevent armed conflict from taking place *without* detriment to vital national interests. Deterrence, thus, would continue to be an integral component of national security strategy, but it would need to redefine its goal and would be weighted much more in favour of denial than punishment. More important, the war prevention objective and strategy would require re-orientation of the concepts of and plans for employment of military power, exploration of new ways and means for *conflict prevention* and, where war prevention strategy fails, the application of limitations and restraints to the level of conflict and its early termination by seeking minimum goals. Overall, national objectives of war prevention would provide a powerful base for the application of defensive security concepts and non-offensive defence doctrines.

It may be argued that one of the areas where the concept of defensive security cannot be applied successfully is that of intra-State conflicts and low intensity warfare. It must, of course, be emphasized that defensive security concepts essentially relate to inter-State security paradigms and thus would have little relevance to intra-State conflicts. On the other hand, if defensive security concepts are constructed as politico-military doctrines and based on sound principles, they also begin to offer new opportunities to deal with the threat and dangers of intra-State conflict. The attenuation of intra-State conflicts is basically not incompatible with the concept of defensive security, and there is potential to draw upon the latter to try to avoid intra-State conflicts.

Global and Regional Dimensions

The applicability of defensive security concepts at the bilateral, regional and global levels greatly depends on how

the concept itself evolves and is then applied. As it is, one cannot escape the conclusion that the concept of non-offensive defence has been perceived by many as providing an acceptable, respectable label for arms control and the management of the arms race in Europe, where arms build-up, had, in fact, gone far beyond even what an offensive doctrine would have required. At the same time, if the concepts of defensive security and non-offensive defence are to be perceived and applied essentially as only military doctrines (whether at strategic, operational or tactical levels), their application on the global, regional and bilateral (local) levels will, perforce, remain highly restricted. In fact, aside from the arms control rationale, they face the prospect of strongly contradicting military doctrines that seek military efficiency. On the other hand, the full potential of defensive security doctrines can be realized through much wider and durable application, provided the concept is seen essentially as a *politico-military* doctrine with political philosophy on one end and military efficiency on the other, modified to support a more cooperative framework of security.

As noted earlier, power projection strategies are in contradiction with defensive security concepts at the global and even regional levels. Given the nature of the international system, power projection strategies, forces, and postures are likely to remain in existence and have validity, as indeed the United States-led multinational force projection in the Gulf War demonstrated. What defensive security concepts will need to address, therefore, is the resolution of the contradictions. This would necessitate redefining the parameters of power projection strategies, for example, by applying them through international organizations like the United Nations in a multilateral, rather than a unilateral, framework.

The same applies to interventions. Not every intervention is destabilizing, and States, especially small ones, opting for defensive security may even need external interven-

tion in support of their security needs. On the other hand, extraregional interventions and coercive diplomacy threaten the concept of defensive security, since the creation of capabilities to resist extraregional, especially great-Power, interventions would distort the paradigm in the more limited regional/bilateral framework. The solution appears to lie in seeking a global consensus on the norms, conditions, and methodologies of intervention. This would be an appropriate task for the United Nations, especially since the issue is closely linked to peace-keeping operations.

At the global level, defensive security will have to address itself to weapons with global reach and to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons systems, by their very nature, are not only offensive; there is no credible defence against them. States inevitably resort to acquisition of similar capabilities to create deterrence for defence. This in fact characterizes the security paradigm of the nuclear age, in which, with the offensive power of nuclear weapons, security has been built by generating tremendous insecurity and exploiting vulnerability. Attempts have been made to apply non-offensive defence doctrine to strategic weapons through making distinctions between first-strike "attack" capabilities and second-strike "retaliatory" capabilities—the former being placed in the class of offensive and the latter in that of counter-offensive "defence" capabilities. This holds true only in a limited way, and only if the basic reality that all nuclear weapons are essentially offensive by nature is ignored. Defensive security, to be viable, will need to push towards progressive elimination of nuclear weapons.

The basic paradigm in the global context has primarily been constructed in an East-West framework. The fundamental alteration of the political architecture of East-West relations has opened up opportunities for a wider application of defensive security concepts (which in turn has reinforced the development of a political cooperative framework). But there is a new

trend to formulate the emergence of threats to the North's security from the South. In some regions—like the Mediterranean—this has a specific meaning. However, when expressed in more vague but global terms, it appears to be an effort to construct a North-South security paradigm based on mutual suspicion and insecurity. The need for universally accepted norms and principles assumes great importance if the potential confrontational security paradigm now being formulated is to be pre-empted. Even in the Mediterranean context, defensive security concepts offer the optimum approach to the security of not only the North African/Middle Eastern States, but also the States of Europe.

The application of defensive security concepts in a regional/bilateral framework offers the greatest opportunities and challenges. Problems of security and stability are largely region-specific. For example, the security environment in the Middle East is quite different from that, say, of North-East Asia or Southern Asia. Moreover, strategic and security issues cannot be addressed properly in narrow geographical and sometimes arbitrary cultural terms (like the *South* Asia construct), or in terms to suit the convenience of management structures in Governments. A more comprehensive and broader concept of "regions" will need to be accepted if security issues and the applicability of concepts—old and new—are to be objectively pursued. In security terms, the overlapping of regions must be accepted as normal, and the compartmentalization of regions needs to be avoided.

Given this context, defensive security concepts would have little chance of success if they were not also able to address fundamental reasons for or causes of regional instability and insecurity. For example, most of the third world is suffering from problems inherited from the process of decolonization. National frontiers were set in many cases in an arbitrary way and on an artificial basis. Ethnic and subnational divisions caused by the establishment of new borders have left

serious problems of security. There may be as many as 120 cases of disputed borders (and sovereignty) in the world today.[4] Defensive security will have no prospect of succeeding if it does not seek to freeze these disputes and maintain the status quo. The lessons of the Helsinki process, which finally made a definite movement towards defensive security in Europe possible, are clear pointers towards meeting the needs in other regions.

At the regional/bilateral levels there are other problems affecting the implementation of defensive security concepts. Defensive security, to be successful, has to be adopted by all countries in a region and in a cooperative framework, with corresponding reciprocal commitments. This is not a concept that can be applied with any degree of success in a unilateral manner. It may be unrealistic to expect States with mutual security problems to adopt a uniform doctrinal approach to security.

The application of defensive security in regional/bilateral contexts requires that a range of activities be pursued concurrently. Binding political commitments on the lines of the Helsinki process (and the Indo-Pakistani Simla Agreement of 1972) should form the foundation for a range of confidence- and security-building measures. At regional levels, it is necessary to establish instrumentalities (modelled on the post-cold-war CSCE) to initiate and pursue the dialogue necessary for such measures. The "region", or course, must not be so restrictive as to be practically bilateral. For example, Asia itself needs three overlapping regional instrumentanlities—one each for North-East, South-East, and Southern (including Central) Asia—to provide an interlocking, integrated approach able to address the security concern of all States in the region. Deep cuts in conventional forces which are predominantly offensive in character are possible in a bilateral framework, even in an otherwise tense security environment such as that which exists between India and

Pakistan.[5] This creates tremendous opportunities to restructure security doctrines and reshape the security environment. On the other hand, defensive security (and non-offensive defence) doctrines run the risk of obsolescence if they are conceived and/or applied in purely military terms.

Notes

1 See Jasjit Singh, "Defensive Strategies" in UNIDIR: *Non-Offensive Defense: A Global Perspective*, New York, Taylor and Francis; and Jasjit Singh & V. Vekaric, *Non-Provocative Defence*, New Delhi, Lancer International, 1989.

2 Anatol Rapoport, "Introduction" in Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, New York, Penguin Books, 1982.

3 Ephraim Kam, *Surprise Attack*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1988.

4 Friedrich Kratochvil, *Peace and Disputed Sovereignty*, New York, University Press of America, 1985.

5 See, for example, Jasjit Singh, *Times of India*, 26 September 1991, in which 30-40 per cent cutbacks in offensive weapons of the two countries are proposed.

Military Aspects of Defensive Security[1]

Robert Neild

The Principles

The distinction between defensive and offensive strategy has a long history. Debates about the relative merits and strengths of defence and offence go back at least to Clausewitz. But the debate was traditionally conducted on the assumption that war was a way of life, not an outlawed activity, and conquest was respectable. We now live in an era in which the aim is to avoid war, for moral reasons to which all Governments subscribe formally, and for the compelling reason that nuclear weapons might bring our civilization to an end. Military forces are increasingly kept in order to avoid war rather than to make war. This gives defensive conventional strategy a new significance.

To start from first principles, strategy can be defined as the art of pursuing political aims by the use or possession of military means. If your political aims are offensive, you must have offensive forces. If your political aims are defensive, you can adopt either an offensive strategy—keeping the enemy at bay by the threat of retaliation—or a defensive strategy—keeping him at bay by denial, that is, by the prospect that he will get bogged down and cannot hope to achieve his political objective.

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With nuclear weapons there is little or no choice. They are so destructive that they will always be held and perceived as possible weapons of retaliation; their use for defence means that you risk blowing yourself up. With conventional forces, on the other hand, there is a choice of strategy and forces within limits that depend upon geography, technology and other factors.

The reasons for preferring a defensive strategy when your aims are peaceful can be put under two headings: feedback and stability. By feedback I mean the effect that the strategy of one side in a confrontation has on the political perceptions, the strategy and the military programme of the other, including the size of its future military spending. An offensive strategy can be expected to produce negative feedback in the form of fear, political hostility and an arms race. A defensive strategy can be expected to produce positive feedback and to contribute to reassurance, political reconciliation and an easing of competitive arming.

Two kinds of stability are normally distinguished: crisis stability and escalation stability.

A classic form of crisis instability is a race to mobilize and strike first, of which the summer of 1914 is a classic example. In the words of Liddell Hart, describing what happened then: "The rush to the abyss now gathered unbreakable speed—driven by the motor of 'military necessity'".[2] Nowadays the development of highly effective yet vulnerable offensive weapons—aircraft, missiles, armoured forces and warships—has produced instability in a new form, namely pressure to undertake a pre-emptive strike by suddenly attacking, for example, aircraft on the ground, because you fear that if you do not attack your opponent's aircraft first, he will attack yours.

Escalation stability is a particular problem in a nuclear setting (that is, where both sides in a confrontation possess nuclear weapons). If, in these conditions, you pursue

decisive victory in mobile armoured warfare, you risk provoking the use of nuclear weapons. If you go for denial, checking your enemy and then seeking a political solution, you will avoid, or at least reduce, this risk.

It will be seen that feedback concerns how your choice of strategy and force structure influences your opponent's choice of strategy and forces and vice versa. It expresses itself over time. Stability concerns how the strategy and forces you have adopted and those of your opponent influence what happens in a crisis or a war. It expresses itself at a moment in time.

The aim of a defensive conventional strategy is to get rid of instability of both kinds and in so doing to create positive feedback. The main methods of achieving these aims that have been suggested in the considerable work that has been done in Europe are these:

1 In order to avoid a race to mobilize, have forces *in situ*, whether professional, full-time forces or militia raised from the region.

2 In order to avoid the pressure for pre-emptive attack, reduce your offensive capability so that the other side does not fear pre-emptive attack, and design your forces so that they do not offer "rich targets, for example, exposed aircraft on airfields, concentrations of forces or vulnerable control and command centres.

3 To avoid the risk of nuclear escalation, introduce a strategy of denial and attrition and structure forces so that they can slow down, halt and press back the attacker in a manner that gives time for political resolution of the conflict.

4 Minimize, and be seen to minimize, your capability to attack by reducing reliance on mobile armoured forces and avoiding the deployment in forward positions, suitable for offensive operations, of logistics, bridging and other engineering equipment and such armoured forces as you need for your defensive stance.

5 Maximize your capability to defend by developing, as far as possible, barriers in depth, dispersed logistical supply and forested areas; by developing and relying on passive munition such as mines and exploiting modern technologies which may permit you to dispense mines in the path of attacking forces. Use light infantry armed with anti-armour weapons as well as anti-personnel weapons; use remote control anti-tank and similar weapons so that soldiers who operate them are not too fearful of giving away their positions when they fire. For bombardment of concentrations of attacking forces, use dispersed launchers of smart modern munitions of limited range (so as not to reach too far into the territory of the other side) and provide multiple communication systems so that there is a high chance that command and control will survive. Invest in stocks and facilities that will help the population to survive.

By pursuing principles of this kind, it is clear that the offensive capability of land forces can be reduced and their defensive capability increased, or vice versa within some limits. (We shall come to air forces and navies in a minute.) Those who make decisions about strategy, training and weapons development are in fact making choices, consciously or unconsciously, about these matters all the time.

In applying these principles it is important to distinguish between the strategic, operational and tactical level of operations. Our concern is that a defensive policy, where it is feasible, should be adopted at the strategic level by clear political choice. That will dictate what is decided at the operational level, and that in turn will, to some extent, dictate what choices are made at the tactical level. But it is important to remember that to adopt a defensive strategy does not mean that you become passive at all levels. For example, if one part of a line you are holding is yielding, you will wish to be able *at the tactical level* to take the initiative and push back the

attacker by local counter-attack; and the same will be true on some scale at the operational level.

A general proposition that has emerged from the recent debate about defensive strategy is that as the accuracy of conventional weapons increases, it matters more and more who shoots first.[3] The appropriate defensive response to accuracy is to be concealed and invulnerable so as to avoid being shot at first and to be in a position to shoot first. With land forces, the defender enjoys the possibility, where suitable cover can be found or created, of using dispersed, concealed forces to lie in wait for the attacker who must show himself in order to advance. This potential advantage for the defender is at the core of many of the models of defensive defence in land warfare. On the other hand, the development of indiscriminate area weapons and of increasingly acute methods of observation tell in the other direction: they may permit an attacker to eliminate or reduce concealed defending forces.

Aircraft and navies pose more difficult problems than land forces. They inevitably generate instability because aircraft and ships are highly vulnerable and there is a great premium on attacking first so as to gain air superiority or naval superiority. One cannot classify some warships as defensive, some as offensive.

It is a little easier to do that with aircraft, but even then the lines are very difficult to draw.

Two further factors which may be important to defensive security, particularly with reference to land forces, are mobility and transparency. They tell in different directions. The faster land forces can move (that is, the more mobile they are), the greater the distances and the larger the area from which forces can be brought to a given point of concentration for attack within a given time. Hence if the warning time within which one side can react to preparations for attack by the other and prepare its defences is fixed, an increase in

mobility will increase the chances that an attacker will succeed. On the other hand, if transparency is increased, it will have mixed effects: it will increase the warning time and so improve the chances of the defender; and it will increase the ability of an attacker—and defender—to find targets and strike first. Technical developments seem to be increasing both mobility and transparency. But there is another aspect to it. Transparency between hostile nations, based on reconnaisance of areas and facilities which are closed to foreigners and where camouflage is in use, will be an uncertain asset which can engender fear as well as confidence. On the other hand, where nations become reconciled and open up, as has happened between NATO and the WTO, fear is eased and confidence induced.

Implementation: The One-Sided Case

If one considers only the one-sided implementation of a defensive strategy, as I have done so far in this paper, one can only be rather tentative about what results can be achieved. Having reviewed the problem, I recently reached the following conclusions:

1 Nations can choose, within limits dictated by geography and technology, between land forces designed with offensive emphasis and land forces designed with defensive emphasis; they can thus choose between emphasis on retaliation and emphasis on denial by wars of attrition. As regards geography, Israel, for example, is so small that it probably has rather little scope for a defensive stance compared with larger countries; Europe is better placed but still does not have great space.

2 There is much less scope for changing the structure of air forces and navies. But land forces are the heart of the matter. Air forces and navies, using non-nuclear weapons, can do great damage by bombardment and blockade, but they are unlikely to have a quick, decisive effect on the outcome of a

war in the absence of land forces that can advance and take territory.

3 Comparison of the military expenditures of non-allied countries in Europe and those of countries in the alliances indicates that, over a long period, the costs of the two strategies are not decisively different: defensive strategies are significantly cheaper in terms of budgetary costs in relation to gross domestic product (GDP), but they entail larger unpaid contributions and indirect costs (which are not readily measurable); and they require investment in defensive infrastructure, which is a moderate burden if spread over a long period but would be a heavy burden if undertaken quickly.

4 It is impossible to say whether denial or retaliation will be a more effective short-run strategy (at a given cost) for dissuading a potential enemy from attack; but a defensive strategy will be better than an offensive strategy for stability and feedback; it will provide a greater opportunity for a confrontation to be ended and competition in arms reversed, if your opponent, like you, has peaceful intentions.

5 A transition by one country from offensiveness to defensiveness can appear menacing to a neighbour and hence be destabilizing if it is not achieved by reductions in offensive forces that substantially outweigh the additions, if any, that are made to defensive forces.[4]

Implementation: The Two-Sided Case

As soon as you consider the idea that, in order to settle their differences, both parties to a two-sided confrontation might in unison adopt the objective of defensive security, the problem is transformed; many of the difficulties resolve themselves and most criticisms become irrelevant. Instead of trying to introduce defences that will stand up to offensive forces, the task is to remove offensive capabilities from both sides. There may be no need to add to existing defences of any

kind. As we have seen in Europe recently, progress is unlikely to be made if there are adversarial negotiations in which the parties continue to seek relative advantage. But once the parties are keen on reconciliation and ready to step forward, rapid progress may be possible through a combination of unilateral actions, co-operative negotiation and informal understandings. The substance of what needs to be done is that each side should remove those weapons, forces, elements of secrecy and other things that most add to its offensive potential and to the fear it generates in the mind of the other. It should be possible, as in Europe, to pick upon a selection of key weapons which, if removed from *both* sides, would reduce the offensive capability of each relative to the other.

It is important to distinguish this approach from that adopted at the 1932 Disarmament Conference of asking if it was possible to make a general distinction between offensive and defensive weapons, an approach which led to hopeless wrangling and obfuscation. For just as the laying of a mine-field can augment the offensive potential of a nation by releasing forces for attack, so any weapon will in some degree add to its offensive (as well as defensive) capability. All of which is beside the point. What you need to ask is: Are there certain weapons which, if removed from *both* sides, will diminish their power to attack each other? To which the answer is clearly yes, and experts will have no difficulty in picking out the key items.

Implementation: Many Parties

When you come to the case of many nations, possibly of different sizes, seeking security through the adoption of defensive strategy, the problem becomes more difficult.

The general problem is that any one nation out of a group of nations of similar strength that can attack one another might, in theory at least, have to face a combination of all or a substantial number of the others in the group. In most

circumstances it will be very difficult if not impossible for one nation to produce defences sufficiently strong to withstand an attack from the others. Even if the others have twisted their force structure and strategies in a defensive direction, their remaining offensive capabilities may be such that, if combined, they will be sufficient to overwhelm one victim. Such a scenario may or may not be politically plausible, but it is a theoretical case which must at least be considered.

A particular problem, exemplified by Germany in 1914 and perhaps by Israel now, is that of one country which, being located between two potentially hostile neighbours, fears attack from both sides, and to avoid a "war on two fronts" prepares to be able to attack and defeat one neighbour before the other can mobilize, and then to concentrate its forces against the latter. This strategy gives an incentive to the neighbours to plan for swift mobilization so that they cannot be caught in this way but can, together, pose a sufficient threat to the country in the middle to deter it from attack. This in turn makes the centre country feel surrounded and threatened on the two fronts.

The politico-military solution to these multi-country (as distinct from two-party) problems, which has been enshrined in the League of Nations Covenant and the United Nations Charter but not yet often put into practical effect, is to use a system of collective security, meaning a political commitment on the part of the members of a group of nations to go to the aid of one that is attacked. In other words, the classical solution is to seek political commitments which ensure not only that groups of nations do not gang up against one victim, but that they should combine to go to the defence of a victim—which may not be militarily easy.

How far then do nations need to keep offensive forces in order to be able to go to the defence of the victims of aggression? At the moment, the arguments being made in favour of Western nations maintaining rapid reaction forces

for intervention presuppose that we need substantial offensive forces for a repetition of the war in the Persian Gulf, or something like it. If you ask yourself why we needed strong offensive forces to deal with Iraq, the answer is that the permanent members of the Security Council had armed Iraq with large forces of that kind. If nations did not acquire mobile armoured ground forces supported by modern air forces, and instead opted for more defensive forces, the need for intervention forces with offensive capability would be less.

Notes

1 The issues discussed in this paper are dealt with more fully in the author's recent book *An Essay on Strategy as It Affects the Achievement of Peace in a Nuclear Setting* (London, Macmillan Press, 1990).

2 B.H. Liddell Hart, *History of the First World War*, London, Pan Books, 1972, p. 22.

3 See Robert Neild, "The Implications of the Increased Accuracy of Nonnuclear Weapons", reproduced in *The Foundations of Defensive Defence*, edited by Anders Boserup and Robert Neild, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp. 55-62.

4 Robert Neild, *An Essay on Strategy, op. cit.*, p. 66.

Defensive Security in Regions Other Than Europe

Nazir Kamal

Conceptual Aspects of Defensive Security

"Defensive security" is part of a conceptual rubric that encompasses "sufficient defence", "defence sufficiency", "cooperative security", "non-offensive defence" and "non-provocative defence". While all these concepts imply non-threatening military postures, defensive security is perhaps closest to non-offensive defence or non-provocative defence. Cooperative security is a broader concept, subsuming other forms of security, such as collective self-defence. Sufficient defence or defence sufficiency seem more concerned with competitive or imitative tendencies towards excessive military build-up, while defensive security and non-offensive defence are conceptually more sharply focused on the problems posed by competitive reliance on offensive capabilities for ensuring or enhancing security.

For present purposes, the terms "defensive security" and "non-offensive defence" will be used interchangeably, where convenient. Non-offensive defence has been defined as a reciprocal relationship in which both sides have "ample forces for defence and, by implication, insufficient forces for attack or when their forces are stronger in defence than when

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used in an attack".[1] Defence sufficiency has also been defined in ways similar to non-offensive defence. Several years ago, Gorbachev spoke of defence sufficiency as a situation in which the armed forces of a State "would be sufficient to repulse a possible aggression but insufficient for offensive operations".[2]

These overlapping concepts do not necessarily imply disarmament or significant arms reduction. However, achieving their objectives would normally involve negotiated regimes for arms limitation or reduction and perhaps even disarmament in specific areas. There could also be some scope for unilateral measures.

In effect, defensive security implies a shift (absolute, relative or comparative) from the doctrine of deterrence (threat of use of force) to assured defence (mutual inability to use force for meaningful offensive purposes). Inter-State structures devoted to defensive security would require a manipulation of bilateral or multilateral military equations to reduce offensive capabilities or restrict the offensive use of armaments, thereby altering the nature of the military balance in favour of defence rather than offence.

Defensive Security Efforts in Non-Western Regions

Thus far, efforts involving non-offensive defence measures have been witnessed almost wholly in the Middle East and Central America. An important arrangement is the Sinai force disengagement regime established under the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty of 1979, which led to Israel's phased withdrawal from Egyptian territory. A demilitarized buffer zone was established inside Egyptian territory together with contiguous force-limitation zones where both sides were restricted to 4,000 troops and light arms. An additional force-limitation zone was created for Egypt covering the rest of Sinai. The United States played a crucial role in facilitating

the Treaty of Peace and the preceding Camp David Framework Accords, which provided the political context for the disengagement agreement. The United States also operated an elaborate control system covering an area of some 38,850 square kilometres.

In Latin America the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) began concentrated efforts in the early 1980s to end the civil wars, inter-State tensions and foreign military intervention that plagued the Central American region. The initiative envisaged a restructuring of regional military arsenals in order to reduce offensive capabilities, limit the size of armed forces and prohibit destabilizing weapons systems. The Contadora Act of 1985 proved abortive. Attempts to address United States objections to earlier draft agreements left Nicaragua dissatisfied. Essentially, ideological tensions between the United States and the Sandinistas remained unresolved.

The Contadora effort was replaced by the Central American Security Commission established under the Esquipulas II Agreements of 1987 and 1990 (involving Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua). The Commission has been working on a model for establishing a proportionate and reasonable balance of forces in the region. The progress of peace efforts in El Salvador should facilitate the Commission's task, previously encumbered by internal conflicts in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Role of Defensive Security in Non-Western Regions

The end of United States–Soviet rivalry, the collapse of Soviet power and certain regional developments have sharpened the focus of international attention on the security situation in non-Western regions. The perception has become fairly widespread that international security is more likely to be threatened in the foreseeable future by develop-

ments within such regions, where old rivalries, traditional threat-perceptions, latent if not patent ambitions, and possible eruptions of domestic instability could lead to crises and conflicts unless these dangers are contained within new security structures.

Arms control *per se* is often viewed with some misgivings in many non-Western regions, partly because of misperceptions or lack of familiarity and, to some extent, because of the West's controversial approach, reflected in the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which are widely perceived as promoting a system of "have" and "have-not" States. Lack of familiarity seems understandable in the case of defensive security and other related concepts, since these were conceived against the background of the cold war by arms control advocates concerned about the European and East-West situation. Perhaps more problematic in the foreseeable future (but perhaps not in the long term) are deficiencies in the national technical means (NTMs) of regional States for devising arms control regimes and verifying compliance.

Differentiating offensive from defensive weapons also presents some problems. In 1974 the United States Army adopted a weightage system for various categories of armament. Only tanks and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were evaluated as being more effective in their offensive role.[3] But such attempts at categorization have been criticized for their oversimplification, partly because of the rapid development of weapons technology and the resultant changes in warfare witnessed in recent years. However, some weapons systems are clearly defensive in nature (unless used as "shields" to brandish the "sword"), while in many other cases, the nature of a weapons platform could be modified along with supportive changes in force structure.

Technological progress now provides the means to increase defence, thereby enabling less reliance on offensive

capabilities, provided the adversary's offensive capabilities can be contained. For example, fighter aircraft could be configured to reduce their capability for ground-attack or interdiction. (Qualitative controls have been an important part of major-Power negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons, especially with regard to the payload capacity of certain missiles.) But engendering an across-the-board non-offensive balance could entail a complex manipulation of military equations between States. While such complex exercises are conceptually conceivable, verification measures could be regarded as being too intrusive or too burdensome, or technically inadequate for enabling a timely detection of violation and remedial action. Such problems would be greater for technically less advanced States in regions where tensions and mutual distrust may be pronounced.

Nevertheless, limited objectives could be explored which are technically and politically less demanding. Elements of non-offensive defence could be introduced in order to contain militarization trends and lower the vulnerability of States to the growing lethality and range of modern weapons systems. Such efforts could initially focus on those regions or subregions where militarization trends and the security structure need more containment and stability and where, consequently, greater security imperatives exist for arms control efforts.

The Middle East and Defensive Security

The American scheme for security in the Persian Gulf area rests, above all, on a forward carrier battle group presence, backed by Central Command's rapid deployment forces. Opposing the prepositioning of United States military hardware in its territory, Saudi Arabia has instead sought an enlarged indigenous force. The prospects of creating a pan-Arab force envisaged in the Damascus Declaration of March 1991 continue to fluctuate. The Islamic Republic of

Iran remains strongly opposed to foreign military presence. This is potentially destabilizing for the Gulf region.

In order to deal with any future Iraqi threat through non-offensive defence measures, a United Nations monitored, demilitarized or force-limitation zone could be established covering Iraq's borders with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Controls on arms supply to Iraq would further reinforce the force-limitation zone. In return, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States could seek Iranian reciprocity, while the Gulf States as a whole could limit naval expansion (particularly in view of the region's tight and highly sensitive maritime environment) by accepting restrictions on off-shore force-projection capabilities. While Iran is reportedly acquiring Russian Kilo-class submarines, the Gulf navies in general are upgrading their capabilities, which were previously confined to coastal defence (with the partial exception of Iran).

Iraq's United Nations–sanctioned denuclearization has removed the danger of Arab-Israeli nuclear rivalry for the foreseeable future. However, unlike the Arab States, Israel stands outside the NPT, enjoying a covert nuclear weapons monopoly and possessing delivery systems that could threaten all its neighbours. With United States financial and technical assistance, Tel Aviv has also been working on an advanced anti-missile defence under the Arrow project, which could enable Israel to use its short- and intermediate-range missiles (Jericho I & II) for offensive purposes with impunity.

A breakthrough in the Middle East peace process would provide the political context for overcoming Israel's intransigence on the nuclear issue and reversing ballistic missile proliferation. However, Israel may still wish to retain its nuclear arsenal, and a change of Israeli attitude may then depend on the strength of United States pressure. A territorial settlement would provide the context as well as the imperative

for a robust security structure involving measures of defensive security. The Sinai disengagement arrangement would continue to retain its importance.

South Asia and Defensive Security

Past Indo-Pakistani wars have been far less destructive than many wars in other third world regions. But prevailing political and technological trends provide little comfort. In general, the deplorable Indo-Pakistani situation, which has already done considerable damage to both sides, calls for new political thinking and a restructuring of relations. At a minimum, India and Pakistan should seek to contain escalatory pressures should an armed conflict erupt. This could be done by limiting the offensive use of armaments (or prohibiting their excessive use). A step in this direction was taken when the two adversaries ratified an agreement in April 1991 prohibiting attacks on each other's nuclear facilities. The scope of this agreement could be enlarged by including other assets and targets whose damage or destruction could cause a deadly escalation. Such steps may also help to retard nuclear proliferation trends by reducing the military utility of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.

The prospects of defensive security in South Asia would improve markedly if India and Pakistan agreed to resolve the Kashmir dispute as part of a larger effort to reverse their adversarial relationship. An innovative approach towards resolving the Kashmir dispute could include the disputed territory's demilitarization, while a broad arms control regime would help to neutralize any adverse security implications arising from a territorial settlement. A wide-ranging regime would also enable both sides to demonstrate more convincingly their intention to establish conditions of durable peace. As part of a comprehensive approach, demilitarized zones along the Indo-Pakistani border could be coupled with contiguous force-limitation zones in order to

eliminate the threat of surprise attack and the capability to launch meaningful offensive operations. As a general rule, geographical peculiarities would have to be taken into account. A United Nations monitoring presence would enable the violator to be identified in case of a serious breach. This in turn would help the Security Council to react promptly. Regular reconnaissance by aircraft could be supplemented by satellite data obtained from a third party (perhaps the United States) at an affordable price. The United States could also help the parties, including the proposed United Nations monitoring body, in devising and initially operating a monitoring system in the demilitarized and force-limitation zones.

In addition, if only to strengthen military stability, India and Pakistan could move towards bilateral defence sufficiency by agreeing to a ceiling (say, on a 2:1 ratio in India's favour) for major categories of conventional armaments, together with a staged 50 per cent reduction of armaments (say, over a ten-year period) on the basis of India's current level. This would also help to ease the defence burden on their strained national budgets. Jasjit Singh, Director of the Indian Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, has suggested that India and Pakistan, over a five-year period, carry out substantial reductions of their armour and multi-role strike aircraft and also establish a ceiling on reservists.[4] The definitional and verification measures adopted for the agreements on conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) could be a model. But existing Indo-Pakistani NTMs are quite inadequate. Thus, much would depend on obtaining outside assistance at an affordable cost.

In the absence of a peace process for resolving the Kashmir dispute or a framework for a comprehensive settlement of all outstanding issues, certain confidence-building measures could be adopted to address the danger of surprise attack or the use of military force for political

intimidation. Prohibitions could be imposed on large-scale military exercises close to the border, while such exercises in adjacent zones could be subject to advance notification. Provision for compulsory on-site observation of notifiable military movements would constitute a confidence-building measure in its own right. Defensive security could also be promoted by the non-introduction of new weapons systems likely to trigger an unwieldy military competition.

A ballistic missile race, being difficult to control, would open up a new dimension to military instability in South Asia—a region already ridden with various instabilities. The time available for averting such a development is fast shortening. However, monitoring compliance with non-deployment would, again, require technical means which are currently beyond the capabilities of both parties. Intrusive on-site verification would involve a degree of military transparency that is likely to be regarded as disproportionate or politically premature. In the circumstances, both sides could observe a temporary moratorium, thus avoiding legal undertakings.

Defensive Security in North-East and South-East Asia

Defensive security is particularly relevant to the Korean peninsula, where a relatively simple North-South context exists and where the imperatives for engaging in demilitarization are clear and pressing. The Korean peninsula is one of the most heavily armed regions faced with the delicate task of achieving national reconciliation. The political situation has been improving steadily, even if a little erratically, since the end of the cold war. Such a pattern could continue. The declared commitment by both sides to national reconciliation provides the framework for pursuing demilitarization and defensive security. Unification is the ultimate goal of national reconciliation, but until that is achieved, defensive

security could be seen as the penultimate security objective of national reconciliation as well as an interim stage on the way to future unification.

The prevailing concentration of armaments and armed forces not only has become anachronistic, but also poses a potential threat to the delicate and incipient process of North-South reconciliation. North Korea has finally signed and operationalized its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). But suspicion of Pyongyang's intentions and activities have not been fully laid to rest. Once this is achieved (for which there is ground for optimism), the two sides could build upon their non-aggression pact of December 1991.[5] North Korea could announce a moratorium on ballistic missile tests as a first step.

In South-East Asia, arms control has to contend with the unique archipelagic nature of the region, where the naval dimension is clearly more important but, as yet, of only nascent concern. As the largest South-East Asian State, Indonesia is the anchor of regional stability. Its military posture, in effect, conforms to the idea of defensive security. Within the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the established norm of mutual non-interference, moves towards greater economic regionalism (as in a free trade area) and economic growth-oriented policies are important factors for regional stability, although traditional threat perceptions, unresolved disputes and mutual suspicions still exist. All the regional States are parties to the NPT, while the dangers of ballistic missile proliferation are more likely to arise in the context of external developments or threats. But reciprocal measures are needed to stabilize the sensitive multilateral dispute over the oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Maintenance of the *status quo*, which no side has respected, would help ease tensions until the attitudes of claimants become more conducive to settling a complicated

issue that could otherwise unhinge regional stability in the foreseeable future.

Defensive Security in Other Regions

The situation in South America has improved greatly. Fears of nuclear proliferation have been virtually put to rest following the recent agreement between Argentina and Brazil establishing an elaborate system of mutual inspection along with a safeguards arrangement with the IAEA. Meanwhile, ballistic missile proliferation has been contained as a result of Argentina's decision to disband its Condor-II project.

Trends towards the production of nuclear-powered submarines have also slowed down, dissipating any near-term possibility of their introduction. More broadly, Brazil and Argentina have substantially improved their bilateral relations, reversing their past pattern of rivalry and mutual suspicion. Prompted by these developments, Chile may become a full party to the nuclear-weapon-free zone regime established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

A major advance has been made towards Africa's denuclearization following South Africa's accession to the NPT in July 1991 and its stated readiness to participate in a nuclear-weapon-free zone regime. Recent revelations have confirmed past suspicions that South Africa was engaged in a nuclear weapons programme. This is an important development for the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which has been seeking a denuclearized status for Africa since its inception in 1964.

Role of Extra-Regional States

The Bush initiative of September 1991 and Moscow's reciprocal response regarding tactical nuclear weapons have eased long-standing concerns about the stationing and transit of nuclear weapons in regional territories. This development has removed an excessive and highly offensive element in the

maritime environment and is now being reinforced by prospects of greater reduction of strategic nuclear weapons than envisaged in the START agreement. However, stepped-up American efforts to contain ballistic missile proliferation in the developing world should be combined with incentives to assist in building anti-missile defence. Otherwise, missile proliferation could create new offensive threats if significant disparities arise between regional States. Assistance against ballistic missile threat could also discourage proliferation by States seeking to acquire military advantage or superiority over other States.

Of continuing concern is conventional arms trade involving the major suppliers at a time when declining defence budgets have reduced the domestic demand for weapons manufactured by Western firms. The initial five-Power agreement of October 1991 and the follow-up agreement of May 1992 (see "Documentation" in this issue) have raised hopes, but it remains to be seen how these agreements on rules of restraint will impact on conventional arms sales and regional stability. Similarly, there is uncertainty about the effectiveness of fledgling Western schemes to induce former Soviet scientists to reject possible recruitment offers by some third world countries. The prevailing disarray in the Russian Federation could get worse.

Defensive Security and the Maritime Environment

The global naval presence of the former Soviet Union has decreased significantly and Moscow's naval force projection capabilities could suffer a greater decline. Although the United States naval forces will see some planned reduction in overall size over the next decade, its overseas presence is likely to remain considerable. At the regional level, naval forces are unmistakably expanding not only because of perceived force-modernization requirements, but also in

terms of absolute size. This unfolding process will lead to a more dense naval environment, heightening the potential threat posed by maritime boundary disputes and other military as well as non-military issues.

The physical and legal characteristics of the maritime environment provide considerable military transparency with regard to surface combatants, thus reducing the problems of verifying arms control with respect to such weaponry. Yet, partly because of organic linkages between naval and land forces, naval arms control presents greater difficulty than arms control on land. Traditional United States opposition to naval arms control, which remains firm, is also a limiting factor. As such, more reliance may have to be placed on confidence-building measures. However, there is some scope for promoting defensive security in the naval field at a time when regional navies are expanding and a new maritime situation is steadily emerging. For a start, the non-introduction of certain weapons systems could contain military tensions and limit naval build-up.

In particular, nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers could be prohibited where they have not already proliferated, or their deployment levels could be frozen. If a freeze is maintained long enough, existing deployments could be reversed as a result of obsolescence. Similarly, restrictions could be imposed on the introduction of large amphibious assault vessels and helicopter carriers.

Defensive Security and the United Nations

Freed from the restrictive cold war structure, some major regional States may seek to enhance their politico-military status in the international system. In the past, many small and medium States could obtain security assurances and assistance from one of the super-Powers by taking sides in the cold war. The cold war context no longer exists, while the ad hoc United Nations–sanctioned multilateral action against

Iraq's attempted annexation of Kuwait has not generated sufficient confidence with respect to international responses to future threats.

Defensive security seems implicit in the United Nations Charter. Its security concept rests on collective security and measures to regulate and limit the armed forces of Member States. Collective security can work best if the military capabilities of Member States are oriented towards defensive security, since it would enable the Organization to enjoy assured superiority in offensive capability in case military action is required under Chapter VII. Yet, progress towards defensive security by Member States may depend on initial moves towards collective security by the Organization.

Strengthening the United Nations collective security role under Chapter VII would be an important macro-level development, providing some security assurances to the small and medium States and a measure of deterrent against the pursuit of aggressive design by the major regional States. Despite some complexities, unprecedented circumstances currently exist for restoring the United Nations centrality in the international system.

Prospects of Defensive Security in Non-Western Regions

Defensive security presupposes the renunciation of aggressive designs or the pursuit of big-Power ambitions. The end of United States–Soviet rivalry has sharpened concerns regarding the future role of some major regional States and the implications of militarization trends in some regions. There are also wider concerns about regional stability and the impact of defence spending by many States on their economic and social development at a time of a global resource crunch. The arms control effort, however, must be cognizant of political sensitivities, the complex issues involved, the usually unexpressed concerns of some States about their politico-military

status in the regional and international hierarchy, and the importance of creating a political context for translating a security imperative into an acceptable political reality. There are no standard formulas that could be operationalized for general application. Models developed in the West during the cold war are, at best, of limited relevance.

The non-Western regions generally constitute a more challenging environment than the simpler East-West context when the United States and the former Soviet Union engaged in arms control efforts during the cold war. The risk of nuclear war and the inherent danger of global devastation provided the basic impetus for those efforts. Despite such a powerful impetus and the bipolar context, the arms control effort proved tedious and yielded limited results until the underlying political tensions began to dissipate rapidly in the late 1980s.

Arms control in general—not to mention such ambitious concepts as defensive security—has to contend with the problems posed by major territorial disputes, other political tensions, geographical complexities, disparities in power-potential and the multiplicity of independent actors that exist in many non-Western regions. In general, some States may be more capable of posing threats than others or be geographically better placed. Similarly, some States may be landlocked or coastal, while the maritime interests of littoral States may vary significantly. Military capabilities directed at one State could have unintended implications for another. Security linkages between adjacent regions may have to be taken into account. Similarly, arms control may have to be pursued more often in a multilateral context. The United States and the former Soviet Union regarded each other as military co-equals and their arms control efforts were based on the principle of parity. Such a context hardly exists in any non-Western region.

The non-Western States are also handicapped by limited NTMs. Technology transfers would be necessary but

may not be forthcoming or fully adequate. The United Nations could play an indispensable third-party role, but its capabilities are currently limited. Proposals by France, the former Soviet Union and Sweden in recent years to create an international agency for satellite monitoring and telecommunications remain dormant. In any case, a significant United Nations capability cannot be developed at short notice or without the commitment of substantial funds. As it is, the United Nations remains hamstrung by basic financial difficulties.

Conclusions

Though clearly desirable, defensive security has to deal with questions of feasibility. Geographical and other structural complexities, not to mention the current problems of verifying arms control obligations, are among the major factors limiting the scope of defensive security. A piecemeal approach aimed at reducing the offensive aspects of militarization is more feasible, rather than a major restructuring of military relationships between States. Nevertheless, significant non-offensive defence arrangements could be attempted where a dominantly bilateral context exists and the political and security imperatives are clear, such as between India and Pakistan or North and South Korea.

Generally speaking, the prospects of defensive security as a distinct arms control concept would depend, in large part, on macro-level developments in the international system, such as progress towards "collective security", "comprehensive security" or "common security". The imperatives for making efforts in these directions are clear—not only to effectively contain military threats in a fatefully interdependent world and in a potentially dangerous technological environment, but also to direct greater energy and resources towards tackling the various non-military threats to security which have assumed awesome proportions.

Notes

1 Anders Boserup, "A Way to Undermine Hostility", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, September 1988, p. 16.

2 See Jack Snyder, "Limiting Offensive Conventional Forces", *International Security*, Spring 1988, p. 51.

3 Brig. D. Banerjee, "Non-Provocative Defence: Conceptual Framework and Parameters", in Jasjit Singh and Vatroslav Vekaric, eds., *Non-Provocative Defence* (Lancer International, India, 1989), pp. 123-124.

4 Jasjit Singh, "India and Pakistan: Security for Both at Lower Costs", *Times of India*, 26 September 1991.

5 The text of the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South is reproduced in *Disarmament: A Periodic Review by the United Nations*, vol. XV, number 2, 1992.

Documentation Relating to Disarmament

Protocol to the July 1991 START Treaty*

Lisbon, 23 May 1992

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Reaffirming their support for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Recognizing the altered political situation resulting from the replacement of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a number of independent states,

Recalling the commitment of the member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States that the nuclear weapons of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be maintained under the safe, secure, and reliable control of a single unified authority,

Desiring to facilitate implementation of the Treaty in this altered situation,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, as successor states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the Treaty, shall assume the obligations of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Treaty.

*Text obtained from the United States Department of State.

Article II

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall make such arrangements among themselves as are required to implement the Treaty's limits and restrictions; to allow functioning of the verification provisions of the Treaty equally and consistently throughout the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine; and to allocate costs.

Article III

1 For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" shall be interpreted to mean the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

2 For purposes of Treaty implementation, the phrase "national territory", when used in the Treaty to refer to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be interpreted to mean the combined national territories of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine.

3 For inspections and continuous monitoring activities in the territory of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, or Ukraine, that state shall provide communications from the inspection site or continuous monitoring site to the Embassy of the United States in the respective capital.

4 For purposes of Treaty implementation, the embassy of the Inspecting Party referred to in Section XVI of the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms shall be construed to be the embassy of the respective state in Washington or the embassy of the United States of America in the respective capital.

5 The working languages for Treaty activities shall be English and Russian.

Article IV

Representatives of the Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine will participate in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on a basis to be worked out consistent with Article I of this Protocol.

Article V

The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shall adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968 as non-nuclear-weapons states Parties in the shortest possible time, and shall begin immediately to take all necessary actions to this end in accordance with their constitutional practices.

Article VI

1 Each Party shall ratify the Treaty together with this Protocol in accordance with its own constitutional procedures. The Republic of Byelarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine shall exchange instruments of ratification with the United States of America. The Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the final exchange of instruments of ratification.

2 This Protocol shall be an integral part of the Treaty and shall remain in force throughout the duration of the Treaty.

Done at Lisbon on May 23, 1992, in five copies, each in the Byelarussian, English, Kazakh, Russian, and Ukrainian languages, all texts being equally authentic.

Permanent Five Interim Guidelines Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction*

29 May 1992

The People's Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,

Reaffirming their objectives and commitments as expressed in the communiques following their meetings in Paris and London; Determined to work towards maintaining world peace and freeing mankind from the threat of weapons of mass destruction; Affirming that international non-proliferation efforts should not prejudice the legitimate rights and interests of states in the exclusively peaceful uses of science and technology for development; Recalling the announcement made by each of the parties of its commitment to or support for the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR); Recalling their respective positions on the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear-weapons states; Calling upon states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Declare that they will observe and consult upon the following guidelines:

1 Not assist, directly or indirectly, in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear-weapons state;

2 Promptly notify the International Atomic Energy Agency of the export to a non-nuclear weapons state of any nuclear materials, equipment, or facilities and place them under IAEA safeguards;

3 Exercise restraint in the transfer of sensitive nuclear facilities, technology, and weapons-usable material having in mind existing international practice and not export for peaceful purposes equipment, material, services or technology which could be used in the manufacture of nuclear-weapons-useable material except when

*Text obtained from the British American Security Information Council.

satisfied that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons or to any nuclear activity not subject to safeguards;

4 Not assist, directly or indirectly, in the development, acquisition, manufacture, testing, stockpiling, or deployment of chemical weapons by any recipient whatsoever;

5 Not export equipment, materials, services, or technology which could be used in the manufacture of chemical weapons except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of chemical weapons;

6 Strictly abide by the provision of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, undertake to maintain and support efforts for enhancing the effectiveness of the convention and implement in earnest the confidence-building measures adopted by the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the convention;

7 Not export equipment, material, services, or technology which could be used in the manufacture of biological weapons except when satisfied, for example, by recipient country guarantees or confirmation by the recipient, that such exports would not contribute to the development or acquisition of biological weapons;

8 In considering whether to authorize the export for permitted purposes of the relevant items which might be of use in the manufacture of weapons of mass destruction, take into account:

(a) the capabilities, objectives, policies, and practices of the recipient, and any related proliferation concerns;

(b) the significance and appropriateness of the items to be transferred;

(c) an assessment of the proposed end-use, including relevant assurances by the government of the recipient state and controls on retransfer.

9 Maintain export control systems in accordance with their national laws or regulations to enable these guidelines to be effectively implemented;

10 Work together to increase the effectiveness of export controls pursuant to these guidelines.

Final Document of the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty*

Oslo, 5 June 1992

The Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,

Reaffirming their determination to bring into force the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of November 19, 1990, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, by the time of the Helsinki Summit Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on July 9-10, 1992,

Desiring to meet the objectives and requirements of the Treaty while responding to the historic changes which have occurred in Europe since the Treaty was signed,

Recalling in this context the undertaking in paragraph 4 of the Joint Declaration of Twenty-Two States signed in Paris on November 19, 1990, to maintain only such military capabilities as are necessary to prevent war and provide for effective defence and to bear in mind the relationship between military capabilities and doctrines, and confirming their commitment to that undertaking,

*Text obtained from the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Having met together at an Extraordinary Conference chaired by the Kingdom of Spain in Oslo on June 5, 1992, pursuant to Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, as provisionally applied,

Have agreed as follows:

1 The understandings, notifications, confirmations and commitments contained or referred to in this Final Document and its Annexes A and B, together with the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the States Parties, shall be deemed as fulfilling the requirements for entry into force of the Treaty in accordance with its provisions. Accordingly, the Treaty shall enter into force 10 days after the last such instrument has been deposited.

2 In this context, the States Parties note the Agreement of May 15, 1992, on the Principles and Procedures of Implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the four Protocols to that Agreement and the Joint Declaration of May 15, 1992, in relation to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, as transmitted on June 1, 1992, by that Agreement's Depositary to all States Parties to the Treaty. In this regard, Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, and 12 of that Agreement, the four Protocols to that Agreement, and the Joint Declaration of May 15, 1992, in relation to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe contain necessary confirmations and information.

3 The States Parties confirm the understandings as elaborated in the Joint Consultative Group, and specified in Annex A of this Final Document.

4 The States Parties confirm all decisions and recommendations adopted by the Joint Consultative Group.

5 This Final Document in no way alters the rights and obligations of the States Parties as set forth in the Treaty and its associated documents.

6 This final document shall enter into force upon signature by all of the States Parties.

7 This final document, together with its Annexes A and B, which are integral to it, in all the official languages of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, shall be deposited with the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, as the designated Depositary for the Treaty, which shall circulate copies of this Final Document to all the States Parties.

Annex A

Understandings

1 The first paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Republic of Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the States Parties,".

2 The second paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"Guided by the Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of January 10, 1989,".

The third paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"Guided by the objectives and the purposes of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, within the framework of which the negotiation of this Treaty was conducted in Vienna beginning on March 9, 1989,".

3 With regard to the ninth paragraph of the Preamble of the Treaty, it is noted that the Treaty of Warsaw of 1955 is no longer in force, and that some of the States Parties in the first group specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex did not sign or accede to that Treaty.

4 The "groups of States Parties" referred to in paragraph 1(*a*) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to consist of:

"the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the

Republic of Moldova, the Republic of Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine,"

and

"the Kingdom of Belgium, Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the Republic of Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America.".

5 The first two sentences of paragraph 1(*b*) of Article II of the Treaty shall be understood to read:

"the term 'area of application' means the entire land territory of the States Parties in Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, which includes all the European island territories of the States Parties, including the Faroe Islands of the Kingdom of Denmark, Svalbard including Bear Island of the Kingdom of Norway, the Islands of Azores and Madeira of the Portuguese Republic, the Canary Islands of the Kingdom of Spain and Franz Josef Land and Novaya Zemlya of the Russian Federation. In the case of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Kazakhstan, the area of application includes all territory lying west of the Ural River and the Caspian Sea.".

6 In Article IV of the Treaty, in accordance with the map provided by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at signature of the Treaty:

– the second sentence of the second part of paragraph 1 shall be understood to read:

"such designated permanent storage sites may also be located in the Republic of Moldova, that part of Ukraine comprising the portion of the former Odessa Military District on its territory, and that part of the territory of the Russian Federation comprising the southern part of the Leningrad Military District."

– the first sentence of paragraph 2 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic

of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, that part of the Republic of Kazakhstan within the area of application, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, the Portuguese Republic including the islands of Azores and Madeira, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, the Moscow Military District and the portion of the Volga-Ural Military District on its territory west of the Ural Mountains, the Kingdom of Spain including the Canary Islands, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers do not exceed:"

– the first sentence of paragraph 3 shall be understood to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Belarus, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark including the Faroe Islands, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Hungary, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Republic of Poland, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the portion of the former Baltic Military District on its territory, that part of the territory of Ukraine comprising the former Carpathian and former Kiev Military Districts and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers of active units do not exceed":

– the first sentence in paragraph 3(*d*) shall be understood to read:
"in that part of Ukraine comprising the former Kiev military district, the aggregate numbers in active units and designated permanent storage sites together shall not exceed:".

7 The first sentence of paragraph 1(*a*) of Article V of the Treaty shall be understood, in accordance with the map provided by the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at signature of the Treaty, to read:

"within the area consisting of the entire land territory in Europe, which includes all the European island territories, of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Georgia, the Hellenic Republic, the Republic of Iceland, the Republic of Moldova, the Kingdom of Norway, Romania, that part of the Russian Federation comprising the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts, the part of the Republic of Turkey within the area of application and that part of Ukraine comprising the portion of the former Odessa Military District on its territory, each State Party shall limit and, as necessary, reduce its battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles and artillery so that, 40 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, for the group of States Parties to which it belongs the aggregate numbers in active units do not exceed the difference between the overall numerical limitations set forth in Article IV, paragraph 1, and those in Article IV, paragraph 2, that is:".

8 Paragraph 3 of Section I of the Protocol Governing the Categorisation of Combat Helicopters and the Recategorisation of Multi-Purpose Attack Helicopters shall be understood to read:

"Notwithstanding the provisions in paragraph 2 of this Section and as a unique exception to that paragraph, the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine may hold an aggregate total not to exceed 100 MI-24R and MI-24K helicopters equipped for reconnaissance, spotting, or chemical/biological/radiological sampling which shall not be subject to the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty. Such helicopters shall be subject to exchange of information in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange and to internal inspection in accordance with Section VI, paragraph 30 of the Protocol on Inspection. MI-24R and MI-24K helicopters in excess of this limit shall be categorised as specialised attack helicopters regardless of how they are equipped and shall count against the limitations on attack helicopters in Articles IV and VI of the Treaty.".

9 With reference to paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the proportion of the expenses of the Joint Consultative Group allocated to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall become the collective responsibility of the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Georgia, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Annex B

NOTIFICATIONS, CONFIRMATIONS AND COMMITMENTS

I: NOTIFICATIONS

1 The States Parties note that each State Party has provided to all other States Parties notifications of maximum levels for its holdings of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (Article VII, paragraph 2) in advance of the Extraordinary Conference.

2 Each State Party shall provide the following notifications and information, where applicable, to all other States Parties no later than July 1, 1992:

(a) in view of the inspection requirements in the Treaty, information on its objects of verification and declared sites effective as of November 19, 1990 (Protocol on Notification and Exchange of Information, Section V and Annex on the Format for the Exchange of Information, Section V);

(b) list of its points of entry/exit (Annex on Format for the Exchange of Information, Section V, paragraph 3);

(c) notification of changes to its points of entry/exit (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 11);

(d) lists of its proposed inspectors and transport crew members (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 3);

(e) notification of deletions from the lists of inspectors and transport crew members (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraphs 4 and 7);

(f) notification of its standing diplomatic clearance numbers for transportation means (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 9);

(g) notification of the official language or languages to be used by inspection teams (Protocol on Inspection, Section III, paragraph 12);

(h) notification of its active inspection quota for the baseline validation period (Protocol on Inspection, Section II, paragraph 24);

(i) notification of entry into service of new types, models or versions of conventional armaments and equipment subject to the Treaty (Protocol on Existing Types, Section IV, paragraph 3);

(j) notification in the event of destruction by accident, and documentary evidence supporting destruction by accident, of conventional armaments and equipment limited by the Treaty (Protocol on Reduction, Section IX, paragraphs 2 and 3).

II: CONFIRMATIONS

1 With regard to Article VIII, paragraph 7, of the Treaty, the States Parties confirm that, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty, their respective reduction liabilities in each category shall be no less than the difference between their respective holdings notified, in accordance with the Protocol on Information Exchange, as of the signature of the Treaty, and their respective maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII. In this regard, for those States Parties that have jointly confirmed the validity for them of holdings as of the signature of the Treaty, the sum of their reduction liabilities in each category shall, except as otherwise provided for in the Treaty, be no less than the difference between the jointly confirmed holdings and the sum of their maximum levels for holdings notified pursuant to Article VII.

2 The States Parties confirm their commitment, in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Personnel Strength of November 19, 1990, not to increase during the period of the negotiations referred to in Article XVIII of the Treaty the total peacetime authorised personnel strength of their conventional armed forces pursuant to the Mandate in the area of application.

3 The States Parties confirm their commitment to the Declaration of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe with Respect to Land-Based Naval Aircraft of November 19, 1990.

4 The States Parties confirm their adherence to the agreement set out in the Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Consultative Group on October 18, 1991.

III: COMMITMENTS

A: COSTS

1 In accordance with Article XVI, paragraph 2(*f*), of the Treaty, and with reference to paragraph 11 of the Protocol on the Joint Consultative Group, the Joint Consultative Group shall review its scale of distribution of expenses after entry into force of the treaty in the light of decisions taken on the scale of distribution of expenses of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

B: ARTICLE XII

1 In order to meet the security interests of all States Parties in light of new circumstances in Europe, the States Parties shall as a first priority seek to reach agreement, immediately after entry into force of the Treaty, on Article XII, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.

2 In this context, the States Parties will cooperate to respect the security objectives of Article XII within the area of application of the Treaty. In particular, no State Party will increase, within the area of application, its holdings of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions above that aggregate number held by such organizations at the time of signature of the Treaty, as notified pursuant to the information exchange effective as of November 19, 1990.

3 Notwithstanding the political commitment set forth in paragraph 2 above, any State Party that had an aggregate number of armoured infantry fighting vehicles held by organizations designed and structured to perform in peacetime internal security functions on its territory, as notified effective as of November 19, 1990, that was less than five percent of its maximum levels for holdings for armoured combat vehicles, as notified pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, or less than 100 such armoured infantry fighting vehicles, whichever is greater, will have the right to increase its holdings of such armoured infantry fighting vehicles to an aggregate number not to exceed five percent of its maximum levels for holdings for armoured combat vehicles, as notified pursuant to Article VII, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, or to an aggregate number not to exceed 100, whichever is greater.

Joint United States–Russian Statements*
Washington, 17 June 1992

Joint Understanding on the Elimination of MIRVed ICBMs and Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms

The President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation have agreed to substantial further reductions in strategic offensive arms. Specifically, the two sides have agreed upon and will promptly conclude a Treaty with the following provisions:

Within the seven-year period following entry into force of the START Treaty, they will reduce their strategic forces to no more than:

- an overall total number of warheads for each between 3800 and 4250 (as each nation shall determine) or such lower number as each nation shall decide.
- 1200 MIRVed ICBM warheads.
- 650 heavy ICBM warheads.
- 2160 SLBM warheads.

By the year 2003 (or by the end of the year 2000 if the United States can contribute to the financing of the destruction or elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia), they will:

- reduce the overall total to no more than a number of warheads for each between 3000 and 3500 (as each nation shall determine) or such lower number as each nation shall decide.
- eliminate all MIRVed ICBMs.
- reduce SLBM warheads to no more than 1750.

*Text obtained from the White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, DC.

For the purpose of calculating the overall totals described above:

The number of warheads counted for heavy bombers with nuclear roles will be the number of nuclear weapons they are actually equipped to carry.

Under agreed procedures, heavy bombers not to exceed 100 that were never equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and that are reoriented to conventional roles will not count against the overall total established by this agreement.

- Such heavy bombers will be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles.
- No nuclear weapons will be located at bases for heavy bombers with conventional roles.
- Such aircraft and crews will not train or exercise for nuclear missions.
- Current inspection procedures already agreed in the START Treaty will help affirm that these bombers have conventional roles. No new verification procedures are required.
- Except as otherwise agreed, these bombers will remain subject to the provisions of the START Treaty, including the inspection provisions.

The reductions required by this agreement will be carried out by eliminating missile launchers and heavy bombers using START procedures, and, in accordance with the plans of the two sides, by reducing the number of warheads on existing ballistic missiles other than the SS-18. Except as otherwise agreed, ballistic missile warheads will be calculated according to START counting rules.

The two Presidents directed that this agreement be promptly recorded in a brief Treaty document which they will sign and submit for ratification in their respective countries. Because this new agreement is separate from but builds upon the START Treaty, they continue to urge that the START Treaty be ratified and implemented as soon as possible.

For the United States of America:
George Bush

For the Russian Federation:
Boris Yeltsin

Joint Statement on a Global Protection System

The Presidents continued their discussion of the potential benefits of a Global Protection System (GPS) against ballistic missiles, agreeing that it is important to explore the role for defenses in protecting against limited ballistic missile attacks. The two Presidents agreed that their two nations should work together with allies and other interested states in developing a concept for such a system as part of an overall strategy regarding the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Such cooperation would be a tangible expression of the new relationship that exists between Russia and the United States and would involve them in an important undertaking with other nations of the world community.

The two Presidents agreed it is necessary to start work without delay to develop the concept of the GPS. For this purpose they agreed to establish a high-level group to explore on a priority basis the following practical steps:

- The potential for sharing of early warning information through the establishment of an early warning center.
- The potential for cooperation with participating states in developing ballistic missile defense capabilities and technologies.
- The development of a legal basis for cooperation, including new treaties and agreements and possible changes to existing treaties and agreements necessary to implement a Global Protection System.

For the United States of America:
George Bush

For the Russian Federation:
Boris Yeltsin

Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary Meeting*

Oslo, 29 June–2 July 1992

The Plenary Meeting in Oslo adopted the following press release on 2 July:

"A Plenary Meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was held in Oslo 29 June–2 July and chaired by Norway. Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Switzerland, the new members of the Regime, attended for the first time. This multilateral non-proliferation regime thus comprises the following 22 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.

Partners agreed that the MTCR Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-relevant Transfers of 16 April 1987 remain an essential mechanism for preventing proliferation of missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

In view of the Partners' concern about the use of missiles to deliver all kinds of weapons of mass destruction, the member countries agreed to amend the Guidelines to extend the scope of the Regime to missiles capable of delivering biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons.

The Partners took note with satisfaction of the decision of a growing number of countries to observe the MTCR Guidelines and issued a joint appeal to all states to do likewise. The text of the appeal is annexed.

The next Plenary will be held in Canberra 8–11 March 1993."

*Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Press Release 119/92.

Annex

Joint Appeal

Participating countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)—Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America—appeal to all states to adopt the Guidelines of Sensitive Missile-relevant Transfers. The Partners welcome that a growing number of countries have indicated to them or in national statements their commitment to observe the Guidelines. Observance by as many states as possible of export control measures in accordance with these Guidelines will contribute to limiting the risks of proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction and to fostering international security.

Oslo, 2 July 1992

Helsinki Document 1992 (excerpts)*

Helsinki, 9–10 July 1992

CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation

The participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

1 Reaffirming their commitments undertaken in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe and, in particular, their determination to establish new negotiations on disarmament and confidence- and security-building open to all participating States,

2 Encouraged by the opportunities for new co-operative approaches to strengthening security offered by the historic changes and by the process of consolidation of democracy in the CSCE community of States,

3 Welcoming the adoption of the Vienna Document 1992 on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, the conclusion of the Treaty on Open Skies and the adoption of the CSCE Declaration on the Treaty on Open Skies and the Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe as well as the imminent entry into force of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,

4 Determined to build upon those important achievements and to give a new impetus to arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, security co-operation and conflict prevention in order to better contribute to the strengthening of security and stability and the establishment of a just and lasting peace within the CSCE community of States,

5 Underlining the equality of rights and the equal respect for the security interests of all CSCE participating States,

6 Reaffirming their right to choose their own security arrangements,

7 Recognizing that security is indivisible and that the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all others,

8 Have decided

*A/47/361-S/24370, sect. V.

—to start a new negotiation on arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building,

—to enhance regular consultation and to intensify co-operation among them on matters related to security,and

—to further the process of reducing the risk of conflict.

9 To carry out these tasks the participating States have decided to establish a new CSCE Forum for Security Co-operation, with a strengthened Conflict Prevention Centre, as an integral part of the CSCE.

10 The participating States will ensure that their efforts in the Forum towards arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building, security co-operation and conflict prevention are coherent, interrelated and complementary.

OBJECTIVES

11 The participating States will strengthen security and stability through the negotiation of concrete measures aimed at keeping or achieving the levels of armed forces to a minimum commensurate with common or individual legitimate security needs within Europe and beyond. These new measures may entail reductions of and limitations on conventional armed forces and may, as appropriate, include measures of a regional character.

12 They will address the question of the harmonization of obligations agreed among participating States under the various existing instruments arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building.

13 They will develop the Vienna Document 1992 on the basis of a review of its implementation.

14 They will negotiate new stabilizing measures in respect of military forces and new confidence- and security-building measures designed to ensure greater transparency in the military field. Such measures may be of a regional character and/or may apply in relation to certain border areas.

* * *

15 The participating States will aim at establishing among themselves new security relations based upon co-operative and common approaches to security. To this end, they will develop consultation, goal-oriented continuing dialogue and co-operation in the field of security.

16 They will promote increased predictability about their military plans, programmes and capabilities, including the introduction of major new weapons systems.

17 They will support and enhance regimes on non-proliferation and arms transfers.

18 They will enhance contacts, liaison, exchanges and co-operation between their armed forces.

19 They will promote consultation and co-operation in respect of challenges to their security from outside their territories.

20 They will also consider other measures to foster security among the participating States in order to contribute to a just and lasting peace among them, including the possibility of further strengthening the norms of behaviour among them through the elaboration of additional security instruments.

* * *

21 They will make every effort to prevent conflict and give full effect to relevant provisions.

22 They will further enhance the capability of the CPC to reduce the risks of such conflicts through relevant conflict prevention techniques.

23 They will foster their co-operation in the field of the implementation and verification of existing and future arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building agreements.

* * *

24 The negotiations on new measures of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building will proceed in distinct phases, taking into account progress made in the implementation of existing arms control agreements. They will also take into consideration ongoing reduction, restructuring and redeployment processes regarding armed forces as well as further relevant political and military developments. Such new measures will build upon the achievements of existing agreements and will be effective, concrete and militarily significant.

25 All measures negotiated in the Forum will be developed in a way which precludes circumvention.

...

Annex

Programme for Immediate Action

(46) The participating States have decided to give early attention to the following:

A. ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING

Measures to be negotiated under paragraphs 1–3 will apply to the territory of the participating States in Europe or in Asia as defined below in relation to the area of application of each measure. Measures to be negotiated under paragraphs 4 and 5 will apply to the conventional armed forces and facilities of the participating States both on the territory of all the participating States and beyond. Measures to be negotiated under paragraph 6 will apply to the territory or part thereof of the participating States involved in the measures. Exceptions to these rules on the area of application may be agreed by consensus.

1 Harmonization of Obligations concerning Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence- and Security-building

An appropriate harmonization of the obligations of participating States under existing international instruments applicable to conventional armed forces in Europe, in particular of those concerning the exchange of information, verification and force levels. The harmonization of obligations concerning arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building will apply to the areas of application in respect of which the obligations have been undertaken.

2 Development of the Vienna Document 1992

Improvement and further development of confidence- and security-building measures contained in this document. The area of application will be as set out in the Vienna Document 1992.

3 The Further Enhancement of Stability and Confidence

The negotiation of new stabilizing measures and confidence-building measures related to conventional armed forces, including, with due regard to the specific characteristics of the armed forces of individual participating States, measures to address force generation capabilities of active and non-active forces. These measures may be of a constraining kind. They will apply within the area of

application set out in the Vienna Document 1992. This is without prejudice to the possibility that participating States may, if they so choose, decide to offer certain assurances in respect of their conventional armed forces in parts of their territory adjacent to this area of application if they consider such forces relevant to the security of other CSCE participating States.

4 Global Exchange of Military Information

The negotiation of further transparency by means of a global annual appropriately aggregated or disaggregated exchange of information encompassing armaments and equipment, including information on armaments and equipment categories limited by the CFE Treaty, and personnel in the conventional armed forces of the participating States. The regime will also include information on the production of military equipment. The regime will be separate from other information exchange regimes and, because of its special nature, will not involve limitations, constraints or verification.

5 Co-operation in respect of Non-Proliferation

Co-operation in respect of the strengthening of multilateral non-proliferation regimes, including the transfer of sensitive expertise, and the establishment of a responsible approach to international armaments transfers.

6 Regional Measures

The negotiation by the participating States of suitable measures, including, where appropriate, reductions or limitations in accordance with the objectives set out above, for example in relation to certain regions or border areas. The area of application will be the territory or part thereof of the participating States' territories involved in a regional measures.

B. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT AND CO-OPERATION

Proposals for and dialogue on measures and activities under paragraphs 7–12 will apply to all participating States, unless otherwise agreed or specified below.

7 Force Planning

The elaboration of provisions to provide transparency about each CSCE participating State's intentions in the medium to long term as regards the size, structure, training and equipment of its

armed forces, as well as defence policy, doctrines and budgets related thereto. Such a system should be based on each participating State's national practice, and should provide the background for a dialogue among the participating States.

8 Co-operation in Defence Conversion

The development of a programme of exchanges, co-operation and the sharing of expertise in the field of defence conversion throughout all the territory of the participating States.

9 Co-operation in respect of Non-Proliferation

Co-operation in respect of the strengthening of multilateral non-proliferation regimes, including the transfer of sensitive expertise, and the establishment of a responsible approach to international armaments transfers.

10 Development of Provisions on Military Co-Operation and Contacts

The development of a programme of military contacts, liaison arrangements, co-operation and exchanges, particularly in the fields of the training and organization of armed forces. Participation in this programme will be open to all CSCE participating States in respect of all their armed forces and territory.

11 Regional Security Issues

Discussion and clarification of regional security issues or specific security problems for example in relation to border areas.

12 Security Enhancement Consultations

Goal-oriented dialogue and consultations aimed at enhancing security co-operation, including through the further encouragement of responsible and co-operative norms of behaviour on politico-military aspects of security. The participating States will undertake consultations with a view to strengthening the role of the CSCE, by establishing a code of conduct governing their mutual relations in the field of security.

C. CONFLICT PREVENTION

Consistent with and further to the decisions taken in Paris, Prague and Helsinki about the tasks of the CPC, the following parts of this work programme will be undertaken in the CPC:

13 Relevant Techniques

Without prejudice to other tasks of the CPC or to the competence of the Committee of Senior Officials in the field of conflict prevention and crisis management, the Consultative Committee will, particularly in the light of experience gained in the execution of its own tasks, maintain under consideration the need for improvements in relevant techniques.

14 Co-operation in the Field of Verification

The encouragement of practical co-operation, through training, exchanges and participation in evaluation and inspection teams, in the implementation of the verification provisions of arms control, disarmament and confidence- and security-building agreements among CSCE participants who are parties to such agreements. The area of application will correspond to that of the relevant agreements.

Recent Books and Articles

Brandon, Henry, ed. *In Search of a New World Order: The Future of U.S.-European Relations.* Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1992. 177 p.

In this book, in addition to his own opening and concluding chapters, the editor collects eight essays from scholars and businessmen from five countries: the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and the United States. They attempt to assess the impact a new world order will have on the relationship between the United States and the new Europe, including its influence on world stability.

Brauch, Hans Günter, Henny J. Van Der Graaf, John Grin, and Wim A. Smit, eds. *Controlling the Development and Spread of Military Technology: Lessons from the Past and Challenges for the 1990s.* Amsterdam, VU University Press, 1992. 406 p.

This book contains contributions presented during the Seventh International AFES-PRESS Conference on "Controlling Military Research and Development and Exports of Dual-Use Technologies as a Problem of Disarmament and Arms Control Policy in the 1990s", held in October 1991 in Germany. More than thirty experts from different parts of the world contributed to this work. In their view, the proliferation of technology for building and delivering weapons of mass destruction is perhaps the greatest security challenge for the 1990s. In their articles, they review existing efforts to control potentially destabilizing research and development and explore future possibilities. In the final section of the book, in their policy-oriented report, the editors point out that, with the end of the cold war, there are two contradictory developments: considerable achievements in disarmament, on the one hand, and technological revolution leading to more accurate and lethal weapons, on the other. They therefore believe that in future disarmament efforts, high priority should be given to control of and constraints on continuous weapons development.

Bryans, Michael. *The CSCE and Future Security in Europe.* Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992. 96 p. (Working Paper 40)

The CSCE and Future Security in Europe contains the report of a conference co-hosted by the Canadian Institute for

International Peace and Security and the Institute of International Relations, Prague, held at Prague, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 4–5 December 1991. The Conference examined the security situation in Europe in the light of the upheaval in Eastern Europe and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and the Persian Gulf War. Five main topics were discussed: CSCE and other security institutions; security interests and priorities of the CSCE signatories; scenarios for meeting the security needs and concerns of signatories; dispute settlement and possibilities for the future development of the Conflict Prevention Centre; and opportunities for middle-Power leadership in European security questions. It was the opinion of a majority of participants that "the CSCE was an important part of the European institutional architecture but one that needed to change if it was going to be fully effective".

Folta, Paul Humes. *From Swords to Plowshares? Defense Industry Reform in the PRC.* Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 1992. 297 p.

This book examines the significance of the reform of defence industries in the People's Republic of China that occurred as part of its economic and military modernization programmes between 1978 and 1990. The study also provides background for understanding the evolution of China's defence industries within its reform programmes.

Hinde, Robert A., ed. *The Institution of War.* New York, St. Martin's Press. 1992. 253 p.

Based on material from a conference organized by the Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar, this volume consists of 14 essays contributed by scholars from diverse disciplines: anthropology, history, political science, theology, philosophy, international law, economics, psychiatry and biology.

In the introductory chapter, the editor provides some theoretical background for the view that in order to reduce the incidence of conflict, one must understand the diverse forces that maintain the institution of war. The chapters that follow are divided into two sections: the first part deals with the nature of war, and the second with the factors that maintain the institution of war.

Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security. *Pacific Rim Security Cooperation*, Seoul Computer Press, 1992. 232p.

This book grew out of an international conference on "Pacific Rim Security Cooperation", held in Seoul, Republic of

Korea, from 26 to 27 November 1991. The Conference, sponsored by the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, reviewed the security interests and roles of selected Pacific Rim countries and explored possible needs and ways in which they could cooperate in the post–cold-war era. These issues were examined in the papers and discussion sessions from the perspectives of Canada, Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the United States, and of the Oceania and ASEAN.

Jorgensen-Dahl, Arnfinn and Willy Ostreng, eds. *The Antarctic Treaty System in World Politics.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 475 p.

The book discusses a wide range of subjects affecting Antarctica and the Antarctic Treaty system both now and in the future. The material is divided into five sections: experiences from the Convention on Living Resources; the Minerals Convention as a management tool; resource management and the Antarctic Treaty system at large; the Antarctic Treaty system and the world community; and the Antarctic Treaty system model and the future. The book focuses on the management of natural resources and the environment in Antarctica and examines as well the criticism voiced at the United Nations concerning the position of Consultative Parties to the Treaty. Many of the papers contained in the volume were presented at an international conference of the same name hosted by the Fridtjof Nansen Institute in Oslo, 21–23 May 1990. A select bibliography is included.

Käkönen, Jyrki, ed. *Perspectives on Environmental Conflict and International Politics.* London, Pinter Publishers for the Tampere Peace Research Institute, 1992. 162 p.

The papers presented in this book are the result of a series of workshops on "European Futures: Bases and Choices" launched by the Tampere Peace Research Institute in Finland. The book focuses on environmental problems. In the introduction, the author states that such problems gained prominence in the late 1980s because, first, an environmental catastrophe could destroy human civilization, and secondly, environmental problems such as pollution could lead to social and political conflict.

Lall, Betty G. and John Tepper Marlin. *Building a Peace Economy: Opportunities and Problems of Post–Cold War Defense Cuts.* Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press in cooperation with the Council on Economic Priorities, 1992. 294 p.

This book is a product of a research programme on the peaceful use of military resources, a programme in which the Council on Economic Priorities has been engaged for many years. The authors point out that, with the end of the cold war, United States troops stationed in Europe can return home. The book examines how the United States can make the smoothest possible transition to civilian use of newly released military resources, especially the physical and human resources that have been devoted to defence production. Its aim is to provide information and guidelines to assist policy makers and planners, both in government and in the private sector, and others who are affected by this transition. The final chapter reviews the status of conversion in each state, providing information on the part defence plays in its economy and on the process of conversion in various communities.

Nation, Joseph E., ed. *The De-escalation of Nuclear Crises.* New York, St.Martin's Press, 1992. 249 p.

This volume contains research contributed by nine scholars. The first four chapters address issues of crisis de-escalation and confidence-building. The following two chapters focus on nuclear operations in crises and the assessment of potential de-escalation measures. The last three chapters examine the future rules of de-escalatory confidence-building measures in super-Power and in non-super-Power nuclear crises. In summarizing the research findings, the editor points out, *inter alia*, that confidence-building measures involving military forces are useful across a wide spectrum of situations, but that their contribution may be more significant in avoiding or ending wars than in fostering better relations in peacetime.

Reyes, Virgilio A., ed. *In the National Interest: The Philippines and the United Nations: Issues of Disarmament, Peace and Security, 1986–1991.* Manila, Philippines, Vera-Reyes Publishing, Inc., 1991. 331 p.

Virgilio A. Reyes, a career diplomat in the Philippine foreign service, chronicles his country's participation in disarmament efforts both inside and outside the United Nations. The volume includes official statements by high officials and spokesmen of the Philippine Government, including the author, during the period 1986-1991.

Ross, Andrew L., ed. *The Political Economy of Defense: Issues and Perspective.* Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press, 1991. 229 p.

The volume contains ten articles contributed by scientists and researchers who discuss the nature of political economy of defence, an area of inquiry beyond the traditional analysis of defence economics and defence politics, and attempt to broaden its scope beyond the economic consequences of military spending. The articles are intended to contribute to the development of a research agenda in this new area.

Stearns, Monteagle. *Entangled Allies. U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.* New York, Council on Foreign Relation, 1992. 185 p.

This study by a United States diplomat with long experience in the region expresses views about the management of the United States, Aegean and Cypriot policies. It first deals with various aspects of the United States policy in the region since the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine. It next discusses NATO policies, the relationship of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus with the Middle East, and the relationship of the three countries with each other.

The study then analyses Greek-Turkish-Cypriot differences and proposes steps towards a solution. The conclusion advances reasons for a new diplomatic initiative at this time and suggests a role for the United States. The author advocates that the United States initiate a new effort through NATO to resolve the problems between Greece and Turkey first, and then tackle the issue of Cyprus later.

Thakur, Ramesh, ed. *The South Pacific: Problems, Issues and Prospects.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1991. 232 p.

The publication comprises 14 articles from the proceedings of the Twenty-fifth Otago Foreign Policy School, New Zealand, 1990. In the introduction, the editor gives an overview of the South Pacific, including geographical location, Forum island country profiles, regional institutions and regional concerns, economic vulnerabilities and nuclear sensitivities. The three central themes of the 1990 School, as outlined in the concluding observations, were: the international political change and its impact on New Zealand; New Zealand's South Pacific interests; and the contribution that New Zealand is to make to the changing South Pacific.

Tower, John G., James Brown and William K. Cheek, eds. *Verification: The Key to Arms Control in the 1990s*. New Jersey, Brassey's (US), Inc., 1992. 243 p.

This volume comprises 14 essays based on papers presented at the conference on "Issues and Implications of Treaty Verification", held at Southern Methodist University, in Dallas, Texas, in April 1990. Part I of this collection discusses the politics of verification; part II examines multilateral perspectives of verification; part III considers issues of compliance; and part IV focuses on verification issues relating to chemical and biological weapons.

Treverton, Gregory F., ed. *The Shape of the New Europe*. New York, Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991. 232 p.

This book, which is a collection of papers presented by European and American scholars to a study group at the Council on Foreign Relations during 1989–1990, reviews the challenges facing the new Europe. The authors present their analyses from different perspectives, covering political, security and economic aspects.

UNESCO Studies on Peace and Conflict. *Peace and Conflict Issues after the Cold War*. Paris, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1992. 226 p.

This volume of the "Studies on Peace and Conflict" series prepared by UNESCO examines two themes: conflict issues after the cold war, and the concept of peace culture. The final part of the book presents UNESCO's work for peace and the reports it has received from various research institutions in the field of peace and conflict resolution.

Verification at Vienna: Monitoring Reductions of Conventional Armed Forces. Edited by Jürgen Altmann *and others*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Gordon and Breach Science Publishers in cooperation with the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), 1992. 396 p.

Verification at Vienna contains papers presented at the Second Workshop on Verification of Arms Reductions organized by the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and held in Vienna, Austria, 3–5 September 1990. The workshop, which met shortly before the signing of the CFE Treaty, brought together scientists, political analysts, diplomats and government officials from Europe and the United States to discuss the issue of conventional forces verification. The volume offers an overview of current and future issues and

examines the technical, organizational and scientific aspects of verification, with particular emphasis on the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. A review of existing and future United Nations activities in the area of verification, as well as a detailed examination of the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards system, are among the topics discussed in the volume.

Weber, Steve. *Cooperation and Discord in US-Soviet Arms Control*. Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1991. 331 p.

Cooperation and Discord in US-Soviet Arms Control, a study of the United States-Soviet efforts to cooperate in the limitation of strategic nuclear weapon systems, was written prior to the break-up of the Soviet Union and the demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The author attempts to explain why the United States and the Soviet Union achieved cooperative agreements with the goal of enhancing their mutual security in certain arms control issues and not in others by developing a theory of international cooperation that starts from, but goes beyond, a formal, game-theory approach. He cites three cases—attempts to limit antiballistic missile systems, multiple independently targetable vehicles (MIRVs) and anti-satellite weapons—to support his argument.

Further Publications

Disarmament is unable to publish summaries of all books and articles sent to the Editor. The following is a list of items received recently.

Arms Transfers, Export Control, and Dual-Use Technology in the Aftermath of the Kuwait War, from a AAAS Congressional Seminar. Washington, D.C., American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1991. 19 p.

Aspen Institute. *United States-Soviet Relations: Building a Congressional Cadre.* Queenstown, Maryland, 1992. 54 p. (contains proceedings of the conference, held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, 15–20 January 1992)

Bouchard, Joseph F. *Command in Crisis: Four Case Studies.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1991. 325 p.

Cheeseman, Graeme. *Australia's Force Structure Review: The 1987 Defence White Paper Revisited.* Canberra, Australia, The Australian National University, Peace Research Centre, October 1991. 17 p. (Working Paper No. 111)

Clark, Michael T., and Simon Serfaty, eds. *New Thinking and Old Realities: America, Europe, and Russia.* Seven Locks Press, Maryland, in association with the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1991. 232 p.

Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé. *L'Evolution de la Pensée Navale II.* Paris, France, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, 1992. (Dossier 46)

Daalder, Ivo H. *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces since 1967.* New York, Columbia University Press, 1991. 411 p.

de Pauw, John W., and George A. Luz, eds. *Winning the Peace: The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action.* New York, Praeger, 1992. 238 p.

Downs, George W., and David M. Rocke. *Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control.* Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan Press, 1990. 242 p.

Gasteyger, C., ed. *Candidates for Integration: The Neutral and Central European Countries Facing the European Community.* Geneva, Switzerland, Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1992. 106 p. (PSIS Occasional Papers Number 2)

Gizewski, Peter, ed. *Toward Minimum Deterrence: How Low Can We Go?* Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, December 1991. 74 p. (Aurora Papers 11)

Glynn, Patrick. *Closing Pandora's Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War.* New York, A New Republic Book, Basic Books, 1992. 445 p.

Goodwin, Craufurd D., ed. *Economics and National Security: A History of Their Interaction.* Durham, North Carolina, Duke University Press, 1991. 310 p. (Annual Supplement to Volume 23, *History of Political Economy)*

Higgs, Robert, ed. *Arms, Politics, and the Economy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives.* New York, Holmes and Meier for the Independent Institute, 1990. 295 p.

Implications of Proliferating Advanced Weaponry: Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, Missile, Conventional and Naval Forces. Washington, D.C., Program on Science and International Security, American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1991. 32 p. (contains proceedings of Annual Meeting Symposium, held in Washington, D.C., 19 February 1991)

International Commission on Security and Disarmament Measures for the Mediterranean. Prato, Italy, Italian Affiliate of IPPNW, October 1990.

Job, Brian L. *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States.* Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992. 257 p.

Koulik, Sergey, and Richard Kokoski. *Verification of the CFE Treaty: A SIPRI Research Report.* Stockholm, Sweden, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, October 1991. 129 p.

Krepon, Michael, and Dan Caldwell, eds. *The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification.* New York, St. Martin's Press in association with the Henry L. Stimson Center, 1991. 486 p.

Lacy, James L. *Within and Beyond Naval Confidence-building Measures: The Legacy and the Options.* Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, 1991. 100 p. (Note N-3122-USDP)

Langille, Howard Peter. *Changing the Guard: Canada's Defence in a World in Transition.* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1990. 267 p.

Lindsey, George. *Modernization of Weapons and the Qualitative Problems of Arms Control.* Ottawa, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, May 1992. 116 p. (Working Paper 42)

Menges, Constantine C. *The Future of Germany and the Atlantic Alliance.* Washington, D.C., The American Enterprise Institute Press, 1991. 284 p.

Miller, Steven E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen van Evera, eds. *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War.* Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1991. 301 p.

Neuwirth, Gerd. *Die Entwicklung der Vertrauens- und Sicherheitsbildenden Massnahmen: Vom Stockholmer zum Wiener Dokument (1986–1990): Analyse und Dokumente.* Mosbach, Federal Republic of Germany, Arbeitsgruppe Friedensforschung und Europäische Sicherheitspolitik, 1991. 205 p. (ARES-Press Report No. 12)

Ottosen, Rune. *The Gulf War with the Media as Hostage.* Oslo, International Peace Research Institute, October 1991. 72 p. (PRIO Report No. 4)

Popper, Steven W. *Conversion of Arms Industries in Central Europe.* Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, June 1991. 10 p. (Paper P-7729)

Prins, Gwyn, and Robbie Stamp. *Top Guns and Toxic Whales: The Environment and Global Security.* London, Earthscan Publications Limited, 1991. 165 p.

Reducing the Deficit: Spending and Revenue Options: A Report to the Senate and House Committees on the Budget. Washington, D.C., Congressional Budget Office, Congress of the United States, February 1992. 363 p.

Schmidt, Rachel. *Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960-1990.* Santa Monica, California, RAND Corporation, 1991. 100 p. (Note N-3248-USDP)

Shaw, Martin. *Post-Military Society.* Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 1991. 229 p.

Siverson, Randolph M., and Harvey Starr. *The Diffusion of War: A Study of Opportunity and Willingness.* Ann Arbor, Michigan, The University of Michigan Press, 1991. 141 p.

Stares, Paul B. *Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security.* Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1991. 240 p.

Stephan, Paul B., and Boris M. Klimenko, eds. *International Law and International Security: Military and Political Dimensions.* Armonk, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991. 362 p.

Wirls, Daniel. *Buildup: The Politics of Defense in the Reagan Era .* Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1992. 247 p.

Yearbook of Finnish Foreign Policy 1991. Helsinki, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 1990. 94 p.

Young, Christopher. *The Role of the Media in International Conflict: A Report on a Two-Day Seminar held in Ottawa, 12–13 September 1991.* Ottawa, Ontario, Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, December 1991. 78 p. (Working Paper 38).

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Number 9: *The Asia-Pacific Region: Non-Proliferation and Other Disarmament Issues*
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Number 11: *Disarmament and Security Issues in the Asia-Pacific Region*
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Research Reports

Disarmament and Limitation of Armaments: Unilateral Measures and Policies, Proceedings of the Paris Conference, 24 January 1992 (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.23)

Désarmement et limitation des armements: Mesures et attitudes unilatérales, Actes de la Conférence de Paris, 24 janvier 1992, by Serge Sur, ed., 1992, United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E./F.92.0.23)

Conference of Latin American and Caribbean Research Institutes, Proceedings of the São Paulo Conference, 2–3 December 1991/*Conférence des Instituts de recherche en Amérique latine et dans les Caraibes*, Actes de la Conférence de São Paolo, 2–3 de décembre 1991, by Péricles Gasparini Alves, ed., United Nations publication (forthcoming)

Conference of Research Institutes in Asia and the Pacific, Proceedings of the Beijing (China) Conference, 23–25 March 1992/*Conférence des Instituts de recherche en Asie et dans le Pacifique*, Actes de la Conférence de Beijing (China) 23–25 mars 1992, United Nations publication (Sales number GV.E.92.0.29)

Regional Approaches to Disarmament, Security and Stability, by Jayantha Dhanapala, ed., 1992, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot) (forthcoming)

Nonmilitary Aspects of Security: A System Approach, by Dietrich Fischer, 1992, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot) (forthcoming)

Towards 1995: The Prospects for Ending the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by David Fischer, 1992, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot) (forthcoming)

Security of Third World Countries, by Jasjit Singh, 1992, published for UNIDIR by Dartmouth (Aldershot) (forthcoming)

From Versailles to Baghdad: Post-War Armament control of Defeated States, by Fred Tanner, ed., 1992, United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.26)

Technical Problems in the Verification of a Ban on Space Weapons (A Soviet Perspective), by Stanislav Rodionov, 1992, United Nations publication (forthcoming)

Maritime Security: The Building of Confidence, by Jozef Goldbalt, ed., 1992 United Nations Publication (Sales Number GV.E.92.0.31)

Research Papers

No. 13—*The Non-Proliferation Treaty: How to Remove the Residual.Threats*, by Jozef Goldblat, 1992,
United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.25)

No. 14—Ukraine's Non-nuclear Option, by Victor Batiouk
United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.28)

No. 15—Access to Outer Space Technologies: Implications for International Security, by Péricles Gasparini Alves, 1992.
United Nations publication (Sales No. GV.E.92.0.30)

UNIDIR Newsletter

No. 19, September/septembre 1992, Economic Aspects of Disarmament/Aspects économiques du désarmement, 66 p.

No. 20, December/décenbre 1992, The Chemical Weapons Convention/La convention chimique, 80 p.

No. 21, March/mars 1993, the Middle East (Institutes, projects, publication)/Le Moyen Orient (Instituts, projets, publications), forthcoming.

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Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, Signed 20 January 1992

Declaration of the CSCE Council on Non-Proliferation and Arms Transfers
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Joint Statement of the President of the Argentine Republic and the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil upon the twenty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco
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Excerpts from the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on Cambodia
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CSCE Declaration on the Treaty on Open Skies
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Statement from the Nordic Foreign Ministers' Meeting: Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Helsinki, 4–5 May 1992

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Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Signed by North Korea
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Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Signed by Argentina and Brazil
Vienna, 13 December 1991

Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect to Nuclear Weapons in the Commonwealth of Independent States
Alma Ata, 21 December 1991

Developments in the El Salvador Peace Process

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New York Act II
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Excerpt from a Message from the President of the Russian Federation, B. N. Yeltsin, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
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Excerpt from the State of the Union Message of the President of the United States, George Bush
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Selected Security Council Resolutions on the Special Commission on Iraq

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